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Abstract
Analysing failures to improve the reliability of high performance computing
systems and data centres is important. The primary source of information for
diagnosing system failures is the system logs and it is widely known that finding the
cause of a system failure using only system logs is incomplete. Resource utilisation
data – recently made available – is another potential useful source of information
for failure analysis. However, large High-Performance Computing (HPC) systems
generate a lot of data. Processing the huge amount of data presents a significant
challenge for online failure diagnosis. Most of the work on failure diagnosis have
studied errors that lead to system failures only, but there is little work that study
errors which lead to a system failure or recovery on real data.
In this thesis, we design, implement and evaluate two failure diagnostics
frameworks. We name the frameworks CORRMEXT and EXERMEST. We im-
plement the Data Type Extraction, Feature Extraction, Correlation and Time-bin
Extraction modules. CORRMEXT integrates the Data Type Extraction, Correlation
and Time-bin Extraction modules. It identifies error cases that occur frequently and
reports the success and failure of error recovery protocols. EXERMEST integrates
the Feature Extraction and Correlation modules. It extracts significant errors and
resource use counters and identifies error cases that are rare. We apply the dia-
gnostics frameworks on the resource use data and system logs on three HPC systems
operated by the Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC). Our results show that:
(i) multiple correlation methods are required for identifying more dates of groups of
correlated resource use counters and groups of correlated errors, (ii) the earliest hour
of change in system behaviour can only be identified by using the correlated resource
use counters and correlated errors, (iii) multiple feature extraction methods are re-
quired for identifying the rare error cases, and (iv) time-bins of multiple granularities
are necessary for identifying the rare error cases. CORRMEXT and EXERMEST
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The supercomputing and dependable systems communities have shown increasing
interest in failure analysis for data centres and high-performance computing (HPC)
systems; demonstrated from publications that report large-scale analysis of hardware
failures in data centres [68] and long-term measurement and analysis of failures in
HPC systems [30]. There is a lot of research on detecting failure-inducing errors
and analysing and diagnosing system failures. A significant body of methods have
shown the value of system logs for detecting errors [50, 69], predicting failures
[14, 18, 22, 46, 52] and diagnosing failures [41, 51, 55]. However, the message
structure is known to vary widely. By vary widely, we mean that both the text and
alpha-numerical words in the message appear in no specific order. The system logs
are redundant and provide low coverage. By low coverage, we mean that the system
logs do not contain all the events needed to establish a complete causal trace path
to the failure. By redundant, we mean that only a small quantity of the system logs
is relevant to the diagnosis of a failure. Another significant body of methods have
shown the value of resource use data for detecting anomalies [28], tracking system
behaviour [61], characterising errors [5, 29], and predicting system failures [58] or
system recovery [31]. The methods show that using resource use data and system
logs separately can help system administrators manage the complexity of a HPC
system and data centre.
1.1 Motivation
Recent work that combine system logs and resource use data for detecting errors
[16, 33, 34] and diagnosing system failures [8, 72] have shown increased accuracy over
the use of system logs alone. The work by N. Gurumdimma et. al. [33, 34] show that
the time window for handling errors and the accuracy for detecting errors can be
increased by combining resource usage data and system logs. The work by Z. Zheng
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et. al. [71] combines RAS logs (Reliability, Serviceability and Availability) and Job
logs in a large scale cluster system for identifying interesting failure characteristics.
The ANCOR framework [8] combines resource usage data and system logs in a
two-phase approach for diagnosing system failures. The first phase identifies system
usage anomalies in the resource use data to provide a partial diagnosis of node failures.
Then in the second phase, system message log-analysis is provided to give a more
detailed diagnosis. The work by S. Di et. al. [16] identifies correlations across nodes
and time in a HPC system by combining RAS logs and Job logs for detecting errors
that lead to a system failure. The error detection and failure diagnostics frameworks
presented in references [8, 16, 33, 34, 72] have identified system errors that lead to a
system failure only. However, there is little work that study errors which lead to a
system failure or recovery. Knowing when an error leads to a success or failure of
an error recovery protocol can be useful to system designers and implementors; the
knowledge can be used to improve the effectiveness of error recovery protocols.
1.2 Background
In this section, we explain fault tolerance, give the basic definition of an error and a
failure, describe failure diagnosis and give an example of a diagnostics scenario.
1.2.1 Fault Tolerance
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Figure 1.1: A summary of fault tolerance techniques. The figure was modified using
Fig. 16 in the reference [3].
Fault tolerance is a property that enables a computer system to continue
operating properly in the event of a failure of some of its components. If the operating
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quality of the computer system decreases, the decrease is proportional to the severity
of the failure. A computer system that is designed to be fault tolerant can continue
its intended operation, possibly at a reduced level, rather than failing completely,
when some part of the system fails. Within the scope of a HPC system or data
centre, fault tolerance can be achieved by anticipating exceptional conditions and
building the system to cope with them.
1.2.2 Errors and Failures
An error is defined as the part of the total state of the system that may lead to its
subsequent failure [3]. An error is detected if its presence in indicated by an error
message or error signal. An error can also be present but not detected; these are
called latent errors. A failure is defined as an event that occurs when the state of the
system deviates from the expected one. Some errors do not lead to a system failure
but some errors do reach the external state of the system and cause a failure. A
system failure occurs when an error propagates from one component to another until
it has reached the system boundary. Errors can propagate to the system boundary
if error recovery mechanisms fail or there is a lack of recovery mechanisms.
1.2.3 Failure Diagnosis
Failure diagnosis is a process of tracing a fault, i.e., the cause of a failure by means
of its symptoms, applying knowledge and analysing test results [25]. Error detection
assumes prior knowledge about the fault model. Differently to error detection,
failure diagnosis assumes no prior knowledge about fault models. Accurate diagnosis
of failures in HPC systems and data centres requires: (i) collecting information
from sensors, (ii) processing the information using advanced data preprocessing
techniques, and (iii) extracting the required features for efficient identification of
faults. When the cause of a failure is identified, remedial actions can be taken to
increase productivity and reduce maintenance in the HPC system and data centre.
Machine learning methods (e.g., feature extraction) and statistical techniques can be
used for developing tools which can aid the system administrators in their day-to-day
task of managing a complex HPC system or data centre.
Error detection: Error detection is the detection of errors caused by noise or other
impairments introduced into data while it is transmitted from source to destination.
When an error message or error signal is indicated, the error is detected. When an
error is present but not detected, the error is called a latent error. Error recovery is
the ability to resume operation after encountering the error. The ability to detect
an error and reconstruct the original error-free state is called error correction. This
thesis focuses on HPC systems diagnosis.
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1.2.4 A Diagnosis Scenario
A diagnosis scenario between an application and a remote file-system is illustrated
in Figure 1.2.
File−system Network Application
Make request for dataReceives request
Forwards requestReceives request
! Error reading dir
Sends error message Receives error message
! Error occurred while
communicating with fs
Receives error messageForwards error message
Figure 1.2: An illustration of errors propagating between the application, network
and file-system.
When an application sends a request for data that is stored on a networked
filesystem, the filesystem will respond to the client. In most cases, the filesystem
will retrieve the data and send the data to the client. However, in some cases the
filesystem may encounter a directory read error. It is unable to access the directory
to read the data. The filesystem will generate an error message and send it to the
client. Then, the client will send another request to the filesystem. There are many
reasons for read errors to occur on a filesystem. Possible causes for filesystem read
errors include bad blocks on the harddisk or another client has obtained a lock on
the directory that holds the data. Some filesystem read errors are recoverable. If the
read error is caused by an application holding a lock on a directory, when the lock is
released, the filesystem is able to access the directory, read the data and send it to
the client. If the read error is caused by bad blocks on the harddisk, then the data
stored on the disk is lost.
1.3 The Problem
Modern day data centres and HPC systems suffer from occurrence of errors and
failures. The data centres and HPC systems are comprised of different combinations
of processors, networks, operating system processes, memory and storage systems.
When new technologies and software deploying in HPC systems and data centres
grow, the nature of computing systems can change rapidly. The computing systems
are capable of generating a lot of data and different types of data. However, the
data are not necessarily structured. Therefore, it is a challenging task to find the
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right types of data and analyse the data to quickly diagnose system problems. For
the system administrators, managing these complex computing systems is a labour
intensive day-to-day task. Therefore, it is important to address the challenge by
providing tools that can help the system administrators identify where, when and
why the error recovery protocol failed or succeeded. In this thesis, we are interested
in capturing the frequent error cases and the rare error cases.
1.4 The Approach
In this thesis, we design, implement and evaluate two system diagnostics workflows











































































Variance Extractor Variance Extractor
(CORRMEXT) (EXERMEST)
Figure 1.3: The workflows of the diagnostics approach. The workflow for the
CORRMEXT framework is shown on the left. The workflow for the EXERMEST
framework is shown on the right. Each module produces a report which can be used
for diagnosis.
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The first diagnostics framework – we called CORRMEXT (CORrelating
Resource use data and Message logs and EXtracting Times) – integrates data type
extraction, correlation and time-bin extraction methods. It identifies frequently
occurring error cases. CORRMEXT uses both TACC Stats [17] resource usage data
and system logs in its analyses. The second diagnostics framework – we called
EXERMEST (EXtracting FEatures and CoRrelating Resource Use Counters and
MESsage Types) – integrates feature extraction and correlation methods. Differently
to CORRMEXT, EXERMEST identifies rare error cases. CORRMEXT can be used
to identify error cases that occur frequently. EXERMEST can be used to identify
error cases that are rare.
1.5 Contributions of this Thesis
The techniques for achieving fault tolerant HPC systems and data centres are
presented in Figure 1.1. Failure diagnosis – a fault removal technique – is one way to
achieve a fault tolerant HPC system. There are many frameworks that identify errors
that lead to a system failure, but there is little work that study errors which lead to a
system failure or recovery on real data. Existing failure diagnosis techniques correlate
a given error event (for example, a file-access error) to a system failure and return
the most likely cause of the failure. While information like these can provide some
details on the likely cause of the failure, capturing the propagation paths of errors
and recovery attempts provide more details. A diagnosis such as “A DNS lookup
failure was caused by a DNS software configuration error. The configuration error
actually resulted in the DNS lookup failure which led to the FTP software failure”
provides more details than “A DNS lookup failure caused the FTP software failure”.
In the former, the diagnosis tells the system administrator that the fault lies in the
DNS software configuration. Therefore, they can fix the problem by configuring the
DNS software correctly. In this thesis, we design, implement and evaluate two new
workflows for system diagnosis. We obtain the resource use data and system logs
on three different HPC systems and conducted extensive experiments to validate
the workflows. Our results show that: (i) we require multiple correlation methods
to identify more dates of groups of correlated resource use counters and groups
of correlated errors, (ii) we require both the correlated resource use counters and
correlated errors to identify the earliest hour of change in system behaviour, (iii) we
require multiple feature extraction methods to identify the rare error cases, and (iv)
we require multiple granularities of time-bins to identify the rare error cases.
• We design, implement and evaluate a new failure diagnostics framework –
called CORRMEXT – that combines analyses of resource use data and system
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logs for detailed dependability-oriented system failure diagnosis. CORRMEXT
evaluates multiple correlation algorithms. We show that: (i) multiple correlation
algorithms are required to identify more dates of groups of correlated resource
use counters and correlated errors, (ii) both the correlated resource use counters
and correlated errors are required for identifying the earliest hour of change in
system behaviour. We study different error cases on the Ranger HPC system.
We report this contribution in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
• We show that the CORRMEXT framework generalises to multiple HPC systems.
We: (i) confirm that more dates of groups of correlated resource use counters
and groups of correlated errors can only be identified by applying multiple
correlation algorithms, and (ii) confirm that the earliest times of change in
system behaviour can only be identified by analysing both the correlated
resource use counters and correlated errors. We study different error cases on
Lonestar4 and Stampede-1. We report this contribution in Chapter 5 of this
thesis.
• We develop a new workflow for identifying rare error cases on multiple HPC
systems. The workflow is implemented in a framework called EXERMEST.
The EXERMEST framework evaluates three feature extraction algorithms and
shows that we require multiple feature extractors to identify the significant
resource use counters and errors associated with the rare error cases. By
significant, we mean the highest scores that the feature extractors assign to
the resource use counters and errors. We study different error cases on Ranger
and Lonestar4. We report this contribution in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
1.6 Outline of this Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 presents a detailed survey of system log-file processing tools. It describes
the main techniques developed by the tools. The techniques are: (i) regular expres-
sions, (ii) clustering, (iii) feature selection, (iv) anomaly detection, and (v) hybrid
method. A hybrid method uses two or more techniques. The chapter highlights the
similarities and differences between the system log-file processing tools.
Chapter 3 presents the problems that we solve in this thesis. It introduces the
system model, fault model and system issues. It describes: (i) Ranger, Lonestar4
and Stampede-1 HPC systems operated by the Texas Advanced Computing Center
at The University of Texas at Austin, (ii) cluster log-data generated on these HPC
systems, and (iii) implementation details for the data preprocessing modules. Parts
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of the chapter use material in the conference paper [10] and journal paper [11].
Specifically, it uses:
• the system model reported in [8], the fault model and data preprocessing
modules reported in [10].
• the system issue reported in [10, 11].
Chapter 4 presents CORRMEXT to identify frequently occurring error cases and
report the rates of success and failure of error recovery protocols. It describes the
data type extraction, correlation and time-bin extraction modules and presents five
different error cases identified on the Ranger HPC system. Parts of the chapter use
material in the conference paper [10] and journal paper [11]. Specifically, it uses
the problem specification, data type extraction, correlation and time-bin extraction
modules, and five error cases identified on the Ranger HPC system.
Chapter 5 shows that CORRMEXT generalises to multiple HPC systems. It
presents several new findings and failure patterns, gives the details of two different
error cases on Lonestar4 and one error case on Stampede-1, and describe the benefit
of combining analysis of resource use data and system logs for HPC systems diagnosis.
Parts of the chapter use material in the journal paper [11]. Specifically, it uses the
two error cases reported in [11].
Chapter 6 presents a features correlation-based workflow called EXERMEST. It
describes the feature extraction and correlation modules in the framework and
presents three rare error cases identified on Ranger and one rare error case on
Lonestar4. Parts of the chapter use material in the conference paper [12]. Specifically,
it uses the problem specification, feature extraction and correlation modules, and
three error cases reported in [12].
Chapter 7 presents a comparative analysis of CORRMEXT and EXERMEST.
It discusses the functions and types of errors diagnosed by CORRMEXT and
EXERMEST. We refer the reader to this chapter for comparing the diagnostics
capabilities of CORRMEXT and EXERMEST.





When a system failure occurs, the first place that the system administrator goes
to to identify the cause of a failure are the system logs. The system logs contain
streams of system events generated by the operating system, filesystem and system
software. The system events are interleaved in time and only a small fraction of the
events are relevant to the diagnosis of a given failure. In this chapter, we present a
detailed survey of system log-file processing tools.
We structure this chapter according to the main techniques developed by the
tool. The techniques are: (i) regular expressions (Section 2.1), (ii) clustering (Section
2.2), (iii) feature selection (Section 2.3), (iv) anomaly detection (Section 2.4), and
(v) hybrid method (Section 2.5). In Section 2.6, we highlight the similarities and
differences between the system log-file processing tools and conclude with a summary
in Section 2.7.
2.1 Regular Expressions
In this section, we present the tools that develop regular expressions as the main
technique for processing textual system event logs. The tools are LoGs [54], Simple
Event Correlator [56, 65], SWATCH [37] and LogSurfer [53].
2.1.1 LoGS
LoGS [54] is a log-analysis tool that is implemented to make the administration
of large clusters more bearable. It has a log-analysis engine which consists of five
different components. The components of the log-analysis engine are: messages, rules,
rulesets, actions and contexts. Messages can be a single line from a syslog file. Rules
match messages and trigger actions based upon those matches. A rule consist of
seven optional components: match function, no-match function, delete-rule function,
9
no-delete-rule function, absolute timeout, continue value and a list of actions. A
ruleset shares many properties of rules and a ruleset can match messages. When a
ruleset matches a message, the rules inside a ruleset are checked against the message.
This functionality allows a ruleset to be organised in a tree and it reduces the number
of comparisons that must be made to determine if a message is interesting. An action
define what is to be done with a message or context of messages. An action can be
triggered when a rule matches a message, a ruleset matches a message or a context
exceeding its limits. Actions are Common Lisp functions. Contextual information
are used by LoGS to gather and store related messages for potential use. Related
messages may be analysed as a group.
2.1.2 SEC
The Simple Event Correlator (SEC) [56, 65] is a real-time log-file analysis tool
that is developed to provide support for recognising the temporal component of log
analysis. SEC receives input events from a file-stream and produces output events
by executing user-specified shell commands. The input events include regular files,
named pipes and standard input. The input events are handled as regular expressions
and configuration files that contain rules can be created and stored.
The rule types that are supported include Single, SingleWithScript, SingleWith-
Suppress, Pair, PairWithWindow, SingleWithThreshold, SingleWith2Threshold, Sup-
press and Calendar. The Single rule type matches an input event and executes a
list of actions. The SingleWithScript rule type matches an input event and executes
a list of actions if an external script or program returns certain exit values. The
SingleWithSuppress matches an input event and executes a list of actions but it will
ignore the matching events which follow for a specified number of seconds. The rule
Pair matches an input event and executes a list of actions, ignore the matching
events which follow for a specified number of seconds and then match a second event
and execute another list of actions. The rule PairWithWindow executes the rule
type Pair within a given time-window. The rule type SingleWithThreshold counts
matching input events within a given time-window and executes a list of actions if a
given threshold has exceeded. The rule type SingleWith2Thresholds executes the rule
type SingleWithThreshold two times within two time-windows and two threshold
values. The rule type Suppress suppresses a matching input event and the rule type
Calendar executes a list of actions at specified times.
SEC supports a comprehensive list of actions and the list of actions include
log a message, write a line to a file, execute an external shell script or program, and
generate a new input event that can be matched by other rules.
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2.1.3 SWATCH
SWATCH [37] is a configurable log file filter and monitor that monitors log files,
filters out unwanted data and takes user-specified actions based upon the patterns
in the log. SWATCH can be used in three different ways. The first way is to make a
single pass through a file. The second way is to look at messages that are appended
to a file as the file is being updated. The third way is to examine the standard
output of a program. It has three basic parts. The first part is a configuration file.
The second part is a library of actions and the third part is a controlling program.
A non-comment line in a configuration file is made up of a pattern expression, a list
of actions to be performed if the expression is matched, an optional time interval
and the location of a timestamp.
The list of actions SWATCH understands include echo, bell, ignore, write and
mail, and pipe and exec. The action echo echos the line to SWATCH’s controlling
terminal. The action bell sends a bell signal to the controlling terminal. The action
ignore ignores the current line of input and proceeds to the next line. The actions
write and mail sends a copy of the line to the user via the write and mail commands.
The action pipe matches lines as input to a particular command on the system. The
action exec runs a command on the system with the option of using selected fields
from the matched lines as arguments to the command.
2.1.4 Logsurfer
Logsurfer [53] is a log-file analysis tool that examines messages in a log file in terms of
how they relate to other messages. There are four different components in Logsurfer.
The components are messages, rules, actions, and contexts. Messages are pieces of
incoming data from a single data source. Rules match messages and trigger actions
based on those matches. Actions are triggered when a rule matches a message or
when a context is closed. Actions can also create new rules, create new contexts
and delete unneeded contexts. Contexts gather and store messages in memory. A
logsurfer rule specification is made up of seven fields. The first field specifies a
regular expression that indicates which messages the rule is matched. The second
field specifies a regular expression that indicates exceptions to the first field. The
third field specifies a regular expression that indicates when a rule is to be deleted.
The fourth field specifies a regular expression that indicate exceptions to the third
field. The fifth field specifies the amount of time in seconds a rule can be active.
The sixth field can be used to indicate when a rule matches a message, subsequent
rules should also try to match the message. The seventh field specifies an action to
be taken when a rule matches a message.
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Seven action types are supported by Logsurfer. The action ignore disregards
a message and it is often used to filter out messages that need not be acted upon.
The action exec executes an external program. The action pipe executes an external
program with the current message or context as its standard input. The action open
opens a new context. The action delete deletes a context. The action rule creates a
new rule.
A single message is often not enough to tell whether there is a problem.
Logsurfer employs contexts that collect and store messages in memory and it uses a
pair of regular expressions to determine which messages are added to a context. The
first regular expression in the pair specifies the messages to add to the context, and
the second regular expression specifies exceptions to the first regular expression.
2.2 Clustering
In this section, we present the tools that develop clustering as the main technique
for processing the textual system event logs. The tools are SLCT [66], IPLoM [48],
HELO [23], Baler [49], Decentralized Online Clustering [52] and Handling redundancy
[32].
2.2.1 SLCT and LogHound
SLCT (Simple Log Clustering Tool) [66] is a data clustering algorithm that is
developed for analysing textual event logs. Each log line in the event log is viewed
as a data point with categorical (non-numeric) attributes. SLCT groups data points
into clusters such that the data points in a cluster are similar to each other, and
data points that do not fit in any cluster are categorised as outliers. SLCT uses a
density-based algorithm that identifies dense regions in the data space and forms
clusters from them. The author also discussed about the traditional distance-based
clustering approach. SLCT does not use the distance-based clustering approach
because defining a distance function for categorical data is not trivial and the notion
of distance becomes meaningless in a high-dimensional data space. LogHound uses a
frequent itemset mining algorithm to discover frequent patterns in event logs.
2.2.2 IPLoM
The reference in [48] presents a novel algorithm called IPLoM (Iterative Partitioning
Log Mining) for mining clusters in event logs. IPLoM finds frequent event type
patterns and works through a 3-step hierarchical clustering process. The hierarchical
clustering process partitions the event logs by token count, token position and
search for bijection. A token is a sequence of characters with no space. Step 1 of
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the algorithm creates partitions of log messages where each partition contains log
messages that have the same token length. Step 2 of the algorithm finds the position
of a token which has the least unique values in a partition and uses the token position
to split the partition. Step 3 of the algorithm finds 1-to-1 relationships between
tokens in a partition and splits the log messages that contain these tokens into a
separate partition. The final step in the algorithm discovers cluster descriptions in
each partition. If a partition contains one unique token, the token name is used to
describe the cluster. On the other hand, if a partition contains two or more unique
tokens, a wildcard is used to describe the cluster. The authors compared IPLoM
with SLCT, LogHound and Teiresias. IPLoM achieved an average F-measure of 78%
when the closest other algorithm achieved an F-measure of 10%.
2.2.3 Helo
HELO [23] is a novel unsupervised clustering engine that accurately mines event type
patterns from log-files generated by large supercomputers. It has two different parts:
Offline classification and online classification. The first part, offline classification,
finds events in log-files and uses the events to create the first template set. The
algorithm uses a 2-step hierarchical process to group events according to their message
description. In the first step of the process, the best split column for each cluster is
searched. In the second step of the process, the clusters are divided. A split column
represents a word position in the message description and the word position in the
message is used to divide the cluster into different groups.
The second part, online classification, groups messages as they are being
generated by the system. The input to the online classification part is given by the
groups obtained from the offline process on the initial dataset. On receiving a new
message, the online component checks the description of the message and finds the
most appropriate group templates. A new message is added to a group if it fits the
exact description of a group. A new message that does not have an exact match
with any of the groups is added to a group if the message does not decrease the
cluster goodness under a threshold. If the cluster goodness of all groups decrease, a
new group is formed and the message is added to the group. The authors compared
HELO with five tools. The tools are IPLoM, StrApp, LogHound, SLCT and MTE.
HELO was shown to outperform the tools on precision, recall and F-measure.
2.2.4 Baler
Baler [49] is a deterministic, lossless log message clustering tool that is developed
to handle large datasets, the quality of result patterns and explore the results. The
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Baler log-clustering engine has two processing phases: An initial processing phase
and a clustering phase. It tokenises the data and performs clustering based on the
token attributes. The methodology processes the input data using only a single
pass and processes new log-files incrementally. In the initial processing phase, the
input message is parsed using a grammar that comprises of five non-terminals. The
non-terminals are alpha-numeric, white space, colon, bracket and other symbol. Each
of the non-terminals is described using regular expressions. The input message is
then tokenised into a sequence of symbol tokens, with each token having a token-id.
The token attributes are token ID, token type, string value and integer value. When
a token is parsed, its string value is checked against a mapping for an existing token.
If the token exists, its ID is pushed into a sequence of integers that represent the
message. If the token does not exist, a new token is created and a new ID and token
attributes are assigned. The new token ID is inserted into the sequence of integers.
Nine token types are defined. The token types are ENGLISH, NUMBER, ALPHA-
NUMERIC, SPACE, COLON, BRACKET, OTHER, SEQ and KLEEN STAR. The
token type SEQ is a sequence of tokens. The token type KLEEN STAR is a container
of tokens. The token type OTHER is other symbol.
The log-clustering engine uses English terms to determine message patterns.
It uses a heuristic to extract patterns from a parsed log message. A pattern is
inserted into the pattern hash, where the pattern key is a sequence of ids of the
pattern tokens. In the clustering phase, the similarity between pairs of 1-patterns is
evaluated. Levinstein distance measure is used to infer the similarity between pattern
tokens. Two criteria that assess the similarity are defined. In the first criteria, two
1-patterns are considered to be similar when the number of changes is less than
a given threshold. In the second criteria, the ratio of the changes count and the
minimal length of the 1-patterns is used to determine the similarity.
The authors compared Baler with Teiresias, SLCT, Loghound and IPLoM
on three conditions of interest that occurred in a cluster system at Sandia National
Laboratories. The conditions of interests are CPU stuck, oom-killer and EDAC
memory error. Baler identified more patterns for the conditions of interests than
Teiresias, SLCT, Loghound and IPLoM.
2.2.5 Decentralized Online Clustering (DOC)
A. Pelaez et. al. [52] present a solution for predicting compute node soft lockups via
online anomaly detection using a decentralised online clustering algorithm. Resource
anomalies in resource usage logs have been found in faulty nodes and reported in
the reference [8]; this means that detecting anomalies in node resource usage at
runtime can be used for predicting compute node soft lockups. The Decentralized
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Online Clustering algorithm has been developed for distributed system monitoring.
The rationalized message logs collected on the Ranger supercomputer at the Texas
Advanced Computing Center is used for evaluating the effectiveness of the solution.
The solution has three main components. The first component, called DOC,
is responsible for distributing points to the nodes and implements the clustering
algorithm. The points are the resource usage features. The second component
extracts anomalies from the clusters generated by DOC. It also keeps track of the
logs and extracts the relevant features from the logs for invoking DOC with the correct
data. The third component makes predictions based on the anomalies identified in
the second component. It also uses multiple time bins and multiple clustering for
improving the accuracy of the predictions.
DOC is designed to run in a distributed setting on data that is also distributed.
The data is usually generated on the nodes and then the data is input into DOC.
DOC applies a density-based clustering approach. Clusters are detected by evaluating
the relative density of points within the information space. The information space
is subdivided dynamically into regions and each region is assigned to a particular
processing node using a content-based Distributed Hash Table that uses a Peano-
Hilbert space-filling curve. The Peano-Hilbert space-filling curve gives a mapping
between 1-Dimensional and 2-Dimensional space that preserves locality and is used
to assign processing nodes to regions. The Distributed Hash Table is used to get
resource usage features to the processing nodes within each region in a scalable way.
DOC is designed to be flexible to changes in topology. Because the topology of
cluster systems is stable, distributing the resource usage features and performing
cluster data aggregation is sped up by adding a caching layer to DOC. The range
of addresses that a node is responsible for is returned when a lookup operation
for a resource usage feature in the distributed hash table is resolved. The address
range and the node identifier are saved in the local cache. When another point that
belongs to the same address range is to be inserted, no lookup will be performed; the
insertion request is sent directly to the node found in the cache which reduces the
communication overhead required during each lookup. The resource usage feature is
inserted only if it belongs to the node’s information space region; this guarantees the
coherence of the cache. Two complementary strategies are developed for improving
the precision of the approach. In the first strategy, multiple time bins - a time bin
is an interval of time where resource usage data is collected - were experimented.
From the experiments, it was observed that pairs of five and ten minute time bins
increased the precision of the approach. In the second strategy, multiple clustering
was performed on different subsets of features including the original feature set. It
was observed that outliers present in multiple clustering runs are more correlated to
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soft lockups.
The authors used two dimensions for testing the usefulness of the approach.
The two dimensions are accuracy of the prediction and scalability and performance.
In the first dimension, the rationalized message logs for the first week of March 2012
was collected and the solution is evaluated against PCA and DBSCAN using the
collected logs. The results show that the approach outperformed PCA and DBSCAN
in terms of job precision by 0.2 and node precision by 0.47. In the second dimension,
the Stampede supercomputer was used to perform all the runs of the solution and
the time measurements were split into two parts. The first part measured the time
DOC took to redistribute all the resource usage features to the processing nodes.
The second part measured the time DOC took to find all the outliers and report
the results back to the processing node. The results show that the clustering time
accounted for only 9.5% of the total time. For 5k nodes, the total time that the
solution took is just slightly more than three minutes.
2.2.6 Handling redundancy
N. Gurumdimma et. al. [32] develop a novel generic log compression technique for
addressing the problem of redundant messages in cluster system logs. The technique
uses iterative clustering. It computes the Leveinstein distance metric to measure
the difference between two strings. The technique has two steps: Tokenisation and
parsing, and filtering. In the first step, the logs are parsed to obtain the event types
and event attributes. Tokens containing alpha-numeric words and English-only words
are kept while tokens containing only numbers are removed. In the second step, the
distance between tokens is measured using the Leveinstein distance metric. The
reason for measuring the distance between tokens instead of measuring the distance
of characters between event types is it reduces the computational overhead that is
normally required. The approach is compared with the normal filtering technique on
three different log-files collected on two different cluster systems. The results show
that the iterative clustering technique achieved higher precision rates and recall rates
over the normal filtering technique.
2.3 Feature Selection
In this section, we present the tools that implemented feature selection techniques to
process the textual system event logs. Feature selection involves choosing a subset
of features to reduce the dimensionality of the data [63]. There are four key steps in
feature selection [38]. The steps are: (i) subset generation, (ii) subset evaluation,
(iii) stopping criterion and (iv) results validation. Here, the tools we survey are: (i)
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BlueGene/L failure analysis and prediction models [45], (ii) Structure-of-Influence
(SIG) graphs [51], (iii) rank correlation for processor failure prediction [58], (iv)
LogMaster [21], (v) PREdictor [20] and (vi) 3D root-cause analysis [72].
2.3.1 BlueGene/L failure analysis and prediction models
The work reported in reference [45] study RAS (Reliability, Serviceability and Avail-
ability) event logs from an IBM BlueGene/L cluster system. The study investigates
the characteristics of fatal failure events and the correlation between fatal events and
non-fatal events in the event logs. Each record in the BlueGene/L event logs has eight
attributes. The attributes are RECID, EVENT TYPE, FACILITY, SEVERITY,
EVENT TIME, JOB ID, LOCATION and ENTRY DATA. The attribute FACILITY
denotes the component (e.g., HARDWARE, KERNEL, APP) where the event is
flagged. The attribute SEVERITY denotes the level of severity of the event. The
levels of severity include INFO, WARNING, SEVERE, ERROR, FATAL or FAIL-
URE. The attributes RECID denotes the record ID, EVENT TYPE denotes the
mechanism through which the event is logged, EVENT TIME contains the timestamp
of the event, JOB ID denotes the job that detected the event, LOCATION denotes
where an error took place, and ENTRY DATA contains a description of the event.
The event logs contain a lot of records and many of the records are repeated
and redundant. To isolate the unique failures, the authors developed a filtering tool
that has three steps. In the first step, records that contain the severity levels FATAL
or FAILURE are extracted. Using information from the ENTRY DATA attribute,
the failures are classified into five types. The types are memory failures, network
failures, application I/O failures, midplane switch failures, and node card failures.
In the second step, failures that occur within the same sub-system and reported
at the same location and by the same job are grouped together in a cluster if the
time-window between the failure events is within five minutes; this step is called
temporal compression at a single location. In the third step, failures that occur
below a time-window of five minutes and reported by the same job but at multiple
different locations are removed; this step is called spatial compression across multiple
locations.
The authors developed three prediction algorithms. The first prediction
algorithm is based on the time-between-failures. The second prediction algorithm is
based on spatial skewness. The third prediction algorithm is based on the occurrence
of non-fatal events. The results show that the prediction algorithms predicted around
80% of network and memory failures, and 47% of the application I/O failures.
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2.3.2 Structure-of-influence graphs
A. Oliner et. al. [51] propose a method for identifying the sources of problems in
complex production systems. The method infers the influences among components
in a system by looking for pairs of components with time-correlated anomalous
behaviour. The influences are summarised in a structure called Structure-of-Influence
Graphs or SIGs. A pair of components in a system is defined as two components
share an influence when their anomaly signals are correlated. The correlation arises
from interactions between the components and the interactions may include direct
communication or resource contention between the component s. However, not all the
interactions are instantaneous. Hence, effect delays are used to establish the direction
of influence. An effect delay is defined as how long an anomaly in one component
takes to manifest itself in another component. A SIG encodes the influence as an
edge between components and uses the effect delay as a direction of influence.
A Structure-of-Influence graph is constructed using a process that has four
steps. In the first step, two models are chosen for producing SIGs. The two models
are timing model and entropy model. The timing model is based on message timing
where timing behaviour and the classes of events are important. The timing model
keeps track of past inter arrival time. The entropy model is based on the information
content of message terms where logging is highly selective and ad-hoc. The entropy
model keeps track of the distribution of message contents. In the second step, the
behaviour of components in terms of surprise, i.e., anomaly signal, is computed. To
compute an anomaly signal, the histogram of a recent window of behaviour to the
entire history of behaviours for a component is compared. The Kullback-Leibler
divergence produces a weighted average of how much the fraction of measurements
in a recent distribution differs from the historical distribution. The anomaly signal
is produced using the Kullback-Leibler divergence. In the third step, the Pearson
correlation coefficient of the anomaly signals of two components with a delay of t
time-steps is computed. Then, two matrices are constructed. One matrix is the
correlation matrix that contains the correlation coefficients of pairs of components.
The second matrix is the delay matrix that contains the offsets of pairs of components.
In the fourth step, a SIG is constructed. A SIG is defined as a graph that contains
one vertex per component and edges that represent influences. The edges in a SIG
indicates the delay associated with the influences, and the delay may be undirected,
directed or bi-directional. The correlation matrix and delay matrix are used to
construct a SIG.
The authors evaluated the SIGs by using simulation experiments on idealised
systems that consist of linear chains of components. The simulations use three types
of components. The components are sources, tasks and resources. The component
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sources generates data and the component tasks processes data. The components
sources and tasks require resources to generate data and process data. Results from
the simulation experiments show that SIGs are robust against uniform message loss,
it degrades gracefully when timing measurements are noisy, and it does not depend
on clean training data to detect influences.
The authors applied SIGs to diagnose problems in the STANLEY and JUNIOR
autonomous vehicles and the Thunderbird supercomputer. A component shared
by the lasers on the autonomous vehicle was identified as a cause of the vehicle
swerving and a bug was traced to a buffer shared by the lasers. On the Thunderbird
supercomputer, the SIG identified a bug in the Linux kernel that caused it to skip
interrupts under heavy network activity. The bug caused the kernel to believe that
the clock frequency had changed which led the kernel to generate a CPU error. The
results showed that the error shared an influence with other nodes in the same job
scheduling group.
2.3.3 Rank correlation for processor failure prediction
F. Salfner et. al. [58] propose an architecture for monitoring cores across a chip
for dependable process management in chip-multiprocessing machines. A trend in
the design of commodity processors is combining multiple execution units on one
chip. It becomes more likely that a single execution unit on a processor can fail.
To anticipate hardware failures, the processor performance counters are analysed
using a statistical rank-sum test. The cores on a chip monitor each other and predict
upcoming failures by analysing hardware event sampling data.
First, correlations among the counters available are analysed and the counters
that exhibit similar behaviour to other counters are removed. The Spearman-Rank
correlation is used because it has the advantage of not assuming any frequency
distribution of the variables. Events observed as monotonically increasing would be
exhibiting similar behaviour and removed. The result is a list of unique event-type
pairs that can be monitored during run-time. Second, two sampling approaches are
considered. The sampling approaches are time-based sampling and workload-based
sampling. Modern processors do not have a fixed timing behaviour because of
frequency scaling, pipelining, and out-of-order execution, and the Pentium time-
stamp counter does not guarantee a constant rate for some processor models. On
the other hand, the workload-based sampling approach gives a constant scale with
respect to the execution of the load application. As such, the workload-based
sampling approach was chosen. Third, the Wilcox-Rank sum test is used as the
failure prediction approach. It compares a test data set to a reference data set to
determine whether the median is about the same. The reference data set contains
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CPU counter values that were measured and stored during normal operation without
failures. The test data set contains samples that were measured during run-time.
The one-sided version of the test is applied. Since no assumption is made about
the form of the distribution of the counter values, the one-sided test is considered
appropriate for the environment.
The authors performed the experiments with an Intel Core2 Quad CPU
(Q6600) with 2.40GHz, 2GB memory and a Linux 2.6 64-bit operating system. A
fault injection technique and workload generation is applied to trigger erroneous
hardware behaviour. The fault injection technique involved setting the CPU core
voltage to a level below normal operation. Overclocking the processor can cause
permanent damage to the hardware so it was not used. The workload was generated
on the monitored cores using the Mersenne prime number test application MPRIME.
31 performance counters with unique behaviour were investigated and 30 failures
for each counter were collected. The area-under-the-curve or AUC metric is used
to evaluate the predictors. A perfect predictor would achieve an AUC value of 1
and a random predictor would achieve an AUC value of 0.5. The experimental
work showed that there are three groups of event-types. The first group consists
of 24 out of 31 counters - this group of counters behaved like purely random
predictors. The second and third groups of counters performed better than the
first group of counters. In the second group of counters, 5 out of the 31 counters
belonged to this group. The AUC values for the counters in the second group are:
AUCmin = 0.23, AUCmedian = 0.56, AUCmax = 0.84. While the counters show high
variability in their AUC scores, by inverting the output of the predictor with AUC
= 0.23, good predictions could be obtained. 2 out of the 31 counters belonged in
the third group. In this group, the counters showed better AUC scores. The scores
are: AUCmin = 0.68, AUCmedian = 0.79, AUCmax = 0.91. While the counters in the
third group showed better AUC scores, the variability is still quite high. The authors
posed an open question as to whether or not these counters can be turned into good
predictors.
2.3.4 LogMaster
LogMaster [21] is a set of innovative algorithms that mines event correlations that
have multiple attributes for fast failure prediction. Examples of the attributes
include node-id, application-id, event type and event severity. LogMaster proposes
two algorithms. The first algorithm, named Apriori-LIS and its improved version
Apriori-simiLIS mine event rules. The event rules are represented by the second
algorithm called Events correlation graphs. LogMaster was validated on the system
event logs on an IBM BlueGene/L system, a 260-node Hadoop cluster system and a
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HPC cluster system.
The LogMaster architecture has three major components. The components
are Log agent, Log server and Log database. The Log agent collects, preprocess
and filters repeated events and periodic events on each node. The Log server mines
event rules from events sent by the Log agent to the Log server. The Log server also
constructs the event correlation graphs which are used to predict events or failures.
A Log database stores the event rules.
A 3-step approach was implemented to mine the event correlations. In the
first step, the logs are preprocessed and filtered. Logs in different formats are parsed
into a sequence of events where each event is identified by a nine-tuple. Repeated
events are identified when the events are recorded by different sub-systems and when
the events occur repeatedly in a short time window. Periodic events are identified
when the events occur with a fixed interval. Then, repeated events and periodic
events are removed. In the second step, the Apriori-LIS and Apriori-simiLIS event
correlation mining algorithms are proposed. The Apriori algorithm uses the apriori
property which states that any subset of frequent itemset must be frequent. However,
log entries that are represented by event sequences with timing orders are different.
Mining for event correlations between log entries with the apriori algorithm can
increase the analysis time. To improve the efficiency of the apriori algorithm, an
event filtering policy is applied before mining the event correlations. The event
filtering policy reduces the number of events that has to be analysed by extracting
events that occur in the same nodes, the same application or have the same event
types. In the third step, event correlation graphs for representing event rules is
proposed. An event correlation graph is a directed acyclic graph where a vertex
represents an event and an edge represents the correlation of two events linked by
the edge. Vertices can be dominant or recessive. For a 2−ary event rule, the vertices
A and B that represent two events are dominant. In the case when events A and B
occurred and event B occurred after event A, the vertex A ∧B is a recessive vertex.
Edges link vertices and edges can be dominant or recessive. An edge is dominant if
the two vertices that are linked by the edge are dominant. Otherwise, the edge is
recessive. Three main steps are used in constructing an event correlation graph. In
the first step, a group of event correlation graphs based on event rules found during
single-node analysis is constructed. In the second step, event correlation graphs that
represent event correlations found during multiple-node analysis are constructed. In
the third step, indices that record the positions of events in the event correlation
graphs are saved. The indices are used to locate the events in the event correlation
graphs.
The authors applied LogMaster to analyse three real logs generated by an IBM
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BlueGene/L cluster system, a Hadoop cluster system and a HPC cluster system. To
evaluate the algorithms, three evaluation metrics are defined. The first metric is the
average analysis time, the second metric is the average prediction time, and the third
metric is the precision and recall. The results from event preprocessing and filtering
show that a compression rate of above 90% is achieved on the Hadoop and IBM
BlueGene/L logs, and a compression rate of 69.4% is achieved on the HPC cluster
system logs. The results from event rules mining show that the Apriori-simiLIS
algorithm significantly improves the time efficiency of the Apriori-LIS algorithm
with small rule loss. The results from prediction show that the precision rates of the
Apriori-simiLIS algorithm is higher than the Apriori-LIS algorithm, and the recall
rates of the Apriori-simiLIS algorithm is lower than the Apriori-LIS algorithm. The
reason for the high precision rates and low recall rates is due to keeping a richer set
of log information without spatial filtering. The results from average prediction time
of the three logs show that the Apriori-simiLIS algorithm has a shorter prediction
time than the Apriori-LIS algorithm.
2.3.5 PREdictor
The work reported in reference [20] presents the development of two models for
predicting failures in coalition systems. The first model is a spherical covariance
model and the second model is a stochastic model. The spherical covariance model
has an adjustable timescale parameter and it is used to quantify the temporal
correlation among failure events. The distance in time between two failures is used to
calculate their covariance value and the timescales for calculating the covariances can
be adjusted for different types of failures. The probabilistic distribution of failures is
used in the stochastic model to compute the spatial covariance among failures. A
framework called PREdictor is implemented to explore correlations among failures
and forecast the time-between-failure of future instances.
The failure prediction framework has a multi-layer prediction architecture for
analysing the correlations of failure instances in different scopes of a coalition system.
The framework has node-wide, cluster-wide and system-wide failure predictors. The
node-wide failure predictor keeps track of the new events recorded to the local event
logs since its last operation, extracts failure records, creates formatted failure reports,
monitors the performance dynamics of executing applications and measures the
resource utilisation. The cluster-wide failure predictor collects failure reports from
the compute nodes managed by the master node, statistically processes and analyses
the failure events, predicts prospective failures and generates system availability
reports for the resource scheduler and system administrator. The system-wide failure
predictor receives failure reports from master nodes of clusters and forecasts the
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failure dynamics of the entire coalition environment for system management.
The performance of the prediction framework in both offline and online
prediction modes was evaluated on the Los Alamos HPC traces and in an institute-
wide clusters coalition environment. The results show that the prediction framework
can achieve an accuracy of more than 76% in offline prediction and more than 70%
accuracy in online prediction.
2.3.6 3D root-cause analysis
Z. Zheng et. al. [72] present an automated root-cause diagnosis mechanism for
large-scale HPC systems. The diagnosis mechanism provides fine grained root-
cause analysis by pinpointing the failure layer, the time and location of the event
that caused the failure. The authors evaluate their diagnosis mechanism on real
RAS (Reliability, Serviceability, Availability) logs collected from a production IBM
BlueGene/P system at Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
The diagnosis mechanism is comprised of four interrelated steps. The steps
are: (i) preprocessing, (ii) information fusion, (iii) layer identification and (iv)
time and location identification. The preprocessing step tackles the challenge of
data volume by removing redundant records and noise from the RAS logs. The
information fusion step synthesizes the information from RAS, job and environmental
logs. The layer identification step reduces the search space by co-analysing multiple
logs on the application, system software and hardware layers. The time and location
identification layer pinpoints the event which triggered the failure by tracing the
event that occurred days before the failure.
The authors presented four case studies identified using the diagnosis mech-
anism. The case studies are a hardware BPC clock failure, an application out of
memory failure, a network torus sender failure and a kernel panic. A node power
error was identified as a trigger event for the BPC clock failure. An insufficient
memory error was identified as a trigger event for the application out of memory
error. An invalid memory address error was identified as a trigger event for the
network torus sender failure. A machine check error was identified as a trigger event
for the kernel panic.
2.4 Anomaly Detection
In this section, we present anomaly detection tools that implement feature extraction
as the main technique for processing system usage logs, textual event logs or both
system usage logs and textual event logs. The tools are: (i) automated anomaly
detection [44], (ii) adaptive anomaly detector [27], (iii) increasing error handling
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time-window [33] and (iv) DILAF [2].
2.4.1 Automated anomaly detection
The work reported in reference [44] present an automated mechanism for node-level
anomaly identification in large cluster systems. The mechanism is comprised of a
set of techniques that analyse data collected from many sensors. It transforms the
data into a form suitable for feature extraction, extracts features from the data
and identifies anomalous nodes in an unsupervised manner. Two feature extraction
techniques are compared. The techniques are Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
and Independent Component Analysis (ICA). The authors implemented a prototype
and injected a variety of faults into a production system at the National Center for
Supercomputing Applications to evaluate the prototype.
A total of 19 features were collected per node for the experiments. The
features that were collected include CPU, memory, I/O and network metrics. To
evaluate the PCA and ICA-based anomaly detector, the authors defined two sets
of metrics. The first metric, sensitivity, measures the proportion of correct faulty
classifications to the number of actual faulty nodes. The second metric, specificity,
measures the proportion of correct non-faulty classifications to the number of actual
normal nodes.
The authors conducted two sets of tests. The tests are a single-fault test
and multifault test. In the single-fault test, one type of faults is injected into 0 to
20 randomly selected nodes. Then, the PCA-based and ICA-based implementation
is assessed as to whether it can correctly identify the faulty nodes. The authors
compared results obtained on the PCA, ICA and no feature extraction based methods.
Their results show that the feature extraction based methods achieve better sensitivity
and specificity than the no-feature extraction based method. Their results also show
that the ICA-based method achieves the best sensitivity and specificity. In the
multifault test, different types of faults are simultaneously injected into 0 to 20
randomly selected nodes. The pairs of faults include memory and CPU, CPU and
network, I/O and network. The results obtained show that the ICA-based method
achieves a specificity of above 0.94 and a sensitivity of 1. The ICA-based method
outperforms both the PCA-based method and the no-feature extraction based method
in terms of specificity and sensitivity.
2.4.2 Adaptive anomaly detector
The work reported in reference [27] present an adaptive anomaly detection mechanism
that develops Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to identify anomalous behaviour
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in cloud computing systems. The anomaly detection mechanism integrates cloud
performance metric analysis with filtering techniques to extract the most relevant
principal components of different types of failures. The authors implement a prototype
of the anomaly detector and conduct experiments using traces obtained on a Google
data centre.
The adaptive anomaly detection mechanism is comprised of two algorithms.
The first algorithm, called Most Relevant Principal Component (MRPC), identifies
a set of principal components that have strong correlation with failures. It uses
neural networks to compute the principal components from normalised values of
cloud performance metrics in a rolling time window. The second algorithm, called
Adaptive Anomaly Identification, identifies anomalies using MRPCs by leveraging
adaptive Kalman filters.
The authors conducted experiments on a cloud testbed that consists of 362
servers. Third party monitoring tools such as sysstat and perf were used to collect
runtime performance data on the hypervisor and virtual machines. The authors
also develop a fault injection program to inject a variety of faults into the cloud
testbed. They studied four types of failures identified by the MRPC algorithms. The
failure cases are memory related failures, disk related failures, CPU related failures
and network related failures. The MRPC-based anomaly detector is compared with
decision tree, Bayesian network, support vector machine (SVM) and PCA-based
anomaly detectors. Their results show that the MRPC-based detector achieves the
best performance, with a true positive rate of 91.4% and false positive rate of 3.7%.
2.4.3 Increasing the error handling time window
N. Gurumdimma et. al. [33] address a fundamental question, that is, increasing the
error handling time window in large-scale distributed systems by using resource usage
logs and system failure logs. The resource usage logs are used to track anomalous
resource usage and the system message logs are used to identify the root-causes
of system failures. An anomaly-based detection algorithm is developed to identify
anomalous resource usage in the system.
The methodology has two phases. The first phase identifies events that are
correlated with frequently occurring failures. Fault events that are regarded as causes
of system failures are extracted from large logs of cluster systems using an existing
fault diagnostics tool reported in reference [7]. In the second phase, an approach
that extracts anomalous running jobs believed to be pointers to problems in the
cluster system and correlated in the event logs is explained. The approach has
three steps. In the first step, the counters for each job on each node within a given
time are extracted from the resource usage logs. Then, a Resource Usage Feature
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Matrix is generated. The resource use counters are represented by the columns of the
matrix and the jobs on each node are represented by the rows of the matrix. In the
second step, an unsupervised approach based on Principal Component Analysis is
introduced. In the approach, the outlierness of a job is determined by the variation
in the dominant principal direction. The variation is computed by subtracting the
cosine similarity between two leading principal directions by 1. A job and an earliest
time when the anomaly occurred are saved when the variation exceeds a specified
threshold. The authors showed that PCA can identify anomalous jobs in the resource
usage logs but it could not identify relationships among the resource use counters.
In the third step, the Maximal Information Coefficient is applied to understand the
relationships between the resource use counters. Then, the error event lead time is
defined. It records the time when the earliest anomalous job is detected to the time
when the fault is logged.
The authors evaluated their approach using the resource usage logs and
system message logs collected on the Ranger supercomputer at the Texas Advanced
Computing Center. Their results show that the lead time to failure can be extended
by up-to 55 minutes.
2.4.4 DILAF
DILAF [2] is a framework for distributed analysis of large scale system event logs
for anomaly detection. The framework is comprised of three main processes which
facilitate log parsing, feature extraction and machine learning activities. DILAF
distinguishes itself from existing tools by not requiring the availability of source codes
in the analysed system and performing all the processes in a distributed manner to
support scalable analysis.
The architecture of DILAF is comprised of four processes. They are: (i)
log parsing, (ii) feature extraction, (iii) normalisation and (iv) machine learning.
The log parsing process transforms the free-form log messages into structured and
featured events. The feature extraction process constructs numerical feature vectors
and creates a primary message count vector utilising the identifier and message type
information, which are extracted by the log parsing process. The normalisation
process applies Term Frequency/Inverse Document Frequency (TF/IDF) technique
that measures the importance of a message type for an identifier and generates a
feature matrix. The machine learning process applies Principal Component Analysis
that filters repeating patterns in the feature matrix to identify anomalous patterns.
The authors implement PCA using the Bulk Synchronous Parallel computation
model to distribute the computational workload among participating processes. To
ensure the accuracy of the anomaly detector, they use Apache’s Spark Resilient
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Distributed Datasets to recover a partition in the event of a crash.
The authors conducted experiments on a Hadoop Distributed File System
(HDFS) log dataset and the Thunderbird supercomputer logs. On the HDFS dataset,
the DILAF framework achieved 99.8% accuracy for anomaly detection. On the HDFS
dataset, DILAF achieved a performance increase of 65% over the log parsing method
reported in reference [69]. On the Thunderbird supercomputer dataset, DILAF
achieved a performance that scales linearly with respect to the size of the logs; the
Thunderbird supercomputer dataset is 20 times larger than the HDFS dataset.
2.5 Hybrid Methods
In this section, we present the tools that develop hybrid techniques for processing the
textual system event logs. The tools are: (i) Error log processing [57],(ii) System log
pre-processing [70], (iii) LogSig [47], (iv) LKE [19] and (v) LogAider [16]. A hybrid
technique uses two or more methods from regular expressions, clustering, correlation
and feature extraction.
2.5.1 Error log processing for accurate failure prediction
F. Salfner and S. Tschirpke [57] propose three algorithms that show that data prepar-
ation is an important step to achieve accurate error-based online failure prediction.
The first algorithm assigns error IDs to error messages by using Levenshteins edit
distance. The second algorithm groups similar error sequences by using a sequence
clustering technique. The third algorithm filters statistical noise by using a filtering
algorithm. The algorithms were evaluated on error logs derived from a commercial
telecommunications system. Their results show that the failure prediction accuracy
drops by up-to 45% when the original logs are used.
The first algorithm automatically assigns error IDs to error messages using
Levenshteins edit distance. The error ID captures the type of error message. For
example, in the following error log process 1534: end of buffer reached the number
1534 relates to the source rather than the type of message. All numbers and log-
record specific data such as IP-addresses are replaced by placeholders. A copy of the
original error log is kept to maintain the information. However, a 100% replacement
of all record-specific data is infeasible because there are many typographical errors.
To address this issue, the Levenshteins edit distance is computed between all pairs
of error messages that appear in the logs. The method of substituting numbers by
placeholders produced a reduction in the number of original messages by 99.26%. The
Levenshteins edit distance method produced a reduction in the number of original
messages by 99.92%.
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The second algorithm uses a method called Tupling [64] to group similar
error sequences. The Tupling method groups error events that occur within a time
interval (temporal tupling) or error events that refer to the same location (spatial
tupling). For the telecommunications system being studied, spatial tupling is not
considered because it works only for systems with strong fault containment regions.
The tupling method groups all errors that show an interarrival time less than a
predefined threshold. The authors use three parameters to extract the sequences.
The parameters are lead time, data window size and margins for non-failure sequences.
The first parameter, lead time, extracts failure sequences that precede the failure
occurrence by a time of 5 minutes. The second parameter, data window size,
determines the length of each sequence by a maximum time of 5 minutes. The
third parameter, margins for non-failure sequences, extracts non-failure sequences
when the system is fault free and applies a ban period of 20 minutes before and
after a failure. The failure sequence tuples are used to train a hidden semi-markov
model and obtain a dissimilarity matrix. Then, hierarchical clustering methods are
applied to the dissimilarity matrix and obtain groups of similar sequences. The
actual number of groups is determined by visually inspecting the banner plots.
The third algorithm removes unrelated events in the groups of similar se-
quences produced by the second algorithm. Unrelated events in the group of sequences
occur mainly due to system processes which execute concurrently to produce the log
messages. The filtering method is implemented using a test of goodness of fit. It is
based on the notion that indicative events occur more frequently within a failure
sequence by the same failure mechanism than within other failure sequences. In
failure sequences of the same cluster, each error is checked for significant deviation
from the prior using a test variable defined as the non-squared standardised difference.
When the test is less than a predefined threshold, the error is eliminated from the
failure sequence.
2.5.2 System log pre-processing for improving failure prediction
Z. Zheng et. al. [70] present a system log pre-processing method for preserving
important failure patterns that are crucial for failure analysis. The pre-processing
method consists of three integrated steps. The steps are: (i) event categorisation,
(ii) event filtering and (iii) causality-related filtering. The effectiveness of the pre-
processing method is demonstrated on real failure logs collected on a Cray XT4
system and an IBM BlueGene/L cluster.
The pre-processing method addresses three issues of system log pre-processing.
The issues are: (i) finding important failure patterns, (ii) identifying events with
multiple spatial locations, and (iii) characterising different aspects of a failure. The
28
first step, event categorisation, uses regular expressions to classify various events
into a hierarchical set of event categories. The second step, event filtering, uses an
improved temporal and spatial filtering method that keeps track of event start and
the end times, event count and event location. The third step, causality-related
filtering, adopts apriori association rules to track causal correlations among events.
The authors conducted experiments on failure logs collected on a Cray XT4 system
and an IBM BlueGene/L cluster. The results show that their pre-processing method
effectively preserves failure patterns and improves failure prediction by up-to 174%,
with a compression rate of more than 90%.
2.5.3 LogSig
LogSig [47] is a message based signature algorithm that generates system events
from raw textual message logs. It categorises log messages into a set of event
types by searching for the most representative message signatures, and it is able to
incorporate human domain knowledge to achieve a high performance. The goal of
LogSig is to identify the event type of each log message according to a set of message
signatures. To achieve this, a metric called Match Score is proposed to determine
which signature best matches a log message. The metric computes the Multiple
Longest Common Subspace (MLCS) between multiple sequences. However, the
Multiple Longest Common Subspace is known to be a NP-hard problem. The authors
proved by contradiction that the MLCS problem can be reduced to the Longest
Common Subspace problem between two sequences, and proved by contradiction
that the Longest Common Subspace problem can be solved in polynomial time with
a polynomial time solution.
The authors present an approximated version of MLCS and the LogSig
algorithm. The LogSig algorithm is comprised of three steps. In the first step,
every log message is separated into several pairs of terms. In the second step, a
search strategy is used to find groups of log messages where each group share many
common pairs. In the third step, message signatures based on identified common
pairs in each message group is constructed. The authors compared LogSig with seven
algorithms on five different system logs. The algorithms are IPLoM, VectorModel,
Jaccard, StringKernel, StringMatch, semi-StringKernel and semi-Jaccard. LogSig
outperformed the seven algorithms in terms of overall performance.
2.5.4 LKE
The work reported in reference [19] propose an unstructured log-analysis technique
for anomaly detection. In the technique, a novel algorithm that converts free form
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text messages in log-files to log-keys is proposed. The algorithm does not rely heavily
on knowledge of the application-domain. After the messages have been converted
to log-keys, a Finite State Automaton (FSA) is learnt to present the normal work
flow for each system component. A performance measurement model is then learnt
to characterise normal execution performance based on the timing information in
the log messages. The authors applied their technique on the Hadoop and SILK
distributed computing systems and showed that their algorithm can detect running
anomalies effectively.
The technique consists of two processes: (i) the learning process, and (ii) the
detection process. The learning process obtains models that represent the normal
execution behaviour of the system from logs produced by normally completed jobs.
The learning process consists of three steps: (1) log message sequences are converted
into log key sequences, (2) a Finite State Automaton is derived to model the execution
path of the system, and (3) the execution time of each state transition is counted
and a performance measurement model is obtained through statistical analysis. The
reason to convert log message sequences into log key sequences is to address the
problem of mining high dimensional data when directly considering log messages as
a whole. The log key is defined as the common content of all log messages which are
printed by the same log-print statement in the source code; in other words, a log key
is equal to the free form text string of the log-print statement minus any parameters.
A clustering approach based on measuring the similarity of two raw log keys is
implemented. The approach clusters the raw log keys into initial groups, followed by
splitting the groups. The position of words in the raw log keys are used to measure
the similarity of two raw log keys because most programmers tend to write text
messages first then the parameters are added later. The raw log keys similarity is
measured by the weighted edit distance in which the sigmoid similar function is used
to compute weights at different positions. A threshold is determined to automatically
connect pairs of raw log keys together. The k-means algorithm is used to cluster all
distances into two groups. The distances correspond to the inter-class and inner-class
distances. The largest distance from the inner-class distance group is selected as
the threshold. An existing algorithm is applied to learn a FSA from sequential log
sequences. Each transition in the learned FSA corresponds to a log key and a state
is represented by a log message.
A performance measurement model is derived to characterise the performance
of the normally completed jobs. Each log key sequence is first converted to its
corresponding state sequence. Then the state time-stamp is specified by the time-
stamp of its corresponding log key in the log key sequence. Two performance models
are defined to measure low performance problems. The first model called transition
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time measurement model measures the time interval that a system component takes
to transit from one state to the next state which takes much longer than normal
cases. The second model called circulation numbers measurement model counts the
number of circulations in a loop structure. The transition time between adjacent
states and the circulation numbers of all loop structures are used to characterise the
normal performance of jobs.
2.5.5 LogAider
S. Di et. al. [16] develop a tool called LogAider for mining event correlations in
HPC system event logs. LogAider reveals three types of potential correlations. The
correlations are: across-field, spatial and temporal correlation. LogAider’s design
architecture is comprised of four layers. The layers are: user interface layer, analysis
engine layer, log parsing layer and log data layer.
The log data layer includes system RAS and job logs. The system logs are
stored in a relational database. The log parsing layer performs preliminary processing
of the log data, which includes reading the schema information to recognise the
meaning of each field and filtering out duplicate messages. The analysis engine layer
performs across-field, spatial and temporal correlation. The across-field correlation
engine computes: (i) the prior probability distribution based on various metrics or
fields in the logs, and (ii) the posterior probability based on any combination of
fields set by the user. The spatial correlation engine mines potential correlations
across multiple components using an optimised K-means algorithm. The temporal
correlation engine mines potential correlations using similarity analysis of events
that occur close in time. The user interface layer provides templates for specifying
the key fields for performing across-field, spatial and temporal correlation analysis
to the user.
The authors performed experiments on one year worth of RAS and job logs
obtained on the Mira supercomputer at Argonne Leadership Computing Facility.
Their results show that: (i) across-field correlation analysis achieved precision and
recall rates of 99.9%, and (ii) temporal correlation analysis achieved an accuracy of
95%.
2.6 Similarities and Differences
In this section, we summarise the similarities and differences between the system log-
file processing tools surveyed. A comparison table for the system log-file processing
tools is given in Table 2.1.
31
Table 2.1: Comparison table for system log-file processing tools.
Tool reference Resource System Feature Feature
use data logs selection extraction
[54] No Yes No No
[56, 65] No Yes Yes No
[37] No Yes No No
[53] No Yes Yes No
[66] No Yes No No
[48] No Yes No No
[23] No Yes No No
[49] No Yes No No
[52] No Yes Yes Yes
[32] No Yes No No
[45] No Yes Yes No
[51] No Yes Yes No
[58] Yes No Yes No
[21] No Yes Yes No
[20] No Yes Yes No
[72] Yes Yes Yes No
[33] Yes Yes No Yes
[44] Yes No No Yes
[27] Yes No No Yes
[2] No Yes No Yes
[57] No Yes No No
[70] No Yes No No
[47] No Yes No No
[19] No Yes No No
[16] No Yes Yes No
The similarities between the system log-file processing tools reviewed are
given as follows:
• All the tools develop pre-processing steps which can be summarised into two
activities. The first activity tokenises the system log messages by extracting
sequences of words in the free form text in the system log message. The second
activity applies some method to measure the similarity between the system log
messages.
• Each tool implements pre-processing that comprises multiple steps. In each
pre-processing step, the messages in the system log-files are grouped into initial
groups. Then, the messages in each of the initial groups are further grouped
into smaller groups.
• All the tools extract sequences of English-only words in the free form text
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in the system message logs and discard tokens that contain only numbers or
alpha-numeric words.
The differences between the system log-file processing tools reviewed are given
as follows:
• Each tool develop a different technique. The techniques can be divided into
five groups. The groups are: (i) regular expressions, (ii) clustering, (iii) feature
selection, (iv) anomaly detection, and (v) hybrid method. A hybrid method
combines two or more techniques.
• Majority of the tools surveyed target general system event log-processing. By
general, we mean that the tool does not specifically focus on a dependability-
centric issue such as failure prediction.
• Differently to the generic system log-file processing tools, the tools reported
in references [14, 15, 20, 21, 45, 52, 57, 58, 70] develop methods that target
failure prediction. The work reported in references [2, 27, 44] have developed
system logs or resource usage data processing methods that target detection
of faulty nodes. N. Gurumdimma et. al. [33] developed a methodology for
increasing the error handling time-window. A. Oliner et. al. [51] and Z. Zheng
et. al. [72] developed different methods for diagnosing cluster system failures.
S. Di et. al. [16] developed LogAider that targets propagation of errors that
lead to system failures.
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we present two new system diagnosis workflows. The
workflows are:
• We developed the CORRMEXT and EXERMEST frameworks for HPC systems
diagnosis.
• CORRMEXT integrates data type extraction, correlation and time-bin extrac-
tion methods. It identifies frequently occurring error cases.
• EXERMEST integrates multiple feature extraction and correlation methods.
It identifies rare error cases.
2.7 Summary
We presented a detailed survey of system log-file processing tools. We identified three
similarities between the tools and showed that the pre-processing steps implemented
in all the tools can be summarised according to two activities. The first activity
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tokenised system log messages by extracting sequences of English-only words in the
free form text of the textual message logs. The second activity applied a method to
measure the similarity between system log messages. We highlighted the similarities
and differences between the system log-file processing tools.
In the next chapter, we will describe the system and fault models, explain
the system issues, give an overview of the Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1 HPC
systems and the log-data on these HPC systems, and describe the implementation
details for the cluster log-data preprocessing modules.
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Chapter 3
System Models, HPC Systems
and Cluster Log-Data
Modern day data centres and high performance computing (HPC) systems are made
up of complex combinations of processors, networks, operating system processes,
memory and storage systems. When new technologies are introduced, the behaviour
of these computing systems can change rapidly. The computing systems generate
a lot of data and different types of data. For the system administrators, manually
scanning the system logs to identify the cause of a system failure is a labour intensive
task. In this chapter, we present the problem and describe the HPC systems and
cluster log-data.
We structure this chapter as follows: In Section 3.1, we describe the system
model for which the CORRMEXT and EXERMEST frameworks can be applied.
In Section 3.2, we introduce the Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1 HPC systems
operated by the Texas Advanced Computing Center. In Section 3.3, we describe the
TACC Stats resource use data [17], Rationalized message logs [36] and Syslogs [40].
In Section 3.4, we give the implementation details for the data preprocessing module.
3.1 System Model
A general HPC systems model is specified in [8] and we describe the system model here.
The CORRMEXT and EXERMEST frameworks can be applied to a generic HPC
system model as follows: A HPC system S is comprised of X jobs J1...JX , Y nodes
N1...NY and Z production time-bins T1...TZ . A HPC system uses a job scheduler
JS for: (i) allocating jobs to nodes and communicating paths between nodes, and
(ii) setting job production times. The HPC system executes a heterogeneous system
software stack that is comprised of a filesystem FS, operating system OS, network
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software NS and operating system processes OS−PS. We assume that all the nodes
in the HPC system synchronise their clocks and each node maintains its own clock.
System logs may be written to containers U1...Un by each job, node, job scheduler
and system software. System resources that are used by the nodes, jobs and system
software may be written to containers W1...Wm as resource use logs. Data may be
transferred to and from the nodes, jobs, system software and filesystem.
The privacy policies of a data centre may not allow access to software codes.
Therefore, we assume that there is no access to software codes in a data centre.
However, a data centre may allow access to system logs and resource use data.
The system logs contain system and failure events. The resource use data contains
system resource utilisation counters. For the objective of diagnosing failures, i.e., to
determine where, when and why the system crashed, the data centre may grant access
to the system logs, resource use data and system administrators for validating the
diagnoses. However, a data centre may not grant access to the system maintenance
records due to security reasons. Therefore, we assume that the operation context
of the HPC system is not available. Our HPC system model covers both open
source Linux-based computational facilities as well as bespoke computing systems,
for example IBM BlueGene systems.
3.1.1 Fault Model
When the system output deviates from the expected one, a system failure occurs.
We define a system failure as a node crash or operating system hang-up. In order
to increase the dependability of the system, it is important to tolerate those errors
that exist shortly before a system failure. Tolerating errors mean to detect them
and then to correct them, if possible. However, typically before a system failure, an
error has propagated beyond the interface of a source component to affect multiple
components. Thus, knowledge about these errors can be useful to system designers
and implementors for improving the effectiveness of error recovery protocols.
We assume faults can occur at any level in the system, at the lowest level, for
example, register level to the highest level such as operating systems. When these
faults are executed, it will lead to errors which may lead to a system failure if the
error is not handled. Our objective is to identify error cases without prior knowledge
of the fault models.
3.1.2 System Issue
Figure 3.1 shows an illustration of resource use counters and error messages by time.
The resource use counter rx_bytes records the amount of network data received.
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The resource use counter rx_crc_errors records the amount of CRC errors received.
The resource use counter rx_frame_errors records the amount of frame errors
received. In the resource use data, we observe that rx_bytes and rx_crc_errors
are correlated. Furthermore, we observe that rx_bytes and rx_frame_errors are
correlated. The message log master network unreachable indicates a DNS lookup
failure. The message log FTP failed indicates a file transfer protocol failure. In
























Figure 3.1: An illustration of rx bytes, rx crc errors and rx frame errors resource
use counters, master network unreachable and FTP failed messages.
Capturing these correlations is important as these can provide insights into
the behaviour of the system. From Figure 3.1, the resource use counters r1 and r2
may capture the existence of two errors in the system while another counter r3 may
capture the normal behaviour of the system. A correlation between r1 and r3 and a
correlation between r2 and r3 shows that the two errors were triggered following a
normal system behaviour. Similarly, a correlation between different event groups will
provide insights into the system state. However, understanding the occurrence of
groups of errors from system logs alone is challenging. In this thesis, we capture the
notion of an error when: (i) a message is logged and the message captures a state of
the program that deviates from expectation, and (ii) there are groups of resource
use and error message patterns as illustrated in Figure 3.1. In Chapters 4 and 5, we
will present the CORRMEXT framework that seeks to determine the occurrence of
these patterns to study errors which lead to a system failure or recovery.
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3.1.3 Significant Errors on Nodes
Let S be a HPC system with n distinct nodes and all the nodes in the system S are
linked together by a network. We capture the significant errors by first defining a
set NSi = {n1, n2, ..., ni|ni ∈ Nodestate}, where 1 ≤ i < x, x is the number of nodes,
Nodestate = {nfault, nerror, nfailed}, nfault = a node on which a fault is triggered,
nerror = a node that contained an error, nfailed = a node that crashed. Thus, an
error can occur within one node or occur on two or more nodes.
Due to the possibility that errors are associated with a large number of
nodes, finding the significant errors is challenging. In Chapter 6, we will present the
EXERMEST framework that investigates the use of feature extraction methods to
identify the significant errors and the nodes associated with the identified errors.
3.2 Case Study HPC Systems
In this section, we present the Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1 HPC systems
operated by the Texas Advanced Computing Center at The University of Texas at
Austin.
3.2.1 Ranger
The Ranger HPC system1 was a Linux-based cluster that consisted of 4,048 nodes
featuring AMD quad-core Opteron processors. It was operated from 2007 to 2013. All
the nodes were linked together via a high-speed Infiniband network. Job scheduling
and resource management were provided by the Sun Grid Engine2. High speed file
access was provided by the Lustre filesystem3.
Each node of Ranger generated its own resource use data and rationalised
messages. Ranger was the first HPC system operated at a United States academic
institution that deployed TACC Stats [35] and Rationalized message logs [36]. The
TACC Stats resource usage monitor is a job-oriented and logically structured version
of the conventional Sysstat system performance monitor. The Rationalized message
logs incorporates a logical structure and additional content such as job-identification
(rationalisation) to the POSIX formatted logs. The resource usage and rationalized
messages generated on the Ranger HPC system nodes were sent to a centralised
logging system. The resource use logs were combined and interleaved in time. The
Rationalized message logs were combined and interleaved in time. Ranger used





processes that ran on its nodes. The reason for using UDP are lower bandwidth
overhead and latency.
3.2.2 Lonestar4
The Lonestar4 HPC system4 was a Linux-based cluster that consisted of 1,888
compute nodes, with two Intel 6-Core processors per node, for a total of 22,656
cores. It was configured with 44TB of total memory and 276TB of local disk space.
Lonestar4 was operated from 2009 to 2015. All the nodes were interconnected
with Infiniband technology in a fat-tree topology with a 40Gbit/sec point-to-point
bandwidth. All Lonestar4 nodes ran Linux Centos 5.5 and supported batch services
through the Sun Grid Engine. Global, data intensive I/O was supported by a Lustre
filesystem, while home directories were serviced by an NSF filesystem with global
access.
Each node of Lonestar4 generated its own TACC Stats resource use data
and standard Linux syslogs. The resource usage and Linux Syslogs were sent to a
centralised logging system. The resource use logs were combined and interleaved in
time. The Linux Syslogs were combined and interleaved in time. Lonestar4 used
UDP (User Datagram Protocol) as its primary communications protocol for all the
processes that ran on its nodes.
3.2.3 Stampede-1
The Stampede-1 HPC system5 was a Linux-based cluster that consisted of 6,400
nodes featuring Intel Xeon E5 Sandy Bridge host processors and the Intel Knights
Corner (KNC) co-processor. It was configured with 260TB of total memory, 14PB
of shared disk space, and 1.6PB of local disk space. Stampede-1 was operated from
2012 to April 2018. In the Sandy Bridge cluster, all the nodes were interconnected
with Infiniband technology in a fat-tree topology of eight core-switches and over
320 leaf switches. All nodes in the Sandy Bridge cluster ran Linux CentOS 6.3 and
were managed with batch services through the Slurm workload manager6. Global
HOME, WORK and SCRATCH storage areas were supported by three Lustre parallel
distributed filesystems with 76 I/O servers. In the KNC cluster, all the nodes were
interconnected with a separate Intel OmniPath network. All nodes in the KNC
cluster ran Linux CentOS 7.
Each node of Stampede-1 generated its own TACC Stats resource use data.





were combined and interleaved in time. Stampede-1 used UDP (User Datagram
Protocol) as its primary communications protocol for all the processes that ran on
its nodes.
3.3 Cluster Log-Data
In this section, we describe the TACC Stats resource use data [17], Rationalized
message logs [36] and Syslogs [40].
3.3.1 Rationalized Message Logs
The Rationalized message log [36] incorporates additional content such as job-
identification (rationalisation) and a logical structure to the POSIX formatted
logs. Rationalising log messages helps improve the effectiveness of log-based failure
analysis of open-source HPC systems. The Rationalized message logs provide: (1)
easy comprehension of unstructured log messages, (2) simple parsing and (3) direct






0:<3>spurious soft lockup detection on CPU#\%d
1:17
...
The header of a rationalized log message has four main fields. They are: (i)
time, (ii) host, (iii) jobid and (iv) prog. The time field contains a value that tells
the total number of seconds that have elapsed since 1 January 1972 00:00:10. In
this example the value is 1273001236. The host field contains the node. In this
example the node is i175-110. The jobid field contains each executed job through
an assigned numerical number. In this example the job number is 1366122. The
prog field contains the protocol name. In this example the name of the protocol
is kernel. The 0: field contains the key event that occurred at the recorded time
and on the recorded node and job. In this example the key event is a soft lockup
of a central processing unit. The remaining fields provide additional information
associated with the key event.
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3.3.2 Syslogs
Syslog [40] is a general system and program messages logging system in the Linux
environment. The Syslog service is comprised of the system log daemon, where
Linux and its programs can send kernel and program messages to. The logs handled
by Syslog is available in the /var/log/ directory on a Linux system. Among the
logs in the /var/log/ directory, the most common one is /var/log/messages that
stores the kernel system message as well as kernel module core dumps. Thus,
the /var/log/messages is the main log-file to examine for problem diagnosis and
monitoring on Linux-based systems. The POSIX [40] standard for logging system
events allows the freedom for formatting logs. As such, the structure of a log message
can vary. An example of a Syslog is shown below:
Jan 12 15:24:55 oss5 kernel: LustreError: 0:0:(ldlm_lockd.
c:249:waiting_locks_callback()) ### lock callback timer
expired after 254s: evicting client at *.*.*.*@o2ib ....
We observe that the above Syslog is comprised of five fields. The fields are:
(i) timestamp, (ii) node-id, (iii) system-id, (iv) application-id and (v) error message.
Columns one to three contain the date and time. In this example the date and time
is Jan 12 15:24:55. Column four contains the node-id. In this example the node is
oss5. Column five contains the system-id. In this example the system is the Linux
kernel. Column six contains the application name. In this example the application
is the Lustre filesystem. The remaining columns contain the error message.
3.3.3 TACC Stats Resource Use Data
TACC Stats [17] is a job-oriented and logically structured version of the conventional
Sysstat system resource usage monitor. TACC Stats provides online monitoring of
system resources and it records all the values on all the system metrics it monitors
at all time-intervals. TACC Stats will only reset the system metrics values to zero if
an actual reset on a node is performed. An example of a TACC Stats resource use
log is given below:
2066522 Aug 11 12:50:01 i150-412 eth0 rx_bytes 302345 ..
In a TACC Stats resource use log, the first column contains the job number.
In this example the job number is 2066522. The second to fourth columns contain
the date and time. In this example the date and time is Aug 11 12:50:01. The
fifth column contains the node-id. In this example the node is i150-412. The sixth
column contains the component identifier. In this example the component is eth0.
41
The pairs that follow after the component identifier contains the name of the resource
use counter and its value. In this example the resource use counter is rx_bytes and
its value is 302345. The list of resource use counters is given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: List of resource use counters monitored on the Ranger, Lonestar4 and
Stampede-1 HPC systems.
Metric group Qty. Resource use counters
Lustre network 6 tx msgs, rx msgs, rx msgs dropped, tx bytes, rx bytes,
rx bytes dropped
Lustre /work, 23 read bytes, write bytes, direct read, direct write, dirty pages hits,
Lustre /share, 23 dirty pages misses, ioctl, open, close, mmap, seek, fsync, setattr,
Lustre /scratch 23 truncate, flock, getattr, statfs, alloc node, setxattr, getxattr,
listxattr, removexattr, inode permission
Virtual 21 pgpgin, pgpgout, pswpin, pswpout, pgalloc normal, pgfree,
memory pgactivate, pgdeactivate, pgfault, pgmajfault, pgrefill normal,
pgsteal normal, pgscan normal, pgscan direct normal, pginodesteal,
slabs scanned, kswapd steal, kswapd inodesteal, pageoutrun,
allocstall, pgrotated
Block md0, 11 rd ios, rd merges, rd sectors, rd ticks, wr ios, wr merges, wr sectors,
Block hdd 11 wr ticks, in flight, io ticks, time in queue
Cpu 0 to 15 112 user, nice, system, idle, iowait, irq, softirq
Mem 0 to 3 80 MemTotal, MemFree, MemUsed, Active, Inactive HighTotal,
HighFree, LowTotal, LowFree, Dirty, Writeback, FilePages, Mapped,
AnonPages, PageTables, NFS Unstable, Bounce, Slab,
HugePages Total, HugePages Free
Net ib0, 23 collisions, multicast, rx bytes, rx compressed, rx crc errors,
Net lo, 23 rx dropped, rx errors, rx fifo errors, rx frame errors, rx length errors,
Net eth0, 23 rx missed errors, rx over errors, rx packets, tx aborted errors,
tx bytes, tx carrier errors, tx compressed, tx dropped, tx errors,
tx fifo errors, tx heartbeat errors, tx packets, tx window errors
Numa 0 to 3 24 numa hit, numa miss, numa foreign, interleave hit, local node,
other node
Ps 7 ctxt, processes, load 1, load 5, load 15, nr running, nr threads
3.3.4 Compute Node Soft Lockups
Compute node lockups are one of the most frequent source of problems for the system
administrators at the Texas Advanced Computing Center. A soft lockup is a bug
which causes the Linux operating system kernel to loop without giving other tasks
a chance to run. In a system message log, a soft lockup event can be identified by
scanning the message for the keywords soft lockup. The soft lockups occur more
than 1,000 times in one day. Figure 3.2 shows the number of soft lockups reported
in three months worth of Rationalized message logs collected on the Ranger HPC
system. Figure 3.3 shows the number of soft lockups reported in two months worth
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Figure 3.2: Distribution (log-scale) of soft lockup events on Ranger.
3.3.5 Data Collection
In Section 3.2, we reported that: (i) each node on Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1
generated its own resource use data, and (ii) each node on Ranger and Lonestar4
generated its own system logs. The Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1 HPC systems
record 410 resource use counters across nine groups of system metrics (see Table 3.1).
The resource use on Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1 were sampled at 10-minute
intervals. The system logs generated on Ranger and Lonestar4 contain messages
produced by the Linux operating system kernel, the Lustre filesystem and Linux
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(a) February 2013 (b) March 2013
Figure 3.3: Distribution (log-scale) of soft lockup events on Lonestar4.
processes. There are no system message logs available on Stampede-1. A summary
of the resource use data and system logs analysed in this thesis is given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Summary of the data collected on Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1.
Ranger
Resource use data Rationalized message logs
Month Size Qty. lines Size Qty. messages
June 2011 29.8 GB 88,821,351 2.7 GB 10,021,516
July 2011 29.3 GB 92,425,427 9.6 GB 64,822,682
August 2011 29.9 GB 91,502,909 14.5 GB 114,745,476
Lonestar4
Resource use data Syslogs
Month Size Qty. lines Size Qty. messages
February 2013 24.9 GB 111,424,271 966 MB 8,993,154
March 2013 46.6 GB 207,068,692 1.3 GB 12,267,629
Stampede-1
Resource use data Syslogs
Month Size Qty. lines Size Qty. messages
February 2017 128.9 GB 236,509,583 N/A N/A
3.4 Processing the Cluster Log-data
The CORRMEXT and EXERMEST diagnostics frameworks target processing of
TACC Stats resource use data, Rationalized message logs and Syslogs. The resource
use data contain hundreds of different resource use counters. The system logs contain
thousands of message types. The system message logs may be ambiguous and
unstructured. To address the problem, we describe two data preprocessing modules.
The modules are: (i) Resource Use Extractor, (ii) Message Types Extractor.
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3.4.1 Resource Use Extraction Module
Currently, the Resource Use Extractor (RUExt) module extracts resource use counters
from TACC Stats resource use data. We present the resource use counters in a form
on which standard analysis algorithms can be applied. RUExt generates a data
matrix DRtimebins that contain counts of resource use counters by time-bins. The
time-bins are one hour, 30 minutes and 10 minutes. In a resource use counter data
matrix, each row represents a resource use counter name, each column represents one
time-bin and each cell contains the count of a resource use counter name within the
time-bin. Currently, RUExt generates three different types of resource use counter
data matrices of one hour, 30 and 10 minute time-bins. We generate the resource
use counter data matrices using a process. The process is given below:
• Step 1: Split one day worth of resource usage logs into individual hours.
• Step 2: Split the hourly resource usage logs into 30 minutes.
• Step 3: Split the hourly resource usage logs into 10 minutes.
• Step 4: For each log entry in the individual hour resource usage logs, extract
the resource use counter name and store it in a list.
• Step 5: Identify the unique resource use counter name in the list and obtain
the list of resource use counters.
• Step 6: For each resource use counter name in the hourly resource usage log
which matches the resource use counter name in the given list of resource use
counter names, if the values associated with the resource use counter name of
two consecutive hourly resource usage logs are different, obtain the difference
and add the difference to the value obtained in the preceding operation and
store the value.
• Step 7: Repeat Step 6 for the 30 minutes resource usage logs.
• Step 8: Repeat Step 6 for the 10 minutes resource usage logs.
3.4.2 Message Types Extraction Module
The Message Types Extractor (MTExt) module extracts message types from large
quantities of system logs. We define a message type as a sequence of words that
contain only alphabets in the English language. MTExt extracts message types from
the error message part of a system log and presents the message types in the form of
a data matrix that contain counts of message types by time-bins. The time-bins are
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one hour, 30 minutes and 10 minutes. Currently, MTExt generates three different
message types data matrices of one hour, 30 and 10 minute time-bins. In a message
types data matrix, each row represents a message type, each column represents one
time-bin and each cell contains the count of a message type within the time-bin. The
data matrix provides a form on which standard analysis algorithms can be applied.
We generate the message types data matrices using a process. The process is given
below:
• Step 1: Split one day worth of system logs into logs of individual hours.
• Step 2: Split the hourly system logs into logs of 30 minutes.
• Step 3: Split the hourly system logs into logs of 10 minutes.
• Step 4: For each log message in the hourly system logs, extract the message
type part and store it in a list.
• Step 5: Identify the unique message type in the list and obtain the list of
message types.
• Step 6: Given a list of message types obtained on one day worth of system logs,
count the number of message types by hour and obtain the hourly message
types data matrix.
• Step 7: Given a list of message types obtained on one day worth of system
logs, count the number of message types using the 30 minutes system logs and
obtain the 30 minutes message types data matrix.
• Step 8: Given a list of message types obtained on one day worth of system
logs, count the number of message types using the 10 minutes system logs and
obtain the 10 minutes message types data matrix.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we described the system model, fault model and system issues,
introduced the Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1 HPC systems operated by the
Texas Advanced Computing Center at The University of Texas at Austin, described
the TACC Stats resource use data, Rationalized message logs and Syslogs, and gave
the implementation details for the Resource Use Data and Message Types Data
preprocessing modules.
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we present two system diagnosis workflows that
are based on the system model, fault model and system issues described in this
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chapter. In Chapter 4, we present the CORRMEXT framework to identify frequently
occurring error cases. In Chapter 5, we show that CORRMEXT generalises on
multiple HPC systems. In Chapter 6, we present the EXERMEST framework that
uses the resource use data matrices and message types data matrices to identify rare




for HPC Systems Diagnosis
Combining system logs with resource utilisation data have been shown to increase
the accuracy of failure diagnosis. Most of the work on failure diagnosis have focused
on identifying errors that lead to system failures only, but there is little work that
study errors which lead to a system failure or recovery on real data.
We structure this chapter as follows: In Section 4.1, we introduce the COR-
RMEXT (CORrelating Resource use data and Message logs and EXtracting Times)
framework. In Section 4.2, we illustrate the system issue and describe the problem
specification. In Section 4.3, we present the details of the Data Type Extractor,
Correlation and Time-bin Extraction modules. In Section 4.4, we present the analyses
from CORRMEXT through five error cases identified on the Ranger HPC system
and conclude with a summary and a recommendation in Section 4.5.
4.1 Introduction
There are many frameworks that have shown that combining system logs with
resource utilisation data increases the accuracy of error detection [33, 34] and failure
diagnosis [8, 9, 72]. The diagnostics framework developed by Z. Zheng et. al. [72]
uses RAS and job logs to identify application and hardware failures and in [71]
they show that interesting failure characteristics can be identified by combining job
and RAS logs. The ANCOR framework [8] uses resource usage data to identify
anomalous nodes and then uses system logs to diagnose the cause of system failures.
The CRUMEL framework [9] identifies correlations of resource use counters and
errors to system failures. The approach developed by N. Gurumdimma et. al. [33]
shows that the error handling time window can be increased by combining system
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logs with resource usage data. CRUDE [34] shows that error detection accuracy can
be increased by 85% over current state-of-the-art error detection techniques. The
diagnostics frameworks reported in references [8, 9, 72] correlate errors to system
failures only, but there is little work which study errors leading to a system failure
or recovery.
Knowing when an error leads to a system failure is important. Consider the
following diagnosis: (1) “An inode on the Lustre filesystem failed which led to a
communication error between the Lustre client and server”, and (2) “The Lustre
client failed to communicate with the Lustre server”. If diagnosis number 2 is only
available to the system administrator, they may decide to change the Lustre filesystem
configuration and increase the number of retries. However if diagnosis number 1
is also available, then the system administrator may decide against increasing the
number of retries and choose to terminate the job because an inode failure cannot
be recovered. Diagnosis number 1 provides more information about the underlying
cause of the communication error, i.e., a corrupted inode. Thus, detailed knowledge
about the error can help the system administrator make the right decision to solve
the problem.
In this chapter, we introduce a new framework to provide more detailed
system diagnosis. We name the framework CORRMEXT. CORRMEXT combines
a resource monitoring system called TACC Stats [17] and system logs based on
message-log rationalization [36]. CORRMEXT identifies and links groups of resource
use counters and system events on a given date. It applies multiple correlation
algorithms. We implement a three-phase approach where: (i) CORRMEXT extracts
groups of correlated resource use counters on the resource use data, (ii) CORRMEXT
extracts groups of correlated messages on the system logs, and (iii) CORRMEXT
extracts the variance on the time-bins of the groups of correlated resource use
counters and groups of correlated messages. We show that CORRMEXT provides a
pathway to the root-cause of successful and failed error recovery mechanisms which
alternative diagnostics tools can not provide.
4.1.1 Contributions
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• We design, implement and evaluate a new framework that combines resource
utilisation data with system logs for detailed HPC systems diagnosis. We name
this framework CORRMEXT.
• We demonstrate that CORRMEXT can: (i) identify frequently occurring error
cases, and (ii) report the success and failure of error recovery protocols.
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• We show that more dates of groups of correlated resource use counters and
groups of correlated errors can only be identified by applying multiple correla-
tion algorithms.
• We include a detailed statistical validation step to ensure accurate system
diagnosis. We show that all the correlations are statistically significant by
applying the Bonferroni correction.
• We show that both the correlations of resource use counters and correlations
of errors are required for identifying the earliest times of change in the system
behaviour on all dates.
4.2 System Issue and Problem Specification
In this section, we illustrate the system issue and describe the problem specification.
4.2.1 System Issue





















Figure 4.1: An illustration of the resource use counters: (i) user processor utilisation,
(ii) memory pages not accessed recently and (iii) memory pages accessed recently,
and the system messages: (i) northbridge error, (ii) ECC memory error and (iii)
processor core.
CPU user, MEM Inactive and MEM Active are resource use counters. CPU user
records CPU usage by a user. MEM Inactive records the number of memory pages
that are not accessed recently. MEM Active records the number of memory pages that
are accessed recently. We observe that CPU user and MEM Inactive are correlated.
We observe that CPU user and MEM Active are correlated. Northbridge Error,
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ECC error and core are system messages. Northbridge Error indicates a mother-
board chipset error. ECC error indicates a ECC memory error. core indicates a
processor core message. We observe that Northbridge Error, ECC error and core
are correlated.
In the above example, an error in the system may be captured by a resource
use counter r1 and a recovery procedure may be captured by another resource use
counter r2. When r1 and r2 are correlated, it shows that the error triggered a
recovery procedure. Similarly, when groups of different events are correlated, the
correlations provide an insight into the state of the system. Therefore, to provide
an insight into the system behaviour it is important to capture these correlations.
However, the system logs provide low coverage. By low coverage, we mean that the
system logs do not contain all the information required for establishing a causal
path to the failure. In this chapter, we present the CORRMEXT framework that
combines resource utilisation data with system logs to determine the occurrence of
these patterns.
4.2.2 Problem Specification
The problem that we address in this chapter is specified in [10] and we describe the
problem as follows: Given (i) a set of resource use data, (ii) a set of system logs, (iii)
a list of resource use counter names, (iv) a list of message types, (v) a failure event,
and (vi) a list of dates, then:
1. Identify groups of resource use counters that are strongly correlated by time-bins
on the specified dates,
2. Identify groups of errors that are strongly correlated by time-bins on the
specified dates,
3. Identify errors that are:
(a) Strongly correlated to a specified failure event,
(b) Weakly correlated to the specified failure event,
4. Identify the time-bins that are associated with the correlated resource use
counters and correlated error groups on the dates specified.
The date specified captures the date where deeper insights are sought. To
achieve this, we have developed the CORRMEXT (CORrelating Resource use
data and Message logs and EXtracting Times) framework as shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: The workflow of the CORRMEXT framework.
Data Type Extraction, (2) Correlation and (3) Time-bin Extraction. The workflow
automatically process the resource use and system logs through the Data Type
Extraction, Correlation and Time-bin Extraction modules. Each module produces
a report. The reports can be used for diagnosis. CORRMEXT is available for
download at https://diag-toolkits.github.io/CORRMEXT/.
In the next section, we describe in detail the Data Type Extraction, Correla-
tion and Time-bin Extraction modules used within the CORRMEXT framework.
4.3 CORRMEXT Framework
We have implemented a failure diagnostics framework called CORRMEXT to identify
error cases that occur frequently and to report the success and failure of error recovery
protocols. The framework is comprised of three-phases and we summarise it here.
The three-phases are: (i) identifying resource use counter groups that are correlated,
(ii) identifying error groups that are correlated, and (iii) identifying the earliest hour
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of change associated with the correlated resource use counter groups and correlated
error groups. Then, we validate that all the correlation coefficients of the correlated
resource use counters and correlated errors are significant.
4.3.1 Data Type Extraction
Currently, the Data Type Extractor (DTE ) module processes TACC Stats resource
use data [17], Rationalized message logs [36] and Syslogs [40]. TACC Stats [17] is
an online job-oriented system resource usage monitor. It monitors 410 resource use
counters online and records all the resource use counters at intervals of 10-minutes
(refer to Table 3.1 for the list of system metrics). When a node is reset, the readings
on the node will be set to zero. An example of a resource use log is given as follows:
2066522 Aug 11 12:50:01 i150-412 eth0 rx_bytes 302345 ... The resource
use log contains: (i) 2066522 it is the job number, (ii) Aug 11 12:50:01 it is the
date and time, (iii) i150-412 it is the node, (iv) eth0 it is the component identifier
and (v) rx_bytes 302345 it is a key-value pair. The key-value pair contains the
name of the resource use counter and its value.
The Rationalized message log [36] is a special type of system log that incorpor-
ates a logical structure and additional content such as job-identification. An example
of a Rationalized message log is given as follows: 2055415 Aug 3 00:00:03 i120-306
kernel GSIFTP: failed. The Rationalized message log contains: (i) 2055415 it is
the job number, (ii) Aug 3 00:00:03 it is the date and time, (iii) i120-306 it is
the node, (iv) kernel it is the software identifier and (v) GSIFTP: failed it is the
message. A message is a sequence of English-only words. Here, the message is a
GSIFTP failure.
A Linux syslog contains a date and time, node, software identifier and message.
A Linux syslog typically does not contain a job number. Furthermore, the format
of a system log on another HPC system may be different. Having said that, most
system logs contain three basic fields. The fields are: (i) date and time, (ii) node and
(iii) message. Therefore, we have implemented a log-reformator to convert system
logs that contain the three basic fields to a standard format. If a system log does
not contain a field in the standard formatted log, then a placeholder is used. The
standard formatted log contains the following fields:
job number, month, day, time-stamp (Hour:Minute:Second), node, software
identifier, application name, message.
The resource use data contain hundreds of different resource use counters.
The Rationalized message logs and Syslogs contain thousands of different message
types. Further, the resource use counters and system logs are collected at different
53
times. For example, the system resources used by a job are recorded at a regular time
interval while a message is recorded in the system log only when an error is reported
by the job. Therefore, we need a standardise way to represent the resource use
counters and message types by time. To address the problem, we implemented two
sub-modules within the Data Type Extractor. The sub-modules are: (i) a Resource
Use Extractor (RUExt) and (ii) a Message Types Extractor (MTExt). The Resource
Use Extractor organises the resource use counters. It receives a resource use log-file
and outputs a data matrix DRtimebins. The data matrix contains counts of resource
use counters by time-bins of one hour. The Message Types Extractor organises
the message types. It receives a standard form log-file and outputs a data matrix
DMtimebins. The data matrix contains counts of message types by time-bins of one
hour.
4.3.2 Correlation
The Correlation module receives the time-bin data matrices that were generated by
the Data Type Extractor. The Correlation module computes:
• The correlation coefficients for all the resource use counters and extracts a
smaller set of resource use counters for analysis.
• The correlation coefficients for all the message types and extracts a smaller set
of messages for analysis.
Our Correlation module currently evaluates two correlation methods. They
are: (i) Pearson correlation, and (ii) Spearman-Rank correlation. The TACC Stats
system resource use monitor monitors all the instantaneous values for all system
metrics at all time intervals. Any change in the resource use counter readings can
be tracked by summing up all changes between consecutive time intervals. When
the counts for a pair of resource use counters increase gradually, the Spearman-
Rank correlation method can be used for capturing a monotonically increasing
relationship between the resource use counters. The messages in the system logs are
only instantaneous values. The counts for a pair of messages may increase gradually
or fluctuate over time. Hence, the Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods
can be used for capturing message patterns which change over time. We use Pearson
correlation to identify linear patterns of resource use counters and messages. We
use Spearman-Rank correlation to identify monotonically increasing patterns of
resource use counters and messages. Other methods are available. However, those
methods assume that the variables in the data are independent and identically
distributed. Therefore, the Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation algorithms are
54
suitable methods. We implemented the Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation
methods into the Correlation module.
The Pearson correlation algorithm [67] assumes that the relationship between
the data of two variables is linear and a line of best fit is drawn through the data of
the two variables. Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r is defined as the mean of the
























is the standard score of y, x
and y are two datasets containing n values of a pair of resource use counters or











i=1(yi − ȳ)2 is the sample standard deviation of y, x̄ and ȳ is the
sample mean of x and y.
The Spearman-Rank correlation algorithm [67] assumes that the relationship
between the data of two variables is monotonic. A monotonic relationship does
one of the following: (i) when the value of one variable increases the value of the
other variable increases, (ii) when the value of one variable remains the value of
the other variable remains. Spearman-Rank’s correlation coefficient, ρ is defined as
the Pearson correlation coefficient between a pair of ranked variables. To rank the
variables, we implemented a standard technique that is called the tied rank average
method [67]. We describe the ranking process as follows:
• Rank order the values in the dataset x with the smallest value getting a rank
of 1.
• If more than one value has the same rank in dataset x, assign the average rank
to these values.
• Rank order the values in the dataset y with the smallest value getting a rank
of 1.
• If more than one value has the same rank in the dataset y, assign the average
rank to these values.
The resource use data is generated at regular time intervals and the system
logs are generated only if an error output statement in the code is triggered. Because
of this, the resource use logs and system logs contain timestamps that are different.
As a result, different numbers of data points are contained in the resource use
counters and message types datasets. Both Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation
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algorithms require the same number of data points on the x-axis in the datasets. As
such, we do not correlate a resource use counter and message type. Having said that,
our objective is to identify correlations of resource use counters and correlations
of system events. Therefore, we apply the Correlation module separately to the
resource use data and system logs as shown in Figure 4.2.
After we have obtained the correlation matrices, we generate the lists of
strong positive correlated resource use counters and strong positive correlated system
events. We have configured the Correlation module using a process given in [8] and
we describe the process as follows: ∀r<m,n> ∈MTXr where MTXr is a correlation
matrix, r<m,n> is a correlation coefficient in the correlation matrix MTXr, m is the
correlation matrix row index, n is the correlation matrix column index, if there are
the most number of correlations such that r<m,n> of each correlation is the same,
and r<m,n> lies between 0.8 and 1 (inclusive), then rth = r<m,n>,m 6= n. We use
the following rules to interpret the strength of the correlation coefficient. The rules
are [1]: (a) 0.8 to 1: Strong positive correlation, (b) 0.3 to 0.79: Moderate positive
correlation, (c) 0.1 to 0.29: Weak positive correlation.
Our Correlation module extracts: (i) the resource use counters that are strong
positive correlated, and (ii) the system events that are strong positive correlated.
However, we also need to know if the system has recovered from an error. Because
of this, the Correlation module extracts system events that are weakly correlated to
a system failure event.
Validation
We test the significance of all the correlation coefficients by applying a standard











where r is a correlation coefficient. We have defined the null (H0) and alternate
(Ha) hypotheses as follows: (i) H0r that a pair of resource use counters are weakly
positive correlated, (ii) Har that a pair of resource use counters are strongly positive
correlated, (iii) H0e that a pair of system events are weakly positive correlated, and
(iv) Hae that a pair of system events are strongly positive correlated. Then, we





= (F (r)− F (H0))×
√
n− 3 (4.3)
where n is the number of time-bins, SE = 1√
n−3 is the standard error, and under
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the null hypothesis uz = F (H0). When z ≥ 2.64 at 99% confidence level, we reject
the null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis. We are interested in: (i)
resource use counters that are strong positive correlated, and (ii) system events that
are strong positive correlated. For all the hypotheses, we use the significance level,
α = 0.01 and apply a one-sided test to obtain all the P -values. A P -value less than
0.01 indicates that it is highly unlikely the result would be observed under the null
hypothesis.
Handling False Positive
When we are given d number of hypotheses, the probability to observe one significant
result due to chance is 1− (1−P )d where P is the p-value obtained from each test. If
we need to test only one hypothesis and obtain a P -value of 0.01, then the probability
that this is a false positive is 1%. If we need to test more hypotheses, for example
we have 26 hypotheses to test and obtain a P -value of 0.01 for each test, then the
probability that there is at least one false positive is 1−(1−0.01)26 = 1−0.9926 = 0.22
or 22%. The Bonferroni correction accounts for the inflation in false positive [26].
The Bonferroni correction works as follows: For each test, we apply the Bonferroni
correction on the unadjusted P -value to obtain an adjusted P -value. We multiply
the unadjusted P -value by d and obtain the adjusted P -value.
Implementation of Significance Testing
We describe the process we implemented for testing the significance of all the
correlation coefficients: We use RUExt and MTExt to generate the number of hours
for each date of the logs and use the Data Type Extractor (DTE) to generate the
number of dates. Given the total number of hours in each date of logs and the
correlation coefficients, the validation sub-components in the Correlation module
use the correlation coefficients and number of hours to compute Fishers z-scores for
all correlation coefficients – the flow is shown in Figure 4.2. Then, we map all the
z-scores to P -values by using a Z-table – the P -values obtained are the unadjusted
P -values. We implemented the Z-table in the Correlation module. Then, we multiply
the unadjusted P -value by the total number of dates and obtain the adjusted P -value
for all hypotheses.
4.3.3 Time-bin Extraction
The Time-bin Extraction module receives the data matrices that contain the re-
source use counters that are strongly correlated and system events that are strongly
correlated. We generated the data matrices by:
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• Mapping the names in the list of strongly correlated resource use counters
to the names of the resource use counters in the resource use counters data
matrix, and obtain a smaller resource use counters data matrix.
• Mapping the names in the list of strongly correlated messages to the names
of the message types in the message types data matrix, and obtain a smaller
message types data matrix.
The Time-Bin Extraction module obtains the variance for the correlated
resource use counters and correlated system events at every hour to identify the hour






(xi − x̄)2 (4.4)
where n is the sample size of x, x̄ is the sample mean of x. Our objective is to
identify the earliest hour of change in the system behaviour. To achieve this, we
implemented a process for extracting the variance associated with the time-bins. We
describe the process as follows:
1. Store the variance for each time-bin in a list lvar.
2. Obtain the difference in the variance between two consecutive time-bins and
store the difference in a list lvardiff .
3. Sort lvardiff in descending order with the first element the largest difference in
variance.
4. The time-bin that has the highest variance is the earliest hour of change in the
system behaviour during the day.
4.4 Case Study: Ranger HPC System
In this section, we study error cases within the context of the Ranger HPC system
and then we will apply CORRMEXT to identify error cases on Lonestar4 and
Stampede-1 in Chapter 5. The Ranger HPC system was operated by the Texas
Advanced Computing Center at The University of Texas at Austin from 2007 – 2013.
On Ranger, we collected three months worth of resource usage data and Rationalized
message logs. In the reference [36], J. Hammond et. al. found that there is a lead
time of six hours to a compute node crash when an error is first reported on Ranger.
A compute node crash can be identified by searching the system log-message for
the keywords soft lockup. To extract the dates when compute nodes crashed, we
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implemented a function to scan the system logs for soft lockup keywords. When
we find a soft lockup message, we extract the date associated with the soft lockup
message. In the Rationalized message logs, we identified 26 dates of soft lockup
events. The dates of resource usage data and Rationalized message logs analysed are
given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: List of dates of log-data analysed on Ranger.
Month Dates
June 2011 3, 5, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22
July 2011 5, 6, 7, 11, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31
August 2011 3, 4, 11, 22, 24, 30, 31
We obtain the diagnostics reports generated by CORRMEXT. The diagnostics
reports contain the lists of correlated resource use counters and correlated events. In
the reports, we identified five error cases on the Ranger HPC system. The error cases
are: (i) memory allocation and memory leaks, (ii) communication and filesystem
I/O errors, (iii) chipset and memory errors, (iv) file access and process errors, and
(v) process errors and memory exhaustion. All the error cases are different. We
summarise the error cases in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: List of error cases identified on the Ranger HPC system.
Component Error No. of dates
NUMA & process memory allocation Memory allocation & memory leaks 10
Lustre filesystem & Infiniband Communication & Lustre I/O errors 11
Chipset & ECC memory Chipset & memory errors 13
Linux virtual memory File access & process errors 8
Linux virtual memory Process errors & memory exhaustion 2
4.4.1 NUMA and Process Memory Allocation
In this error case, we determine: (i) correlations between NUMA and Linux process
resource use counters, and (ii) correlations between application memory leaks. We
use the correlations to diagnose NUMA memory allocation problems. Then, we
assess the system reliability.
Phase 1: Correlated NUMA & Process Resource Use Counters
When a node runs out of memory pages (an error occurs) but a process makes a
request for memory pages on that node, the resource use counter named numa miss
is incremented. When a process requests memory pages on the out-of-memory node
but ends up being allocated memory pages on another node (a recovery from the
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error), the resource use counter named numa foreign is incremented. When a Linux
process is created, the resource use counter named ps processes is incremented.
When a context switch occurs between the CPUs, the resource use counter named
ps ctxt is incremented. The resource use counters that record NUMA and Linux
processes activities can be used to see what happens when a Linux process makes a
request for memory on a node that has run out of free memory pages.
Figure 4.3 shows the correlations between the resource use counters NUMA
miss, Linux process and context switch in June 2011.
Figure 4.3: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
Figure 4.4 shows the correlations between the resource use counters NUMA
miss, Linux process and context switch in July 2011.
Figure 4.4: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
Figure 4.5 shows the correlations between the resource use counters NUMA
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miss, Linux process and context switch in August 2011.
Figure 4.5: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
From Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, we observe there is a strong
positive correlation between NUMA miss, Linux processes created and context
switches. We identified: (i) correlations of numa miss and ps processes with scores
ranging from 0.93 to 1 on 25 dates, and (ii) correlations of numa miss and ps ctxt
with scores ranging from 0.93 to 1 on 23 dates. There are small changes in the
correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation
scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on
time-bins of one hour.
Figure 4.6 shows the correlations between the resource use counters NUMA
foreign, Linux process and context switch in June 2011.
Figure 4.6: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
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Figure 4.7 shows the correlations between the resource use counters NUMA
foreign, Linux process and context switch in July 2011.
Figure 4.7: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
Figure 4.8 shows the correlations between the resource use counters NUMA
foreign, Linux process and context switch in August 2011.
Figure 4.8: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
From Figure 4.6, Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, we observe that there is a
strong positive correlation of NUMA foreign, Linux processes created and context
switches. We identified: (i) correlations of numa foreign and ps processes with
scores ranging from 0.93 to 1 on 21 dates, and (ii) correlations of numa foreign and
ps ctxt with scores ranging from 0.93 to 1 on 21 dates. There are small changes in
the correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation
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scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on
time-bins of one hour.
On August 4 and 30, we found that the correlated NUMA & processes resource
use counters were identified only by Pearson correlation. However, we also found
that on 17 dates the correlated NUMA miss & Linux processes resource use counters
were identified only by Spearman-Rank correlation. On 16 dates the correlated
NUMA foreign & Linux processes resource use counters were identified only by
Spearman-Rank correlation. If we use only the Pearson correlation method, then the
correlated NUMA & processes resource use counters would not be identified on more
dates. If we use only the Spearman-Rank correlation method, then the correlated
NUMA & processes resource use counters would not be identified on August 4 and
30. Our results show that:
• Both the Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods are required. On
August 4 and 30, correlations of NUMA memory allocation and Linux process
resource allocations were identified only by Pearson correlation. On 16 dates,
correlations of NUMA foreign and Linux process resource allocations were
identified only by Spearman-Rank correlation. On 17 dates, correlations of
NUMA miss and Linux process resource allocations were identified only by
Spearman-Rank correlation.
• The system attempted a recovery when a process made a request for memory
pages on a node that had run out of memory. The system recovers by allocating
memory pages on another node for the process. We observed that context
switching occurs when memory pages are allocated on another node.
In the second phase, we will use the correlations of two different groups of
error events to diagnose application memory leaks.
Phase 2: Correlated Segmentation Faults & General Protection Errors
A program that attempts a read or write operation in a protected memory location will
cause the operating system to report a segmentation fault. When a program accesses
a memory location that is protected, a general protection fault (GPF) interrupt is
issued by the processor. When a GPF is issued, the operating system removes the
program, issues a signal to the user and continues executing other programs. In most
cases, the operating system catches the general protection fault interrupt. However,
in some cases the operating system may fail to catch the GPF. If the operating
system fails to catch the GPF, the processor issues a second GPF. However, in a
rare case the operating system may fail to catch the second GPF. If the operating
system fails to catch the second GPF, the processor stops working and it will only
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respond to a reset. A segmentation fault can be identified in a system message-log
containing the keywords segfault. A memory access violation can be identified in
a system message-log containing the keywords general protection error.
Figure 4.9 shows the correlation of segmentation fault and general protection
error events in June 2011.
Figure 4.9: The dot-circled events were identified by Pearson correlation only.
Figure 4.10 shows the correlation of segmentation fault and general protection
error events in July 2011.
Figure 4.10: Correlations of segmentation fault and general protection error events.
Figure 4.11 shows the correlation of segmentation fault and general protection
error events in August 2011.
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Figure 4.11: The dot-circled events were identified by Pearson correlation only.
From Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11, we observe that there is a strong
positive correlation between segmentation fault and general protection error events.
On 10 dates, we identified correlations of segfault and general protection error
events with scores ranging from 0.98 to 1. There are small changes in the correlation
scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation scores are
within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on time-bins of one
hour. The dates coincide with all the dates of correlated NUMA miss and Linux
process resource use counters, and correlated NUMA foreign and Linux process
resource use counters (see Section 4.4.1). We found that the correlated segmentation
faults and general protection errors were identified only by Pearson correlation on
June 21 and August 22.
Next, we identify which program caused the segmentation fault. To identify
the faulty program, we implemented a function that scans the system message-
log for the keywords general protection error and segfault. We obtained the
segmentation fault and general protection error messages and extract the program
name. The name of the program is appended at the back of the message. We identified
10 programs. The programs are: enzo.exe, preplot, charmm, fft_x, siesta_test,
lx, phParAdapt, openGR, vasp_acml and mpmc. enzo.exe is an executable for a
cosmology simulation program. preplot is used by analysis programs to reformat
the output for plotting in GNUplot. charmm is the name for a molecular simulation
program. fft_x is a fast Fourier transform algorithm. siesta_test is a unit testing
tool for JavaScript. phParAdapt is a program that simulates multiphase flows using
a parallel adaptive mesh method. openGR is a program that supports large numerical
simulations in general relativity. vasp_acml is a Vienna Ab initio simulation package
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and AMD core maths library. mpmc is a Massively Parallel Monte Carlo method
package.
Correlations with failures: Next, we determine the correlation strength of:
(i) segfault and soft lockup events, and (ii) general protection error and
soft lockup events. We implemented a function to scan the list of correlated events
and a summary is provided in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Summary of correlated “segfault” and soft lockup events, and correlated
“general protection error” and soft lockup events on Ranger.
Error event Failure event Date pCorr sRank
segfault (charmm) soft lockup July 6 0.99 1
general protection error (charmm) soft lockup July 6 1 1
segfault (phParAdapt) soft lockup July 23 0.99 1
general protection error (phParAdapt) soft lockup July 23 0.99 1
From Table 4.3, we observe that: (i) charmm and phParAdapt programs are
associated with both segmentation fault and general protection errors, and (ii) there
is a strong positive correlation of segfault and general protection error events
to soft lockup events on July 6 and 23. Our results show that memory access violation
by the charmm and phParAdapt programs led to soft lockups on July 6 and 23. On
the other eight dates, we found that the segmentation fault and general protection
error events are weakly correlated.
Detailed diagnosis: During a system recovery that was caused by a NUMA miss,
several programs violated the protected memory location policy and caused the
Linux operating system to report a segmentation fault. On eight of ten dates the
faulty program was removed by the operating system. This represents a recovery
rate of 80%. However, on two dates the general protection fault triggered by two
programs were not caught by the Linux operating system which led to failure.
The benefit of combining analysis of NUMA and Linux process resource use
counters with program memory leaks is as follows: When on the same day, Linux
process and NUMA resource use counters are correlated and segmentation fault and
general protection error events are also correlated, it shows that memory errors are
generated by memory allocation activities. Therefore, we can: (i) use the correlation
of NUMA and Linux process resource use counters to monitor the state of memory
allocation, and (ii) use the correlation of segmentation fault and general protection
error events to identify the program that caused the memory leak.
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Phase 3: Earliest Hour of Change
Table 4.4 shows the earliest hour of change in the correlated NUMA & Linux process
resource use counters and correlated segmentation fault and general protection error
events.
Table 4.4: Hours associated with the correlated NUMA & Processes resource use
counters and correlated segmentation fault & general protection fault error messages
on Ranger.
Correlated Jun Jun Jun Jun Jul Jul Jul Jul Aug Aug
counters 3 14 21 22 6 11 23 26 3 22
NUMA & 1 1 3 10 12 7 5 5 1 1
processes PM PM AM AM PM PM AM PM PM AM
Correlated Jun Jun Jun Jun Jul Jul Jul Jul Aug Aug
errors 3 14 21 22 6 11 23 26 3 22
Segfaults & 1 7 11 5 2 11 5 7 4 10
GPF errors PM AM AM AM PM PM PM PM AM AM
On all the dates, we observe that the earliest hour of change is different. On
six dates, the earliest hour of change is associated with the correlated NUMA & Linux
process resource use counters. On three dates, the earliest hour of change is associated
with the correlated segmentation fault & general protection error events. On one
date, the earliest hour of change is associated with both the correlated resource use
counters and correlated errors. If we use only the correlated segmentation faults and
general protection error events, the earliest hour of change on six dates would not
be identified. If we use only the correlated NUMA & Linux process resource use
counters, the earliest hour of change on three dates would not be identified. Our
results show that we require both the correlated resource use counters and correlated
errors for identifying the earliest hour of change in the system behaviour on all the
dates. We found that there are different time-windows between the hours of change
on all the dates. The time-window ranges from one hour to 12 hours.
Validation
Next, we test the significance of the correlation coefficient of: (i) groups of resource
use counters that are strong positive correlated, and (ii) groups of error events that
are strong positive correlated. We tested all the correlation coefficients against the
null hypothesis. We obtained the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients and a
summary is given in Table 4.5.
From Table 4.5, we observe that the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients
range from 6.15 to 10.68. At the 99% confidence level, under the null hypothesis
67
Table 4.5: Summary of z-scores. n contains the number of hours in one day of logs.
Correlated groups June 2011 July 2011 Aug 2011
NUMA & Processes resource zr = 10.68 6.15 ≤ zr ≤ 10.68 zr = 10.68
use counters (n = 24)
Segmentation fault & GPF errors ze = 10.68 9.08 ≤ ze ≤ 10.68 9.08 ≤ ze ≤ 10.68
(15 ≤ n ≤ 24)
z0r = 2.64 and z0e = 2.64. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the
alternate hypothesis.
Next, for all hypothesis tests we use the significance level, α = 0.01 and
apply a one-sided test to obtain a P -value. We use the P -value to determine the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. Table 4.5 summarises
the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients. We observe that the smallest z-
score is 6.15. Since this is a one-sided test, the P -value is equal to the probability
of observing a value greater than 6.15 in the standard normal distribution, or
P (Z > 6.15) = 1− P (Z ≤ 6.15) = 1− 0.99999 = 0.00001. To account for inflation
in false positive due to multiple independent tests, we obtain the adjusted P -value
0.00001× 25 = 0.00025 where 25 is the number of dates. The adjusted P -value is
less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely this result would be observed under the
null hypothesis. From Table 4.5, we observe that all the z-scores are greater than
or equal to 6.15. Therefore, the adjusted P -value for all the z-scores are less than
0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely these results would be observed under the null
hypothesis.
4.4.2 Lustre Filesystem and Infiniband Network
In this error case, we determine: (i) correlations between the Infiniband network
and Lustre filesystem resource use counters, and (ii) correlations between Lustre
filesystem and Infiniband network communication errors. We use the correlations to
diagnose problems on the Lustre filesystem and Infiniband network. Then, we assess
the reliability of the Lustre filesystem inodes and Infiniband network.
Phase 1: Correlated Infiniband Network & Lustre Filesystem Resource
Use Counters
When network packets are dropped on the Infiniband network, the resource use
counter named net ib0 tx_dropped is incremented. When network packets are
transmitted on the Infiniband network, the resource use counter named net ib0
tx_packets is incremented. When data is being read on the Lustre filesystem share
partition, the resource use counter named llite /share read_bytes is incremented.
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When data is being written to the Lustre filesystem share partition, the resource
use counter named llite /share write_bytes is incremented. The Infiniband
network packet drop and network packets transmitted, and Lustre filesystem read
and write resource use counters can be used to see what happens when the network
and filesystem are heavily used.
Figure 4.12 shows the correlations between the resource use counters network
packet drop, filesystem read and write bytes in June 2011.
Figure 4.12: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
Figure 4.13 shows the correlations between the resource use counters network
packet drop, filesystem read and write bytes in July 2011.
Figure 4.13: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
Figure 4.14 shows the correlations between the resource use counters network
packet drop, filesystem read and write bytes in August 2011.
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Figure 4.14: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
From Figure 4.12, Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14, we observe that there is a
strong positive correlation between: (i) network packet drop and filesystem read bytes,
and (ii) network packet drop and filesystem write bytes. We identified: (i) correlations
between net ib0 tx_dropped and llite /share read_bytes with scores ranging
from 0.81 to 1 on 20 dates, and (ii) correlations between net ib0 tx_dropped
and llite /share write_bytes with scores ranging from 0.82 to 0.99 on 12 dates.
There are small changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40
minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the
correlations obtained on time-bins of one hour.
Figure 4.15 shows the correlations between the resource use counters network
packets transmitted, filesystem read and write bytes in June 2011.
Figure 4.15: Correlation of network packets transmitted, filesystem read bytes and
filesystem write bytes.
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Figure 4.16 shows the correlations between the resource use counters network
packets transmitted, filesystem read and write bytes in July 2011.
Figure 4.16: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
Figure 4.17 shows the correlations between the resource use counters network
packets transmitted, filesystem read and write bytes in August 2011.
Figure 4.17: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
From Figure 4.15, Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17, we observe that there is a
strong positive correlation between: (i) network packets transmitted and filesystem
read bytes, and (ii) network packets transmitted and filesystem write bytes. We identi-
fied: (i) correlations between net ib0 tx_packets and llite /share read_bytes
with scores ranging from 0.94 to 1 on 22 dates, and (ii) correlations between
net ib0 tx_packets and llite /share write_bytes with scores ranging from
0.80 to 0.99 on 16 dates. There are small changes in the correlation scores obtained
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on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1.
Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on time-bins of one hour.
On five dates, the correlated net ib0 tx_dropped and llite /share read_
bytes, net ib0 tx_dropped and llite /share write_bytes, and net ib0 tx
_packets and llite /share write_bytes were identified only by Pearson correla-
tion. On 18 more dates, the correlated net ib0 tx_packets, net ib0 tx_dropped,
llite /share read_bytes and llite /share write_bytes were identified only
by Spearman-Rank correlation. If we use only the Pearson correlation method, then
the correlated Infiniband and Lustre filesystem resource use counters on 18 dates
would not be identified. If we use only the Spearman-Rank correlation method, then
the correlated Infiniband and Lustre filesystem resource use counters on five more
dates would not be identified. Our results show that:
• There is a strong relationship of Infiniband network packets transmitted,
Infiniband network packet dropped, Lustre filesystem read bytes and Lustre
filesystem write bytes on 24 dates.
• Both the Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods are required. On
five dates, the correlated Infiniband network and Lustre filesystem activities
were identified only by Pearson correlation. On 18 more dates, the correlated
Infiniband network and Lustre filesystem activities were identified only by
Spearman-Rank correlation.
In the second phase, we will use the correlations between two different groups
of error events to diagnose communication and Lustre filesystem errors.
Phase 2: Correlated Communication & Lustre Filesystem Errors
In the system logs, we identify a communication error by searching for a message-log
that contains the keywords error occurred while communicating with ... We
identify Lustre filesystem errors by searching the system logs for a message-log that
contains either failure inode or error reading dir. In a Unix-style filesystem,
the attributes about a file and the location of disk blocks where the file is stored are
contained in a data structure called an inode. Inodes provide clients the information
they need in order to access files that are stored in a storage server. When an
inode is corrupted, the information stored in the inode is lost. If a client accesses
a corrupted inode, it is unable to obtain the information for locating the file. A
corrupted filesystem partition or faulty hard drive can result in inode failures.
Figure 4.18 shows the correlations between Infiniband network communication




Figure 4.18: The dot-circled events were identified by Pearson correlation only.
From Figure 4.18, we observe that there is a strong positive correlation
between Infiniband communication errors and Lustre inode failures. We identi-
fied: (i) correlations between error occurred while communicating with .. and
failure inode events with scores ranging from 0.81 and 1 on 10 dates. There are
small changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes
but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations
obtained on time-bins of one hour.
Figure 4.19 shows the correlations between Infiniband network communication
error and Lustre filesystem directory read error in August 2011. We observe that
there is a strong positive correlation between Infiniband communication error and
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Figure 4.19: Correlation of communication error and directory read error events.
Lustre filesystem directory read error. We identified: (i) correlations between
error occurred while communicating with .. and error reading dir events
with a score of 1 on August 3. There are small changes in the correlation scores
obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8
to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on time-bins of one hour.
On 11 dates, we found that the dates of correlated communication and
filesystem errors coincide with all the dates of correlated Lustre filesystem and
Infiniband network resource use counters. On the 11 dates, we found that the
correlated communication and filesystem errors were identified by Pearson correlation.
However, the correlated communication and filesystem errors were identified by
Spearman-Rank correlation only on six out of the 11 dates. Our results show that
the correlated communication and filesystem errors were identified only by the
Pearson correlation method.
To determine the cause of the communication error, we implemented a function
to scan the error occurred while communicating with .. message for keywords
failed with Lustre and failed with client.c. If the keywords failed with
Lustre and failed with client.c are contained in the communication error mes-
sage, then it shows that the communication error is associated with the Lustre filesys-
tem. On 10 dates, we found that the failed with Lustre and failed with client
.c keywords are contained in the error occurred while communicating with ..
messages. The communication error message is correlated to failure inode on all
the 10 dates. This shows that the communication error was caused by an inode
failure.
Correlations with failures: Next, we determine the correlation strength between
communication errors, filesystem inode failures and soft lockup events. We implemen-
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Table 4.6: Summary of correlated “error occurred while communicating with” and
“soft lockup”, and correlated “failure inode” and “soft lockup” events on Ranger.
Error event Failure event Date pCorr sRank
error occurred while communicating with soft lockup June 21 1 -
failure inode soft lockup June 21 1 -
error occurred while communicating with soft lockup July 23 0.99 -
failure inode soft lockup July 23 0.99 -
ted a function to scan the list of correlated events for the error occurred while
communicating with ..., failure inode and soft lockup messages. Table 4.6
provides a summary of the correlated events. From Table 4.6, we observe that: (i)
there is a strong positive correlation between communication errors and soft lockup
events on June 21 and July 23, and (ii) there is a strong positive correlation between
inode failure and soft lockup events also on June 21 and July 23. We found that the
communication error, inode failure and soft lockup events were weakly correlated on
eight dates.
Detailed diagnosis: On 10 dates in June and July 2011, some inodes on the Lustre
filesystem became corrupted. Because of this, the remote client was unable to access
a file on Lustre. On 8 of 11 dates, the inode failure did not cause the remote client
to hang. This represents a recovery rate of 72%. However, on 2 of 11 dates the inode
failure led to a remote client hang, representing a failure rate of 18%.
We found that there is a strong positive correlation between error occurred
while communicating with ... and error reading dir events – the correlation
score is 1 (see Figure 4.19). We scanned the error occurred while communicating
with ... message and identified the keywords failed with Lustre and failed
with client.c in the message. We scanned the list of correlated events to determine
the correlation strength between the communication error, error reading directory
and soft lockup events. We found that error occurred while communicating
with ... and error reading dir events were weakly correlated to soft lockup
event.
Detailed diagnosis: On August 3, a remote client made a directory access request
on the Lustre filesystem. When the client attempted to read the directory, the
Lustre filesystem generated a directory read error and communicated the error to
the remote client. The directory read error did not cause the remote client to hang.
Combining analysis of Lustre filesystem and Infiniband network resource use
counters and errors provides the following benefit: When on the same day, we observe:
(i) Lustre I/O and Infiniband network resource use counters are strongly positive
correlated, and (ii) Lustre filesystem and communication error events are strongly
positive correlated, it shows that Lustre filesystem and communication errors were
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generated by Lustre I/O and Infiniband network activities. Therefore, we can use
the correlations between Lustre I/O and Infiniband network resource use counters to
monitor the state of Lustre and Infiniband.
Phase 3: Earliest Hour of Change
Table 4.7 provides the earliest hour of change in the correlated Lustre I/O and
Infiniband resource use counters and correlated Lustre filesystem and communication
errors.
Table 4.7: Hours associated with the correlated Infiniband and Lustre I/O resource
use counters and correlated communication and Lustre filesystem errors on Ranger.
Correlated Jun Jun Jun Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Aug
counters 3 21 22 6 7 11 18 19 23 26 3
Infiniband & 12 10 11 12 12 11 7 1 7 6 11
Lustre I/O PM AM AM PM PM PM AM PM AM AM AM
Correlated Jun Jun Jun Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Aug
errors 3 21 22 6 7 11 18 19 23 26 3
Communica- 8 10 5 11 12 11 10 9 6 3 3
tion & Lustre FS PM PM PM PM PM PM PM PM PM PM AM
On all the dates, we observe that there are different hours of change. On
eight dates, the earliest hour of change is associated with the correlated Infiniband
and Lustre I/O resource use counters. On one date, the earliest hour of change is
associated with the correlated communication and Lustre filesystem errors. On two
dates, the earliest hour of change is associated with both the correlated resource use
counters and correlated errors. If we use only the correlated error events, then the
earliest hour of change on eight dates would not be identified. If we use only the
correlated resource use counters, then the earliest hour of change on one date would
not be identified. Our results show that we require both the correlated resource
use counters and correlated errors for identifying the earliest hour of change in the
system behaviour on all dates. We found that the time-window between the hours
of change on all the dates are different. The time-window ranges from one-hour to
15-hours.
Validation
Next, we test the significance of the correlation coefficient of: (i) groups of resource
use counters that are strong positive correlated, and (ii) groups of error events that
are strong positive correlated. We tested all the correlation coefficients against the
null hypothesis. We obtained the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients and a
summary is provided in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8: Summary of z-scores. n contains the number of hours in one day of logs.
Correlated groups June 2011 July 2011 Aug 2011
Infiniband & Lustre I/O 3.71 ≤ zr ≤ 10.68 3.58 ≤ zr ≤ 10.68 6.51 ≤ zr ≤ 10.68
resource use counters (n = 24)
Communication & filesystem 3.71 ≤ ze ≤ 10.68 5.29 ≤ ze ≤ 10.68 ze = 10.68
errors (n = 24)
From Table 4.8, we observe that the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients
range from 3.58 to 10.68. At the 99% confidence level, under the null hypothesis
z0r = 2.64 and z0e = 2.64. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the
alternate hypothesis.
Next, for all hypothesis tests we use the significance level, α = 0.01 and
apply a one-sided test to obtain a P -value. We use the P -value for determining the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. Table 4.8 summarises
the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients. We observe that the smallest z-
score is 3.58. Since this is a one-sided test, the P -value is equal to the probability
of observing a value greater than 3.58 in the standard normal distribution, or
P (Z > 3.58) = 1 − P (Z ≤ 3.58) = 1 − 0.999828 = 0.000172. To account for the
inflation in false positive due to multiple independent tests, we obtain the adjusted
P -value 0.000172 × 24 = 0.0041 where 24 is the number of dates. The adjusted
P -value is less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely this result would be observed
under the null hypothesis. From Table 4.8, we observe that all the z-scores are
greater than or equal to 3.58. Therefore, the adjusted P -value for all the z-scores
are less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely these results would be observed
under the null hypothesis.
4.4.3 Chipset and ECC Memory System
In this error case, we determine: (i) correlations between CPU and memory resource
use counters, and (ii) correlations between chipset and ECC memory errors. We use
the correlations to diagnose memory errors. Then, we assess the reliability of the
ECC memory system.
Phase 1: Correlated CPU & Memory Resource Use Counters
When a user application is using the CPU, the resource use counter named CPU user
is incremented. When a system application is using the CPU, the resource use
counter named CPU system is incremented. When a memory page has not been
accessed recently in the main memory, the resource use counter named MEM Inactive
is incremented. When a memory page is recently accessed in the main memory, the
77
resource use counter named MEM Active is incremented. The CPU and memory
resource use counters can be used to see what happens when CPU and memory
activities occur.
Figure 4.20 shows the correlations between the resource use counters CPU
user, memory active and memory inactive in June 2011.
Figure 4.20: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
Figure 4.21 shows the correlations between the resource use counters CPU
user, memory active and memory inactive in July 2011.
Figure 4.21: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
Figure 4.22 shows the correlations between the resource use counters CPU
user, memory active and memory inactive in August 2011.
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Figure 4.22: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
From Figure 4.20, Figure 4.21 and Figure 4.22, we observe that there is a
strong positive correlation between CPU user and memory access. We identified:
(i) correlations between CPU user and MEM Inactive with scores ranging from 0.81
to 0.93 on five dates, and (ii) correlations between CPU user and MEM Active with
scores ranging from 0.80 to 0.97 on six dates. There are small changes in the
correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation
scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on
time-bins of one hour.
Figure 4.23 shows the correlations between the resource use counters CPU
system, memory active and memory inactive in June 2011.
Figure 4.23: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
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Figure 4.24 shows the correlations between the resource use counters CPU
system, memory active and memory inactive in July 2011.
Figure 4.24: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
Figure 4.25 shows the correlations between the resource use counters CPU
system, memory active and memory inactive in August 2011.
Figure 4.25: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only. The dot-circled counters were identified by Pearson correlation only.
From Figure 4.23, Figure 4.24 and Figure 4.25, we observe that there is a
strong positive correlation between CPU system and memory access. We identified:
(i) correlations between CPU system and MEM Inactive with scores ranging from 0.84
to 0.97 on eight dates, and (ii) correlations between CPU system and MEM Active
with scores ranging from 0.81 to 0.97 on seven dates. There are small changes in the
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correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation
scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on
time-bins of one hour.
We found that the correlated resource use counters were only identified by
Pearson correlation on June 16, July 23, August 04 and 11. We found that the
correlated resource use counters were only identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
on seven different dates. If we use only Pearson correlation, then the correlated CPU
and memory access resource use counters on June 05 and 22, July 06, 11 and 24,
August 22 and 30 would not be identified. If we use only Spearman-Rank correlation,
then the correlated CPU and memory access resource use counters on June 16, July
23, August 04 and 11 would not be identified. Our results show that:
• There is a strong relationship of CPU user, CPU system, Memory Active and
Memory Inactive resource use counters on 13 dates.
• Both Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods are required. On
four dates, the correlated CPU and memory access resource use counters were
identified only by Pearson correlation. On seven more dates, the correlated CPU
and memory access resource use counters were identified only by Spearman-
Rank correlation.
In the second phase, we will use the correlations between two different groups
of error events to diagnose ECC memory errors.
Phase 2: Correlated Chipset & ECC Memory Errors
The northbridge is a chip in the core logic chipset architecture on a computer mother-
board. The CPU, memory and graphics controller communicate via the northbridge
chip which is connected directly to the CPU. ECC memory is used in computers
where internal data corruption can not be tolerated under any circumstances. When
the CPU attempts to access corrupted data stored in ECC memory, the northbridge
reports an error by generating a Northbridge error message, a CPU core core
message that contains the CPU number that attempted to access the data and an
ECC error ECC error message.
From Figure 4.26a, Figure 4.26b and Figure 4.26c, we observe that there is a
strong positive correlation of northbridge, CPU core and ECC errors. We identified:
(i) correlations between Northbridge error and ECC error events with scores
ranging from 0.99 to 1 on 26 dates, and (ii) correlations between Northbridge error
and core events with scores ranging from 0.99 to 1 on 26 dates. We observe that
the dates of correlated northbridge error, core and ECC memory errors coincide





Figure 4.26: Correlations of northbridge error, core and ECC error events.
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changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but
the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations
obtained on time-bins of one hour.
We found that the correlated events were identified by both Pearson and
Spearman-Rank correlation methods on all the 26 dates. When both Pearson
and Spearman-Rank correlation methods identify the correlated events, Pearson
correlation can be used as the primary method. Our results show that internal data
corruption occurred daily on the Ranger HPC system.
Correlations with failures: Next, we determine the correlation strength of north-
bridge, CPU core and ECC memory errors to soft lockup events. We implemented
a function that scans the list of correlated events for Northbridge error, core,
ECC error and soft lockup. We found that the Northbridge error, core and
ECC error events were weakly correlated to soft lockup events on all the 26 dates.
This represents a recovery rate of 100%.
Combining analysis of CPU and memory access resource use counters with
ECC memory errors provides the following benefit: When on the same day, CPU
and memory access resource use counters are correlated and northbridge, CPU core
and ECC error events are also correlated, it shows that CPU and memory access
activities are associated with the generation of ECC memory errors. Therefore,
we can use the correlated CPU and memory access resource use counters with the
correlated CPU core, ECC and northbridge error events to monitor the state of the
ECC memory recovery protocol.
Phase 3: Earliest Hour of Change
Table 4.9 shows the earliest hour of change in the correlated CPU and memory access
resource use counters and correlated northbridge, ECC error and CPU core events.
On all the dates, we observe that there are different earliest hour of change. On five
dates, the earliest hour of change is associated with the correlated CPU and memory
access resource use counters. On seven dates, the earliest hour of change is associated
with the correlated chipset and ECC errors. On one date, the earliest hour of change
is associated with both the correlated resource use counters and correlated errors .
If we use only the correlated chipset and ECC error events, then the earliest hour
of change on five dates would not be identified. If we use only the correlated CPU
and memory access resource use counters, then the earliest hour of change on seven
dates would not be identified. Our results show that we require both the correlated
CPU and memory access resource use counters and correlated chipset and ECC error
events for identifying the earliest hour of change in the system behaviour on all the
dates. We found that there are different time-windows between the hour of change
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Table 4.9: Hours associated with the correlated CPU and memory resource use
counters and correlated chipset and ECC errors on Ranger.
Correlated Jun Jun Jun Jun Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul
counters 5 15 16 22 6 11 23 24 27
CPU & 7 12 6 8 2 12 4 12 10
memory PM AM AM PM PM PM AM PM PM
Correlated Jun Jun Jun Jun Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul
errors 5 15 16 22 6 11 23 24 27
Chipset & 12 1 6 2 4 12 12 2 5
ECC errors AM PM PM AM AM PM AM PM PM
Correlated Aug Aug Aug Aug
counters 4 11 22 30
CPU & 2 12 5 1
memory PM PM AM PM
Correlated Aug Aug Aug Aug
errors 4 11 22 30
Chipset & 8 2 2 6
ECC errors AM PM AM PM
identified on all the dates. The time-window ranges from one hour to 19 hours.
Validation
Next, we test the significance of the correlation coefficient of: (i) groups of resource
use counters that are strong positive correlated, and (ii) groups of error events that
are strong positive correlated. We tested all the correlation coefficients against the
null hypothesis. We obtain the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients and a
summary is provided in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Summary of z-scores. n contains the number of hours in one day of logs.
Correlated groups June 2011 July 2011 Aug 2011
CPU & Memory 3.74 ≤ zr ≤ 5.86 3.74 ≤ zr ≤ 8.16 4.17 ≤ zr ≤ 6.18
counters (n = 24)
Chipset & ECC errors ze = 10.68 ze = 10.68 ze = 10.68
(23 ≤ n ≤ 24)
From Table 4.10, we observe that the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients
range from 3.74 to 10.68. At the 99% confidence level, under the null hypothesis
z0r = 2.64 and z0e = 2.64. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the
alternate hypothesis.
Next, for all hypothesis tests we use the significance level, α = 0.01 and
apply a one-sided test to obtain a P -value. We use the P -value for determining the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. Table 4.10 summarises
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the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients. We observe that the smallest z-
score is 3.74. Since this is a one-sided test, the P -value is equal to the probability
of observing a value greater than 3.74 in the standard normal distribution, or
P (Z > 3.74) = 1 − P (Z ≤ 3.74) = 1 − 0.99992 = 0.00008. To account for the
inflation in false positive due to multiple independent tests, we obtain the adjusted
P -value 0.00008 × 26 = 0.00208 where 26 is the number of dates. The adjusted
P -value is less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely this result would be observed
under the null hypothesis. From Table 4.10, we observe that all the z-scores are
greater than or equal to 3.74. Therefore, the adjusted P -value for all the z-scores
are less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely these results would be observed
under the null hypothesis.
4.4.4 Linux Memory Management
In this error case, we determine: (i) the correlations between hard disk and virtual
memory resource use counters, (ii) the correlations between file access and process
errors, and (iii) the correlations between process errors and system memory exhaustion
events. We use the correlations to diagnose Linux memory management problems.
Then, we assess the reliability of Linux memory management.
Phase 1: Correlated Harddisk and Virtual Memory Resource Use Coun-
ters
When a harddisk executes I/O write operations, the resource use counter named
block hda wr_ios is incremented. When a number of sectors are written on the
harddisk, the resource use counter named block hda wr_sectors is incremented.
When a minor page fault occurs, the resource use counter named vm pgfault is
incremented. When a major page fault occurs, the resource use counter named
vm pgmajfault is incremented. The hard disk and virtual memory resource use
counters can be used to see what happens when secondary storage (i.e., the hard
disk) is used as memory by the Linux operating system.
Figure 4.27a, Figure 4.27b and Figure 4.27c show the correlations of the
resource use counters harddisk I/O write, minor and major page-fault in June, July
and August 2011 respectively. From Figure 4.27a, Figure 4.27b and Figure 4.27c, we
observe that there is a strong positive correlation between the resource use counters
harddisk I/O write, minor and major page-fault. We identified: (i) correlations
between block hda wr_ios and vm pgmajfault with scores ranging from 0.8 to
0.99 on 19 dates, and (ii) correlations between vm pgfault and block hda wr_ios
with scores ranging from 0.8 to 1 on 25 dates. There are small changes in the
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(a) Correlated harddisk I/O write, minor and major page-fault resource use counters in June
2011.
(b) Correlated harddisk I/O write, minor and major page-fault resource use counters in July
2011.
(c) Correlated harddisk I/O write, minor and major page-fault resource use counters in
August 2011.
Figure 4.27: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
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correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation
scores are within 0.8 to 1.
Figure 4.28 shows the correlations of the resource use counters that record
harddisk sector write, minor page-fault and major page-fault in June 2011.
Figure 4.28: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
Figure 4.29 shows the correlations of the resource use counters that record
harddisk sector write, minor page-fault and major page-fault in July 2011.
Figure 4.29: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
From Figure 4.28, Figure 4.29 and Figure 4.30, we observe that there
is a strong positive correlation between the resource use counters harddisk sec-
tor write, minor and major page-fault. We identified: (i) correlations between
block hdd wr_sectors and vm pgmajfault with scores ranging from 0.8 to 0.99
on 20 dates, and (ii) correlations between vm pgfault and block hdd wr_sectors
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Figure 4.30: The full-circled counters were identified by Spearman-Rank correlation
only.
with scores ranging from 0.8 to 1 on 25 dates. There are small changes in the
correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation
scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on
time-bins of one-hour.
We found that only the Spearman-Rank correlation method identified the
correlated harddisk I/O write, harddisk sector write, minor and major page-fault
resource use counters on all dates. If Spearman-Rank correlation alone identified
the correlations on all the dates, then it can be used as the primary method. Our
results show that:
• When the Linux operating system uses the hard disk as memory, there is a
strong positive correlation between the resource use counters harddisk I/O
write, harddisk sector write, minor page-fault and major page-fault.
• The Spearman-Rank correlation method can be used as the primary method
to identify patterns of Linux system memory paging. It identified patterns of
page-fault and harddisk I/O activities that follow a monotonically increasing
function.
Phase 2: Correlated File Access and Process Errors
We identify file access errors by searching the system logs for messages that contain
the keywords read_lock_failed and write_lock_failed. Information about a
process state, name, memory address and running CPU is provided in a Pid: comm
message. We implemented three functions to search and retrieve file access errors
and process messages. When multiple processes access the same file, the filesystem
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uses read and write locks to prevent other processes from writing to the same file.
This is to ensure that the consistency of the file is maintained. In most cases, the
process will complete its file I/O activity. It releases the lock and give it to the next
process. If a process hanged while it is writing to the file, then the process may
fail to release the lock. When another process attempts to access the same file, a
deadlock can occur.
Figure 4.31 shows the correlations of the error messages read lock failed, write
lock failed and process information in June 2011.
Figure 4.31: Correlation of messages read lock failed, write lock failed and Pid:
comm.
Figure 4.32 shows the correlations of the error messages read lock failed, write
lock failed and process information in July 2011.
Figure 4.32: Correlation of messages read lock failed, write lock failed and Pid:
comm.
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Figure 4.33 shows the correlations of the error messages read lock failed, write
lock failed and process information in August 2011.
Figure 4.33: Correlation of messages read lock failed, write lock failed and Pid:
comm.
From Figure 4.31, Figure 4.32 and Figure 4.33, we observe that there is a strong
positive correlation between file access errors and process messages. We identified:
(i) correlations between read_lock_failed and Pid: comm with scores ranging from
0.82 and 1 on eight dates, and (ii) correlations between write_lock_failed and
Pid: comm with a score of 1 on three dates. There are small changes in the correlation
scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation scores are
within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on time-bins of one
hour.
We found that all the dates of the correlated file access errors and process
messages coincide with the dates of correlated harddisk and virtual memory page-fault
resource use counters. On the eight dates, we found that both Pearson and Spearman-
Rank correlation methods identified: (i) the correlated read_lock_failed and
Pid: comm events, and (ii) the correlated write_lock_failed and Pid: comm events.
If both Pearson correlation and Spearman-Rank correlation methods identified the
correlations on all the dates, then Pearson correlation can be used as the primary
method. Our result shows that both Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation
identified the correlated file access and process errors on all the eight dates. Hence,
Pearson correlation can be used as the primary method.
We manually scanned the Pid: comm and soft lockup messages to identify
the name of the process. The name of the process in both Pid: comm and soft lockup
messages are: ipoib, tacc_stats, sge_execd and sh. ipoib defines how IP packets
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are sent over an Infiniband network. tacc_stats is a job-oriented and logically
structured resource use monitor. sge_execd controls the job queues local to the
machine and runs the jobs sent by the Sun Grid Engine master on the local queues.
sh is a Linux operating system command-line interpreter.
Correlations with failures: We determine: (i) the process name in the soft lockup
message that is strongly positive correlated to the name in the process message,
and (ii) the dates read and write lock failed events are strongly positive correlated
to the soft lockup events. We manually scanned the list of correlated events to
identify: (i) the correlation score between the process and soft lockup messages, and
(ii) the correlation score between the read and write lock failed events and soft lockup
message. We summarise the correlations in Tables 4.11 and 4.12.
Table 4.11: Summary of names of soft lockup processes and dates of correlated “Pid:
comm” and soft lockup on Ranger.
Process error soft lockup Date pCorr sRank
Pid: comm (ipoib) ipoib June 5 0.99 0.97
July 25 0.99 nil
Aug 3 1 0.99
Aug 22 1 1
Aug 30 1 1
Aug 31 1 1
Pid: comm (tacc stats) tacc stats June 16 1 1
Aug 31 1 1
Pid: comm (sge execd) sge execd July 31 1 1
Aug 22 1 1
Pid: comm (sh) sh Aug 30 1 1
Aug 31 1 1
From Table 4.11, we observe that the process name in all the soft lockup
messages matched the name of the process in all the process messages. Further, we
observe that all the soft lockup message dates matched all the dates of correlated
file access errors and process messages. We found that only the Pearson correlation
method identified these correlations on all the dates. Hence, Pearson correlation can
be used as the primary method.
From Table 4.12, we observe that the dates of soft lockups matched all the
dates of correlated file access errors and process messages. We found that only the
Pearson correlation method identified these correlations on all the dates. Hence,
Pearson correlation can be used as the primary method.
Detailed diagnosis: When a process attempt to read or write data to the filesystem
but the read or write locks have not been released, the process generates a “Pid:
comm” error message. On a total of eight dates in June, July and August 2011,
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Table 4.12: Dates of correlated file access and soft lockup on Ranger.
File-access error soft lockup Date pCorr sRank
read lock failed ipoib June 5 0.85 0.87
July 25 0.99 nil
Aug 3 0.99 0.99
Aug 22 1 1
Aug 30 0.99 1
Aug 31 0.99 nil
write lock failed ipoib Aug 22 1 1
read lock failed tacc stats June 16 1 1
Aug 31 0.99 1
write lock failed tacc stats June 16 1 1
read lock failed sge execd July 31 0.99 1
Aug 22 1 1
write lock failed sge execd Aug 22 1 1
read lock failed sh Aug 30 1 1
Aug 31 1 1
the processes failed to recover from the filesystem read and write lock failures. Our
result shows that when the filesystem read or write lock is not released, the process
was unable to access data on the filesystem which led to compute node soft lockup
on eight out of eight dates. This represents a failure rate of 100%.
The benefit of combining analyses of hard disk and virtual memory resource
use counters with file access and process errors is given as follows: When correlations
of hard disk I/O and virtual memory page-faults and correlations of file access and
process errors occur on the same day, it shows that the Linux operating system
memory paging activities are associated with the generation of file access errors and
process messages. Therefore, we can use the correlations to monitor the state of
Linux memory usage.
Phase 2: Correlated Process Errors and System Memory Exhaustion
We identify system memory exhaustion by searching the system logs for keywords
system memory exhausted. When a process is created, the operating system al-
locates memory to the process. In most cases, memory is allocated to the process
successfully. However, in a rare case another process can be created when there is no
more memory available. The operating system is no longer able to allocate memory
for the new process. The operating system starts to move data from memory to
harddisk to make memory available for the new process.
From Table 4.13, we observe that there is a strong positive correlation between
the process message and system memory exhausted events. We identified correlations
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Table 4.13: Correlation of “Pid: comm” and “system memory exhausted” events on
Ranger.
Pid: comm event Error event Date pCorr sRank
bash system memory exhausted June 5 0.99 -
sshd system memory exhausted June 21 1 1
between Pid: comm and system memory exhausted events with scores ranging from
0.99 to 1 on two dates. The correlated process and system memory exhausted events
coincide with two dates of correlated harddisk and virtual memory page-fault resource
use counters. There are small changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins
of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we
focus on the correlations obtained on time-bins of one hour. We found that only the
Pearson correlation method identified the correlated process message and system
memory exhausted event on the two dates. If Pearson correlation alone identified
the correlations on all the dates, then it can be used as the primary method. Our
result shows that Pearson correlation identified the correlated process message and
system memory exhausted event on the two dates. Hence, Pearson correlation can
be used as the primary method.
We manually scanned the Pid: comm messages and identified the process
names. They are: sshd and bash. sshd provides secure encrypted communication
between two clients in an unsecured network. bash is the default command-line
interpreter in the Linux operating system.
Correlations with failures: Next, we manually scanned the list of correlated events
to determine the correlation strength between: (i) the Pid: comm and soft lockup
events, and (ii) system memory exhausted and soft lockup events. A summary is
given in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14: Summary of correlated “Pid: comm”, “system memory exhausted” and
soft lockup events on Ranger.
Error event soft lockup Date pCorr sRank
Pid: comm (bash) bash June 5 0.99 -
system memory exhausted bash June 5 1 -
Pid: comm sshd June 21 0.99 1
system memory exhausted sshd June 21 1 1
From Table 4.14, we observe that: (i) the processes bash and sshd are strongly
correlated to soft lockup events with scores that range between 0.99 to 1, and (ii) the
system memory exhausted events are strongly correlated to soft lockup events with
scores that range between 0.99 to 1. We found that only the Pearson correlation
method identified correlations of process and system memory exhausted events with
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soft lockup events on the two dates. Our result shows that Pearson correlation can
be used as the primary method.
Detailed diagnosis: When the Linux operating system is unable to allocate memory
for a process, a system memory exhausted message is generated. We showed that
process error messages and system memory exhaustion messages are strongly positive
correlated to soft lockup messages. Our result shows that when a process requested
for memory on a system exhausted of memory, the system was unable to allocate
memory to the process which led to compute node soft lockup on two out of two
dates. This represents a failure rate of 100%.
The benefit of combining analyses of hard disk I/O and virtual memory
resource use counters with process errors and system memory exhaustion messages is
given as follows: When correlations of hard disk I/O and virtual memory resource use
counters and correlations of process errors and system memory exhaustion messages
occur on the same day, it shows that Linux O/S memory paging activities are
associated with the generation of process errors and system memory exhaustion
messages. Therefore, we can use the correlations to monitor the state of Linux
memory usage.
Phase 3: Earliest Hour of Change
Table 4.15 shows the earliest hour of change in the correlated harddisk write and
page fault resource use counters and the correlated file access errors and process
messages. On all the dates, we observe that the earliest hour of change is different.
On four dates, the earliest hour of change is associated with the correlated harddisk
write and page fault resource use counters. On three dates, the earliest hour of
change is associated with the correlated file access errors and process messages. If we
use only the correlated harddisk write and page fault resource use counters, then the
earliest hour of change in system behaviour on three dates would not be identified.
If we use only the correlated file access errors and process messages, then the earliest
hour of change in system behaviour on four dates would not be identified.
Table 4.16 shows the earliest hour of change in the correlated harddisk write
and page fault resource use counters and the correlated process error and system
memory exhausted events.
From Table 4.16, we observe that the earliest hour of change is associated
with the correlated errors on June 5. The earliest hour of change is associated with
the correlated resource use counters on June 21. Our results show that we require
both the correlated resource use counters and correlated errors to identify the earliest
hour of change on eight out of nine dates. We found that there are different time
windows between the hour of change on seven dates. The time-window ranges from
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Table 4.15: Hours associated with the correlated HDD and virtual memory resource
use counters and correlated file access and process errors.
Ranger
Correlated June 5 June 16 July 25 July 31
counters
HDD I/O & 1 12 12 6
virtual memory AM AM PM AM
Correlated June 5 June 16 July 25 July 31
errors
File-access & 1 3 3 4
process errors AM PM PM AM
Correlated Aug 3 Aug 22 Aug 30 Aug 31
counters
HDD I/O & 12 10 12 12
virtual memory PM PM PM PM
Correlated Aug 3 Aug 22 Aug 30 Aug 31
errors
File-access & 5 9 7 4
process errors AM AM PM PM
Table 4.16: Hours associated with the correlated HDD and virtual memory resource
use counters and correlated process errors and system memory exhausted events.
Ranger
Correlated counters June 5 June 21
HDD I/O & virtual memory 1 AM 9 PM
Correlated errors June 5 June 21
Process errors & system 12 AM 10 PM
memory exhausted
one hour to 15 hours.
Validation
Next, we test the significance of the correlation coefficient of: (i) groups of resource
use counters that are strong positive correlated, and (ii) groups of error events that
are strong positive correlated. We tested all the correlation coefficients against the
null hypothesis. We obtained the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients and a
summary is given in Table 4.17. We observe that the z-scores for all the correlation
coefficients range from 5.31 to 12.13. At the 99% confidence level, under the null
hypothesis z0r = 2.64 and z0e = 2.64. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis in favour
of the alternate hypothesis.
Next, for all hypothesis tests we use the significance level, α = 0.01 and
apply a one-sided test to obtain a P -value. We use the P -value to determine the
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Table 4.17: Summary of z-scores. nr contains the number of hours in one day of
resource usage logs. ne contains the number of hours in one day of system logs.
Ranger
Correlated June 2011 July 2011 Aug. 2011
counters
HDD I/O & virtual 5.31 ≤ zr 5.31 ≤ zr 5.31 ≤ zr
memory (nr = 24) ≤ 12.13 ≤ 12.13 ≤ 12.13
Correlated errors June 2011 July 2011 Aug. 2011
File access & process 6.72 ≤ ze ze = 12.13 ze = 12.13
errors (17 ≤ ne ≤ 24) ≤ 12.13
Process errors & system ze = 12.13 - -
memory exhaustion (ne = 24)
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. Table 4.17 summarises
the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients. We observe that the smallest z-
score is 5.31. Since this is a one-sided test, the P -value is equal to the probability
of observing a value greater than 5.31 in the standard normal distribution, or
P (Z > 5.31) = 1− P (Z ≤ 5.31) = 1− 0.99999 = 0.00001. To account for inflation
in false positive due to multiple independent tests, we obtain the adjusted P -value
0.00001× 26 = 0.00026, where 26 is the total number of days of Ranger’s log-data.
The P -value is less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely this result would be
observed under the null hypothesis. From Table 4.17, we observe that all the z-scores
are greater than or equal to 5.31. Therefore, the adjusted P -value for all the z-scores
are less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely these results would be observed
under the null hypothesis.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the CORRMEXT framework that correlated both
the resource use data and system logs to identify: (i) frequently occurring error
cases, (ii) report the success and failure of error recovery protocols. The main
technical contribution is a new systems diagnostics framework that integrated data
type extraction, multiple correlation methods and time-bin variance extraction.
We applied CORRMEXT on the TACC Stats resource use data and Rationalized
message logs on the Ranger HPC system. CORRMEXT diagnosed five error cases
and extracted the variance in the times of the correlated resource use counter groups
and correlated error groups to identify the earliest occurrences of the problem. To
ensure diagnostics accuracy, CORRMEXT used the Bonferroni correction and showed
that all the correlations are significant. We showed that CORRMEXT can identify
the error cases that occurred frequently and report the success and failure of error
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recovery protocols.
Here, we provide our recommendation on what one should look for in the
resource use data and system logs. In the resource use data, we can use the following
types of resource use counters to do the following: (i) amount of NUMA miss,
amount of NUMA foreign, number of Linux processes created and number of context
switching to monitor memory allocation when a new Linux process is created, (ii)
number of network packets dropped, number of network packets transmitted, number
of bytes read on the filesystem and number of bytes written to the filesystem to
monitor usage of the network and filesystem, (iii) amount of CPU resources consumed
by a user application, amount of CPU resources consumed by a system application,
amount of active memory pages and amount of inactive memory pages to monitor
CPU consumption and memory access, (iv) number of harddisk I/O writes, number
of harddisk sectors written, number of minor page-faults and number of major
page-faults to monitor Linux memory management.
In the system logs, we can use the following types of messages to do the
following: (i) segmentation fault and general protection error messages to identify a
memory leak caused by a faulty program, (ii) error communicating with, failure inode
and directory read error messages to identify a cause of Lustre filesystem and Lustre
client communication error, (iii) northbridge error, ECC error and core messages
to identify occurrences of data corruption in memory, (iv) read lock failed, write
lock failed and information about a system process to identify a hung process caused
by a lock on the filesystem, (v) system memory exhausted and information about a





In this chapter, we apply the CORRMEXT framework described in Chapter 4 on
multiple HPC systems. We combine analysis of system logs with resource utilisation
data and present several new findings and failure patterns. There are no system
logs available on Stampede-1. Therefore, on Stampede-1 we focus on the resource
use data. We identified one error case and one resource usage activity case on
Stampede-1. We identified two error cases on Lonestar4.
We structure the remainder of this chapter as follows: In Section 5.1, we
describe the cluster log-data and error cases on the Lonestar4 and Stampede-1 HPC
systems. In Section 5.2, we present the analysis for the error and activity cases
on Stampede-1. one In Section 5.3, we present the analyses for two error cases on
Lonestar4. In Section 5.4, we conclude with a summary and a recommendation.
5.1 Case Study Systems: Lonestar4 and Stampede-1
We conduct studies of frequently occurring error cases on the Lonestar4 and Stampede-
1 HPC systems. The Lonestar4 HPC system was a 1,888 node Linux-based cluster.
The Stampede-1 HPC system was a 6,400 nodes Linux-based cluster. The Lonestar4
and Stampede-1 HPC systems were operated by the Texas Advanced Computing
Center at The University of Texas at Austin. We collected 26 days worth of resource
use data and system logs on Lonestar4. We collected 28 days worth of resource use
data on Stampede-1. The TACC Stats resource use data was sampled at intervals of
10 minutes on Lonestar4 and Stampede-1. The dates of log-data analysed are given
in Table 5.1.
When the Linux operating system kernel goes into a loop, i.e., Linux hanged,
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Table 5.1: Dates of cluster log-data analysed.
Lonestar4
Month Dates (26 days)
February 2013 3 to 28
Stampede-1
Month Dates (28 days)
February 2017 1 to 28
a soft lockup event is generated. To identify the soft lockup event, we scan the
system logs for a message containing the keywords soft lockup. We implemented a
function in CORRMEXT to search the system logs for soft lockup events and extract
the dates of soft lockups. In the reference [36], it is reported that there is a lead time
of six hours from the occurrence of an error to a soft lockup event. We identified
three dates of soft lockup events in the Lonestar4 syslogs. There are no system logs
available on Stampede-1. The system logs generated on Lonestar4 contain messages
generated from the Linux operating system kernel, Lustre filesystem and Linux
processes.
We obtain the diagnostics reports generated by CORRMEXT. The diagnostics
reports contain the lists of correlated resource use counters and correlated events.
All the error cases are new ones and have not heretofore been reported in Chapter 4.
The error cases are: (i) network data errors, (ii) network data and software errors,
and (iii) filesystem, process and software errors. A list of the error cases is given in
Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: List of error cases identified on Lonestar4 and Stampede-1.
System Component Error No. of
dates
Stampede-1 Infiniband network Network data 27
Stampede-1 Storage system & Linux processes – 27
Lonestar4 Infiniband network Network data & software 6
Lonestar4 Storage system & Linux processes Filesystem, process & software 6
5.2 Stampede-1 HPC System
5.2.1 Network Data Errors
In this error case, we determine the correlations between the Infiniband network and
compute node network interface resource use counters. We use the correlations to
identify network data errors. Then, we assess the system reliability.
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Phase 1: Correlated Infiniband and Compute Node Network Interface
Resource Use Counters
When a compute node receives data on the network, TACC Stats increments the re-
source use counter named net eth0 rx_bytes and the resource use counter named
net eth0 rx_packets. “eth0” is the identifier for a compute node network in-
terface card. When the Infiniband switch receives data on the network, the re-
source use counter named net ib0 rx_bytes and the resource use counter named
net ib0 rx_packets are incremented. “ib0” is the identifier for the Infiniband
switch. In most cases, both the compute node and Infiniband switch receive the data
correctly. If the switch or a network card is faulty or wrongly configured, then it may
not receive the data correctly. When the Infiniband switch receives corrupted data,
the resource use counter named net ib0 rx_frame_errors and the resource use
counter named net ib0 rx_crc_errors are incremented. When a compute node re-
ceives corrupted data, the resource use counter named net eth0 rx_frame_errors
and the resource use counter named net eth0 rx_crc_errors are incremented.
The Infiniband and compute node network interface card resource use counters can
be used to see what happens when data errors occur on the network.
Figure 5.1 shows the correlation of data frame errors and network data
received by the Infiniband switch and compute nodes on Stampede-1.
Figure 5.1: Correlation of data frame errors.
We observe that there is a strong positive correlation between the resource use
counters that record network data frame errors and network data received. We identi-
fied: (i) correlations of net ib0 rx_frame_errors to net eth0 rx_bytes and net
eth0 rx_packets with a score of 1 on 26 dates in February 2017, and (ii) correlations
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of net eth0 rx_frame _errors to net ib0 rx_bytes and net ib0 rx_packets
with a score of 1 on 27 dates in February 2017. We found that only the Spearman-
Rank correlation method identified the correlated resource use counters on all 27
dates. There are small changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20
and 40 minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus
on the correlations obtained on time-bins of one-hour.
Figure 5.2 shows the correlation of cyclic redundancy check errors and network
data received by the Infiniband switch and compute nodes on Stampede-1.
Figure 5.2: Correlation of cyclic redundancy check errors.
We observe that there is a strong positive correlation between the resource use
counters that record network data CRC errors and network data received. We iden-
tified: (i) correlations of net ib0 rx_crc_errors to net eth0 rx_bytes and net
eth0 rx_packets with a score of 1 on 26 dates in February 2017, and (ii) correlations
of net eth0 rx_crc_errors to net ib0 rx_bytes and net ib0 rx_packets with
a score of 1 on 27 dates in February 2017. We found that only the Spearman-Rank
correlation method identified the correlated resource use counters on all 27 dates. If
Spearman-Rank correlation alone identified the correlations on all the dates, then
it can be used as the primary method. There are small changes in the correlation
scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation scores are
within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on time-bins of
one-hour. Our results show that:
• The Infiniband switch received data frame errors and CRC errors on 26 out of
28 days in February 2017, representing 92% of the dates.
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• The compute nodes received data frame errors and CRC errors on 27 out of 28
days in February 2017, representing 96% of the dates.
• The Spearman-Rank correlation method can be used as the primary method
to identify network data errors. It identified patterns of network data errors
that follow a monotonically increasing function.
Validation
Next, we test the significance of the correlation coefficients of groups of resource use
counters that are strong positive correlated. We tested all the correlation coefficients
against the null hypothesis. We obtain the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients
and a summary is provided in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Summary of z-scores. nr contains the number of hours in one day of
resource usage logs.
Stampede-1
Correlated counters Feb 1 to 28, 2017
Infiniband & compute node (nr = 24) zr = 12.13
From Table 5.3, we observe that the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients
are 12.13. At the 99% confidence level, under the null hypothesis z0r = 2.64 and
z0e = 2.64. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis.
Next, for all hypothesis tests we use the significance level, α = 0.01 and
apply a one-sided test to obtain a P -value. We use the P -value to determine the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. Table 5.3 summarises
the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients. We observe that all the z-scores
is 12.13. Since this is a one-sided test, the P -value is equal to the probability
of observing a value greater than 12.13 in the standard normal distribution, or
P (Z > 12.13) = 1 − P (Z ≤ 12.13) = 1 − 0.99999 = 0.00001. To account for
inflation in false positive due to multiple independent tests, we obtain the adjusted
P -value 0.00001 × 28 = 0.00028 where 28 is the number of days. All the z-scores
are equal to 12.13. Therefore, the adjusted P -value for all the z-scores are less than
0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely these results would be observed under the null
hypothesis.
5.2.2 Storage System and Linux Process
In this activity case, we determine the correlations of harddisk, filesystem and Linux
processes resource use counters. We use the correlations to identify activities between
the storage system and Linux operating system processes.
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Phase 1: Correlated Harddisk, Filesystem and Linux Process Resource
Use Counters
When a Linux process sends data to be read or written to the harddisk, three steps are
executed to perform the operation. In the first step, the filesystem allocates an inode.
TACC Stats increments the resource use counter named llite /work alloc_inode
which records the number of inodes allocated on the work partition of the filesystem.
In the second step, it performs a seek operation. TACC Stats increments the resource
use counter named llite /work seek which records the number of seek operations
on the work partition on the filesystem. In the third step, the data is written to the
harddisk. TACC Stats increments the resource use counter named md0 wr_sectors
which records the number of sectors data is written to the harddisk. The resource
use counter named ps processes records the number of Linux process created. The
resource use counter named ps ctxt records the number of context switches across
all the CPUs. The harddisk, filesystem and Linux process resource use counters can
be used to see what happens when Linux processes write to the storage system.
Figure 5.3 shows the correlation of Linux process and filesystem resource use
counters.
Figure 5.3: Correlation of Linux process & filesystem resource use counters.
From Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, we observe: (i) strong positive correl-
ations of md0 wr_sectors to ps processes and ps ctxt with a score of 1 on
27 dates, and (ii) strong positive correlations of ps processes and ps ctxt to
llite /work alloc_inode and llite /work seek with a score of 1 on 27 dates.
There are small changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40
minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the
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Figure 5.4: Correlation of Linux process & harddisk sector write resource use counters.
correlations obtained on time-bins of one hour. We found that only the Spearman-
Rank correlation method identified the correlated resource use counters on all the
dates. Our results show that:
• When a Linux process writes to the storage system, a strong correlation of
harddisk and Lustre filesystem activities is generated.
• The Spearman-Rank correlation method can be used to identify activities on
the harddisk and Lustre filesystem. It identified patterns of harddisk, filesystem
and Linux process that follow a monotonically increasing function.
Validation
Next, we test the significance of the correlation coefficient of groups of resource use
counters that are strong positive correlated. We tested all the correlation coefficients
against the null hypothesis. We obtained the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients
and a summary is given in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Summary of z-scores. nr contains the number of hours in one day of
resource use logs.
Stampede-1
Correlated counters Feb 1 to 28, 2017
HDD, filesystem & Linux process (nr = 24) zr = 12.13
From Table 5.4, we observe that the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients
is 12.13. At the 99% confidence level, under the null hypothesis z0r = 2.64 and
z0e = 2.64. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis.
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Next, for all hypothesis tests we use the significance level, α = 0.01 and apply
a one-sided test to obtain a P -value. We use the P -value to determine the probability
of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. We observe that all the z-scores is
12.13. The P -value is P (Z > 12.13) = 1− P (Z ≤ 12.13) = 1− 0.99999 = 0.00001.
To account for inflation in false positive due to multiple independent tests, we obtain
the adjusted P -value 0.00001× 28 = 0.00028, where 28 is the number of days. All
the z-scores are equal to 12.13. Therefore, the adjusted P -value for all the z-scores
are less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely these results would be observed
under the null hypothesis.
5.3 Lonestar4 HPC System
5.3.1 Network Data Errors and Network Software Errors
In this error case, we determine the correlations between: (i) the Infiniband network
and compute node network interface resource use counters, and (ii) the correlations
between DNS lookup failure and GSIFTP software messages. We use the correlations
to diagnose network problems. Then, we assess the system reliability.
Phase 1: Correlated Infiniband and Compute Node Network Interface
Resource Use Counters
When a compute node receives data on the network, TACC Stats increments the re-
source use counter named net eth0 rx_bytes and the resource use counter named
net eth0 rx_packets. “eth0” is the identifier for a compute node network in-
terface card. When the Infiniband switch receives data on the network, the re-
source use counter named net ib0 rx_bytes and the resource use counter named
net ib0 rx_packets are incremented. “ib0” is the identifier for the Infiniband
switch. In most cases, both the compute node and Infiniband switch receive the data
correctly. If the switch or a network card is faulty or wrongly configured, then it may
not receive the data correctly. When the Infiniband switch receives corrupted data,
the resource use counter named net ib0 rx_frame_errors and the resource use
counter named net ib0 rx_crc_errors are incremented. When a compute node re-
ceives corrupted data, the resource use counter named net eth0 rx_frame_errors
and the resource use counter named net eth0 rx_crc_errors are incremented.
The Infiniband and compute node network interface card resource use counters can
be used to see what happens when data errors occur on the network.
Figure 5.5 shows the correlation of resource use counters that record data
frame errors and network data received by the Infiniband switch and compute nodes.
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Figure 5.5: Correlation of data frame errors.
We observe that there is a strong positive correlation between the resource use
counters data frame errors and network data received. We identified: (i) correlations
of net ib0 rx_frame_errors to net eth0 rx_bytes and net eth0 rx_packets
with scores ranging from 0.95 to 1 on 24 dates in February 2013, and (ii) correlations
of net eth0 rx_frame_errors to net ib0 rx_bytes with a score of 1 on February
28 2013. We found that only the Spearman-Rank correlation method identified
the correlated resource use counters on 25 dates. There are small changes in the
correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation
scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on
time-bins of one-hour.
Figure 5.6 shows the correlation of resource use counters that record cyc-
lic redundancy check (CRC) errors and network data received by the Infiniband
switch and compute nodes. We observe that there is a strong positive correlation
between the resource use counters CRC errors and network data received. We
identified: (i) correlations of net ib0 rx_crc_errors to net eth0 rx_bytes and
net eth0 rx_packets with scores ranging from 0.95 to 1 on 24 dates in February
2013, and (ii) correlation between net eth0 rx_crc_errors and net ib0 rx_bytes
with a score of 1 on February 28 2013. We found that only the Spearman-Rank
correlation method identified the correlated resource use counters on 25 dates. There
are small changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes
but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations
obtained on time-bins of one-hour. Our results show that:
• The Infiniband switch received data frame errors and CRC errors on 24 out of
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Figure 5.6: Correlation of cyclic redundancy check errors.
26 days in February 2013, representing 92% of the dates.
• The compute nodes received data frame errors and CRC errors on 1 out of 26
days in February 2013, representing 4% of the dates.
• The Spearman-Rank correlation method can be used as the primary method
to identify network data errors. It identified patterns of network data errors
that follow a monotonically increasing function.
Next, we will use the correlations of two different groups of error events to
diagnose a networking software problem.
Phase 2: Correlated DNS Lookup Failure and GSIFTP Software Mes-
sages
The BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Domain) protocol is the most widely used DNS
software on the Internet. The process by which one node locates another node
on the basis of its name is specified in the DNS protocol. Usually the nodes on
the network locate the destination node address and resolve its name successfully.
In a rare occasion, the DNS software may be wrongly configured, for example a
network supports only IPv4 addresses but the DNS software is configured for only
IPv6 addresses. When the DNS software is configured with the wrong settings,
then the node in the network is unable to locate the destination node address and
resolve its name. When a DNS lookup failure occurs, an error message named
master network unreachable resolving is recorded in the system logs. The
error message master network unreachable resolving can be used to see what
happens when a node attempts to locate another node on the network.
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Figure 5.7 shows the correlation of DNS lookup failure and GSIFTP software
messages.
Figure 5.7: Correlation of DNS lookup failures & GSIFTP messages.
The messages START: gsiftp, EXIT: gsiftp and FAIL: gsiftp provide
the state of the GSIFTP software. GSIFTP is the standard File Transfer Protocol
enhanced with Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI). GSI is a specification for secret,
tamper-proof, delegatable communication between software in a grid computing
environment. We observe that there is a strong positive correlation between the DNS
lookup failure and GSIFTP software state messages. We identified correlations of
master network unreachable resolving to START: gsiftp, EXIT: gsiftp and
FAIL: gsiftp with scores ranging from 0.82 to 0.99 on six days in February 2013.
There are small changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and
40 minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on
the correlations obtained on time-bins of one-hour. The dates of correlated DNS
lookup failure and GSIFTP software messages coincide with the dates of correlated
network data received and network data errors. We found that Pearson correlation
identified the correlations on all six dates but Spearman-Rank correlation identified
the correlations only on one date. If Pearson correlation alone identified the correlated
DNS lookup failure and GSIFTP software messages on all the dates, then it can be
used as the primary method. Our results show that Pearson correlation identified
the correlated DNS lookup failures and GSIFTP software messages on all six days in
February 2013. Hence, Pearson correlation can be used as the primary method.
Correlations with failures: From Figure 5.7, we observe that there is a strong pos-
itive correlation of DNS lookup failure message to the start (START: gsiftp) and exit
(EXIT: gsiftp) status of the GSIFTP software on February 3, 11 and 20 2013. This
showed that the DNS lookup failure did not cause the GSIFTP software to fail. Next,
we scan the list of correlated events to determine the correlation strength between
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master network unreachable resolving and BUG: soft lockup, START: gsiftp
and BUG: soft lockup, and EXIT: gsiftp and BUG: soft lockup. We found that
the DNS lookup failure, GSIFTP start and exit messages were weakly correlated to
soft lockups on February 3 2013. Our result shows that DNS lookup failure and the
GSIFTP software did not cause a compute node crash on Lonestar4. This represents
a recovery rate of 100%.
From Figure 5.7, we observe that there is a strong positive correlation of DNS
lookup failure to GSIFTP status fail (FAIL: gsiftp) messages on February 13, 22
and 28 2013. This showed that the GSIFTP software failed on three dates when DNS
lookup failures occurred. We found that there are no soft lockup failures reported on
February 13, 22 and 28 2013. Our result shows that a configuration error in BIND
caused a DNS lookup failure which led to the GSIFTP software failure. The DNS
lookup failure and GSIFTP software failure did not cause a compute node crash on
Lonestar4.
Detailed diagnosis: When the GSIFTP software is executed, it uses the DNS
software to locate the destination node and identify its name. The DNS software was
unable to locate the destination node on six dates in February 2013. The DNS lookup
failure generated an error message master network unreachable resolving which
was recorded in the system logs. On three of the six dates, the DNS lookup failure
occurred but the GSIFTP software started and exited normally. On the other three
dates, the DNS lookup failure occurred and led to the GSIFTP software failure. Our
result shows that the DNS software was unable to locate the destination node and
resolve its name, which led to the GSIFTP software failure on those three dates. On
the three dates, we found that the GSIFTP software failure did not cause a compute
node crash on Lonestar4. This represents a recovery rate of 100%.
The benefit of combining analyses of Infiniband and compute node network
interface counters and DNS lookup failures and FTP software errors is as follows:
When on the same day, Infiniband and compute node network resource use counters
are correlated and DNS lookup failure and FTP software messages are also correlated,
it shows that network data transmission errors are associated with the generation
of DNS lookup failure and network software messages. Therefore, we can use these
correlations for monitoring the state of the network system.
Phase 3: Earliest Hour of Change
Table 5.5 shows the earliest hour of change in the correlated Infiniband and compute
node network interface resource use counters and correlated DNS lookup failure and
GSIFTP messages for the six dates on Lonestar4. On the six dates, we observe that
the earliest hour of change is different. On four dates, the earliest hour of change
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Table 5.5: Hours associated with the correlated data transmission error counters and
correlated DNS lookup failures & GSIFTP error messages.
Lonestar4
Correlated Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb
counters 3 11 13 20 22 28
Infiniband & 10 2 2 9 3 8
compute node AM PM AM PM AM AM
Correlated Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb
errors 3 11 13 20 22 28
DNS lookup failures 4 9 3 3 1 12
& GSIFTP errors AM PM AM PM PM PM
is associated with the correlated Infiniband and compute node network interface
resource use counters. On two dates, the earliest hour of change is associated with
the correlated DNS lookup failure and GSIFTP messages. If the correlated resource
use counters were used as the only data source, then the earliest hour of change on
two dates would not be identified. If the correlated errors were used as the only data
source, then the earliest hour of change on four dates would not be identified. Our
results show that we require both the correlated resource use counters and correlated
errors to identify the earliest hour of change on all six dates. We found that there
are different time windows between the hour of change on all six dates. The time
window ranges from one hour to 10 hours.
Validation
Next, we test the significance of the correlation coefficients of: (i) groups of resource
use counters that are strong positive correlated, and (ii) groups of errors that are
strong positive correlated. We tested all the correlation coefficients against the null
hypothesis. We obtain the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients and a summary
is provided in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Summary of z-scores. nr contains the number of hours in one day of
resource usage logs. ne contains the number of hours in one day of system logs.
Lonestar4
Correlated Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb
counters 3 11 13 20 22 28
Infiniband & compute zr = zr = zr = zr = zr = zr =
node (nr = 24) 12.13 12.13 12.13 12.13 12.13 12.13
Correlated Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb
errors 3 11 13 20 22 28
DNS lookup failures ze = ze = ze = ze = ze = ze =
& GSIFTP errors 5.23 5.06 12.13 4.02 4.02 8.35
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From Table 5.6, we observe that the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients
range from 4.02 to 12.13. At the 99% confidence level, under the null hypothesis
z0r = 2.64 and z0e = 2.64. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the
alternate hypothesis.
Next, for all hypothesis tests we use the significance level, α = 0.01 and
apply a one-sided test to obtain a P -value. We use the P -value to determine the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. Table 5.6 summarises
the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients. We observe that the smallest z-
score is 4.02. Since this is a one-sided test, the P -value is equal to the probability
of observing a value greater than 4.02 in the standard normal distribution, or
P (Z > 4.02) = 1− P (Z ≤ 4.02) = 1− 0.99995 = 0.00005. To account for inflation
in false positive due to multiple independent tests, we obtain the adjusted P -value
is 0.00005× 26 = 0.0013 where 26 is the total number of days. The P -value is less
than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely this result would be observed under the
null hypothesis. All the z-scores are greater than or equal to 4.02. Therefore, the
adjusted P -value for all the z-scores are less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely
these results would be observed under the null hypothesis.
5.3.2 Storage System and Linux Processes
In this error case, we determine: (i) the correlations of harddisk, filesystem and
Linux processes resource use counters, and (ii) the correlations of filesystem, Linux
process and software errors. We use the correlations to diagnose problems in the
storage system. Then, we assess the system reliability.
Phase 1: Correlated Harddisk, Filesystem and Linux Process Resource
Use Counters
When a Linux process sends data to be read or written to the harddisk, three steps are
executed to perform the operation. In the first step, the filesystem allocates an inode.
TACC Stats increments the resource use counter named llite /work alloc_inode
which records the number of inodes allocated on the work partition of the filesystem.
In the second step, it performs a seek operation. TACC Stats increments the resource
use counter named llite /work seek which records the number of seek operations
on the work partition on the filesystem. In the third step, the data is written to the
harddisk. TACC Stats increments the resource use counter named md0 wr_sectors
which records the number of sectors data is written to the harddisk. The resource
use counter named ps processes records the number of Linux process created. The
resource use counter named ps ctxt records the number of context switches across
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all the CPUs. The harddisk, filesystem and Linux process resource use counters can
be used to see what happens when Linux processes write to the storage system.
Figure 5.8 shows the correlation of Linux process and filesystem resource use
counters.
Figure 5.8: Correlation of Linux process & filesystem resource use counters.
We observe: (i) strong positive correlations of ps processes and ps ctxt to
llite /work alloc_inode with scores ranging from 0.8 to 1 on 21 dates, and (ii)
strong positive correlations of ps processes and ps ctxt to llite /work seek
with scores ranging from 0.8 to 1 on 19 dates. There are small changes in the
correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation
scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the correlations obtained on
time-bins of one hour. We found that only the Spearman-Rank correlation method
identified the correlations on all the dates.
Figure 5.9 shows the correlation of Linux process, harddisk and filesystem
resource use counters. We observe: (i) strong positive correlations of md0 wr_sectors
to llite /work alloc_inode and llite /work seek with scores ranging from
0.8 to 1 on 18 dates, and (ii) strong positive correlations of md0 wr_sectors to
ps processes and ps ctxt with scores ranging from 0.95 to 1 on 24 dates. There
are small changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins of 20 and 40
minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we focus on the
correlations obtained on time-bins of one hour. We found that only the Spearman-
Rank correlation method identified the correlations on all the dates. Our results
show that:
• When a Linux process writes to the storage system, a strong correlation of
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Figure 5.9: Correlation of harddisk, filesystem & Linux process resource use counters.
harddisk and Lustre filesystem activities is generated.
• The Spearman-Rank correlation method can be used to identify activities on
the harddisk and Lustre filesystem. It identified patterns of harddisk, filesystem
and Linux process that follow a monotonically increasing function.
Phase 2: Correlated Filesystem, Process and Software Errors
We identify a filesystem I/O error by searching the system logs for a message
that contains the keywords Filesystem: xfs_log _force: error returned. A
harddisk can degrade when it is heavily used over a period of time. When a harddisk
starts to fail, it will produce bad sectors. If a bad sector is detected on a harddisk,
the bad sector will be marked and the filesystem is informed not to write to that
sector. In most cases, the filesystem will locate a good sector on the harddisk and
execute its I/O operation successfully. However, in a rare occasion, if the filesystem
is unable to locate a good sector on the harddisk, then it fails to execute its I/O
operation.
From Figure 5.10, we observe: (i) a strong positive correlation of Filesystem:
...: error returned to a process message Pid: comm calc_du with a score of
0.99 and BUG: soft lockup message with a score of 0.98 on February 3 2013, and (ii)
a strong positive correlation between Pid: comm calc_du and BUG: soft lockup
with a score of 0.99 on February 3 2013. The dates of the correlated errors coincide
with the dates of correlated Linux processes, harddisk and filesystem I/O resource
use counters. There are small changes in the correlation scores obtained on time-bins
of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. Therefore, we
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Figure 5.10: Correlation of filesystem error & process information messages.
focus on the correlations obtained on time-bins of one hour. We found that only the
Pearson correlation method identified the correlated filesystem error, process and
soft lockup messages. Our results show that:
• Filesystem I/O errors are associated with process errors and soft lockup events
as observed from the correlations of Filesystem: ...: error returned,
Pid: comm calc_du and BUG: soft lockup messages shown in Figure 5.10.
• The Pearson correlation method can be used to identify the correlated filesystem
error, process and soft lockup messages. It identified patterns of filesystem error,
process information and soft lockup messages that follow a linear function.
From Figure 5.10, we observe: (i) a strong positive correlation between
Filesystem: ...: error returned and Pid: comm with a score of 0.87 on Febru-
ary 12 2013, and (ii) a strong positive correlation between Pid: comm and Pid: comm
ptlrpc with a score of 0.99 on February 12 2013. The date of the correlated errors
coincide with the date of correlated harddisk, filesystem I/O and Linux process
resource use counters. There are small changes in the correlation scores obtained on
time-bins of 20 and 40 minutes but the correlation scores are within 0.8 to 1. We
found that only the Pearson correlation method identified the correlated filesystem
error and process message. Hence, Pearson correlation can be used as the primary
method. There are no soft lockup messages reported on February 12 2013.
From Figure 5.11, we observe that there is a strong positive correlation of
the error message Filesystem: ... : error returned to: (i) two software error
messages, (ii) one filesystem recovery protocol message, and (iii) one memory leak
error message. The correlation scores range from 0.81 and 0.97 on four dates. The
dates of the correlated errors coincide with the dates of correlated harddisk, filesystem
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Figure 5.11: Correlation of filesystem & software error messages.
I/O and Linux processes resource use counters. The software error messages contain
the keywords smith-waterman and NVRM: failed. The filesystem recovery protocol
message contains the keywords a client was evicted and the memory leak error
message contains the keyword segfault. smith-waterman is associated with the
smith-waterman algorithm that performs local sequence alignment for determining
similar regions between two strings of nucleic acid sequences or protein sequences.
NVRM: failed is associated with the NVIDIA graphics card. The message indicated
that the NVIDIA graphics card driver failed. a client was evicted is associated
with the Lustre filesystem Evict/RPC protocol. The message indicated that the
Lustre filesystem removed an unresponsive client. The error message segfault
indicated that a program suffered a memory leak.
Correlation with failures: There were no soft lockup events reported on February
13, 22 and 25 2013. Soft lockup events were reported on February 23 2013. Next,
we manually scan the list of correlated events obtained for February 23 2013 to
determine if the filesystem error and software error messages are strongly correlated
to soft lockup events. We found that Filesystem: ...: error returned and
smith-waterman were weakly correlated to soft lockup events on February 23 2013.
We found that only the Pearson correlation method identified the correlated errors
on all the dates. Hence, Pearson correlation can be used as the primary method.
Detailed diagnosis: When the filesystem encountered an I/O error, the process
or software that was writing files to the filesystem generated an error message. We
showed that the filesystem error messages are strongly positive correlated to process
and software error messages. Our result shows that when a filesystem I/O error
occurred, the process and software were unable to obtain I/O access which led to
process and software errors. On five out of six days in February 2013, the filesystem
recovered from the I/O errors. This represents a recovery rate of 83%. However, on
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February 3 2013 the filesystem failed to recover from the I/O error which led to a
compute node soft lockup. This represents a failure rate of 17%.
The benefit of combining analyses of harddisk, filesystem I/O and Linux
processes resource use counters with filesystem I/O, process and software errors is
given as follows: When correlations of harddisk, filesystem I/O and Linux processes
resource use counters and correlations of filesystem I/O, process and software errors
occur on the same day, it shows that harddisk, filesystem I/O and Linux processes
activities are associated with the generation of filesystem I/O, process and software
errors. Therefore, we can use the correlations to monitor the health of the storage
system.
Phase 3: Earliest Hour of Change
Table 5.7 shows the earliest hour of change in the correlated harddisk, filesystem
I/O and Linux processes resource use counters and correlated filesystem I/O, process
and software errors.
Table 5.7: Hours associated with the correlated harddisk, filesystem I/O and Linux
processes resource use counters and correlated filesystem I/O, process and software
errors.
Lonestar4
Correlated Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb
counters 3 12 13 22 23 25
HDD, filesystem 5 1 4 4 3 7
& processes AM AM AM PM PM AM
Correlated Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb
errors 3 12 13 22 23 25
Filesystem, process 4 12 3 1 12 12
& software errors AM AM AM PM PM PM
On all the dates, we observe that the earliest hour of change in the system
behaviour is different. On February 25 2013, the earliest hour of change is associated
with the correlated harddisk, filesystem I/O and Linux processes resource use counters.
On five dates, the earliest hour of change is associated with the correlated filesystem
I/O, process and software errors. If we use only the correlated harddisk, filesystem
I/O and Linux processes resource use counters, then the earliest hour of change in
the system behaviour on five dates would not be identified. Having said that, if we
use only the correlated filesystem I/O, process and software errors, then the earliest
hour of change in the system behaviour on February 25 2013 would not be identified.
Our results show that we require both the correlated resource use counters and
correlated errors to identify the earliest hour of change in the system behaviour on
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all six dates. We found that there are different time windows between the hour of
change on all six dates. The time window ranges from one to five hours.
Validation
Next, we test the significance of the correlation coefficient of: (i) groups of resource
use counters that are strong positive correlated, and (ii) groups of error events that
are strong positive correlated. We tested all the correlation coefficients against the
null hypothesis. We obtained the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients and a
summary is given in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Summary of z-scores. nr contains the number of hours in one day of
resource usage logs. ne contains the number of hours in one day of system logs.
Lonestar4
Correlated Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb
counters 3 12 13 22 23 25
HDD, filesystem & zr = zr = zr = zr = zr = zr =
processes (nr = 24) 6.25 6.56 4.86 12.13 3.84 9.49
Correlated Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb Feb
errors 3 12 13 22 23 25
Filesystem, process & software ze = ze = ze = ze = ze = ze =
errors (20 ≤ ne ≤ 24) 9.55 4.72 4.08 8.61 4.98 3.75
From Table 5.8, we observe that the z-scores for all the correlation coefficients
range from 3.75 to 12.13. At the 99% confidence level, under the null hypothesis
z0r = 2.64 and z0e = 2.64. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the
alternate hypothesis.
Next, for all hypothesis tests we use the significance level, α = 0.01 and
apply a one-sided test to obtain a P -value. We use the P -value to determine the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. We observe that the
smallest z-score is 3.75. Since this is a one-sided test, the P -value is equal to the
probability of observing a value greater than 3.75 in the standard normal distribution,
or P (Z > 3.75) = 1− P (Z ≤ 3.75) = 1− 0.9999 = 0.0001. To account for inflation
in false positive due to multiple independent tests, we obtain the adjusted P -value
0.0001× 26 = 0.0026, where 26 is the number of dates. The P -value is less than 0.01,
indicating it is highly unlikely this result would be observed under the null hypothesis.
We observe that all the z-scores are greater than or equal to 3.75. Therefore, the
adjusted P -value for all the z-scores are less than 0.01, indicating it is highly unlikely
these results would be observed under the null hypothesis.
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5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we applied CORRMEXT on multiple HPC systems. CORRMEXT
generated the analyses focused on the correlated groups of resource use counters and
correlated groups of errors, and diagnosed three new error cases and one resource
activity case. It identified the earliest occurrences of the problem by extracting the
variance in the times of the correlated resource use counter groups and correlated
error groups. CORRMEXT applied Fisher’s z-score and the Bonferroni correction
and showed that all the correlations are significant.
We provide our recommendation on what one should look for in the resource
use data and system logs. In the resource use data, we can use the following types
of resource use counters to do the following: (i) bytes received on the network,
number of network packets transmitted, number of network data frame errors and
number of network data CRC errors to identify network data errors, (ii) number of
Linux processes created, number of context switching, number of inodes allocated,
number of filesystem seek operations and number of harddisk sector writes to monitor
activities between Linux processes, harddisk and filesystem.
In the system logs, we can use the following types of messages to do the
following: (i) DNS lookup failure, FTP software start, FTP software exit and FTP
software failure to identify a configuration error in the DNS software, (ii) filesystem





Workflow for HPC Systems
Diagnosis
There is little work which show that multiple feature extraction methods are required
to identify more system messages and resource use counters associated with rare
error cases. In this chapter, we present a new workflow that combines resource use
data matrices and message types data matrices for identifying rare error cases. We
named the workflow EXERMEST (EXtracting FEatures and CoRrelating Resource
Use Counters and MESsage Types). EXERMEST extracts the nodes associated
with the identified errors. There are no message types data matrices available on
Stampede-1. Therefore, we focus on the resource use data matrices and message
types data matrices available on Ranger and Lonestar4.
We structure this chapter as follows: In Section 6.1, we introduce the EX-
ERMEST framework. In 6.2, we describe the system models, problem specification
and details for the modules used within the EXERMEST framework. In 6.3, we
evaluate the feature extractors and present our analyses from EXERMEST for a
series of error cases on the Ranger and Lonestar4 HPC systems and conclude with a
summary in 6.4.
6.1 Introduction
There is a large body of research on detecting errors [16, 33, 34] and diagnosing
failures [8–10, 72] that showed that combining system logs and resource use data
can improve error detection and failure diagnosis over using system logs alone.
The methods developed by N. Gurumdimma et. al. [33, 34] focus on improving
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error detection. Their method presented in [33] showed that the error handling time
window can be increased by up–to 50 minutes by combining system logs with resource
use data. An approach called CRUDE [34] showed that the error detection accuracy
can be improved, on average by 85% over NodeInfo [62], by combining resource use
data and system logs. The technique developed by Z. Zheng et. al. [71] focus on
identifying characteristics of system failures. They combine RAS and Jobs logs on a
HPC system to identify interesting failure characteristics. The ANCOR framework
[8] developed a two-phase approach where: (i) in the first phase, anomalous nodes are
identified on resource use data to provide a partial diagnosis, and (ii) in the second
phase, errors that are correlated to system failures on the anomalous nodes are
identified on system logs to provide a more detailed diagnosis. A tool called LogAider
that is developed by S. Di et. al. [16] focus on identifying error propagation that
lead to system failures. They combine RAS and Job logs to identify correlations of
system events and failures across space and time on a HPC system. The diagnostics
frameworks reported in references [8, 9, 16, 72] have correlated errors to system
failures only.
The anomaly detection frameworks reported in references [8, 27, 34] have
applied only Principal Component Analysis to identify the significant system metrics
in resource usage data. The anomaly detection framework reported in reference [44]
have evaluated PCA-based and ICA-based anomaly detection. They showed that
ICA-based anomaly detection is more effective than PCA-based anomaly detection.
However, there is little work which show that multiple feature extraction methods are
required for identifying more system messages and resource use counters associated
with rare error cases. To bridge this gap, we implement and evaluate a new workflow
– called EXERMEST – that combines resource use data matrices with message types
data matrices. EXERMEST identifies significant resource use counters and messages.
In the EXERMEST workflow, multiple feature extraction algorithms are evaluated.
We implemented a two-phase approach where: (i) in the first phase, different feature
extractors are applied to identify significant errors and resource use counters, (ii)
in the second phase, the significant resource use counters are correlated to other
resource use counters and the significant system events are correlated to other events.
Then, the significance of all the correlation coefficients are validated. By significant,
we mean resource use counters and system events which are assigned highest scores
by the feature extractors.
6.1.1 Contributions
The main contributions of this chapter include:
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• A new workflow called EXERMEST that combines resource use data matrices
and message types data matrices for HPC systems diagnosis. EXERMEST
identifies significant system messages and resource use counters associated with
rare error cases.
• A demonstration that EXERMEST improves failure diagnosis over previous
research. EXERMEST show that multiple feature extraction methods are
required to identify the significant system messages and resource use counters
associated with the rare error cases.
• Identification of: (i) significant Infiniband network packet drops and Lustre
filesystem I/O resource use counters that are correlated to Lustre filesystem I/O
errors, (ii) significant CPU I/O and Lustre filesystem I/O resource use counters
that are correlated to hard disk and Lustre filesystem I/O errors, (iii) significant
Linux virtual memory resource use counters and Lustre filesystem I/O resource
use counters that are correlated to Linux memory management errors, and
(iv) significant Linux process threads and dirty memory resource use counters
that are correlated to data and network synchronisation errors. The Infiniband
network packet drop, Lustre filesystem I/O, CPU I/O, Linux virtual memory,
Linux threads and dirty memory resource use counters are potential flags for
online detection of Lustre filesystem I/O errors, hard disk I/O errors, Linux
memory management errors and data and network synchronisation errors.
• That 10 minutes, 30 minutes and 1-hour time-bins are required for identifying
the correlated system errors and correlated resource use counters.
• A detailed statistical validation step to ensure an accurate assessment of the
diagnosis. EXERMEST uses the Bonferroni correction to show that it is highly
unlikely all the correlations would be observed under the null hypothesis.
6.2 System Models, Problem Specification and EXER-
MEST Framework
The system model to which the EXERMEST framework can be applied is described
in Chapter 3.1; we summarise the system model here. A HPC system is comprised of
a job scheduler, system software stack and sets of nodes and jobs. The job scheduler,
nodes, jobs and system software stack generate system logs - they contain system
events and failure data. The nodes, jobs and system software stack generate resource
usage logs - they currently contain 410 system resource use counters (refer to Table
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3.1). The system and resource use logs are archived on a centralised message logging
system.
6.2.1 Significant Errors on Nodes
Let S be a HPC system with n distinct nodes and all the nodes in the system S are
linked together by a network. We capture the significant errors by first defining a
set NSi = {n1, n2, ..., ni|ni ∈ Nodestate}, where 1 ≤ i < x, x is the number of nodes,
Nodestate = {nfault, nerror, nfailed}, nfault = a node on which a fault is triggered,
nerror = a node that contained an error, nfailed = a node that crashed. Thus, an
error can occur within one node or occur on two or more nodes.
Due to the possibility that errors are associated with a large number of nodes,
finding the significant errors is challenging. In this chapter, we will present the
EXERMEST framework that investigates the use of feature extraction methods to
identify the significant errors and the nodes associated with the identified errors.
6.2.2 Problem Specification
The problem we address in this chapter is specified in [12] and we describe the
problem here: Given (i) a set of resource use data matrices, (ii) a set of message
types data matrices, (iii) a list of resource use counters, (iv) a list of message types,
and (v) the number of dates, then:
1. Identify the significant resource use counters by time-bins,
2. Identify the significant message types by time-bins,
3. Identify resource use counters that are strongly linearly or monotonically
correlated to the significant counters by time-bins on the specified dates,
4. Identify messages that are strongly linearly or monotonically correlated to the
significant messages by time-bins on the specified dates.
A time-bin is one window of a fixed time interval. The number of re-
source use and message types data matrices that we collect are based on the
given number of dates. We develop the EXERMEST (EXtracting FEatures and
CoRrelating Resource Use Counters and MESsage Types) framework as shown
in Figure 6.1. EXERMEST applies the Features extraction and Correlation mod-
ules on the resource use and message types data matrices. Each module produces
a set of diagnostics reports. The reports can be used to identify significant er-
ror propagation and recovery cases. EXERMEST is available for downloading at
https://diag-toolkits.github.io/EXERMEST/. Next, we describe the two mod-































Figure 6.1: The workflow of the EXERMEST framework.
6.2.3 EXERMEST: Feature Extraction
The Feature Extraction module is presented in [12] and we describe the details here.
A resource use log is comprised of a number of attributes and an example is given as
follows:
204865 Jul 12 12:30:01 i132-206 eth0 rx_bytes 352894 ..
In the resource use log, each attribute is separated by a white space. The
first attribute represents a job (204865). The second, third and fourth attributes
represent the month, date and time (Jul 12 12:30:01) the resource use log was
generated. The fifth attribute represents a node (i132-206) on the HPC system.
The sixth attribute represents the device name (eth0); in this example, the device is
a network interface card. The remaining pairs of attributes represent a resource use
counter (e.g., rx_bytes) and its value (352894).
To generate the resource use data matrix, we implemented a process that
extracts the resource use counters and their values in the resource use logs. The
process is described in Chapter 3.4.1 and we summarise it here. The process works
as follows:
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• We divide the resource use log into time-bins of 1 hour, 30 and 10 minutes by
the given date.
• We extract all the resource use counters in the resource use log and store the
resource use counters in a list.
• We identify the unique resource use counters and store them in a list of (unique)
resource use counters.
• We match a resource use counter in the list of unique resource use counters to
the resource use counter in the resource use log and obtain the value of the
resource use counter between two consecutive resource use logs. We obtained
the values of the resource use counters separately by 1 hour, 30 and 10 minute
time-bins.
A system log is comprised of a number of attributes and an example is given
as follows:
227893 Jul 18 08:43:10 i172-108 kernel LustreError: connection
restored
In the system log, each attribute is separated by a white space. The first
attribute represents the job (227893). The second, third and fourth attributes
represent the month, date and time (Jul 18 08:43:10) the system log was generated.
The fifth attribute represents a node (i172-108) on the HPC system. The sixth
attribute represents the system component (kernel); in this example, the system
component is the Linux operating system kernel. The remaining white space separated
attributes represent the system event. In this system event, the Lustre filesystem
had restored its connection (LustreError: connection restored).
To generate the message types data matrix, we implemented a process that
extracts the system events and their counts in the system logs. The process is
described in Chapter 3.4.2 and we summarise it here. The process works as follows:
• We divide the system logs into time-bins of 1 hour, 30 and 10 minutes by the
given date.
• We extract all the system events in the system logs and store the system events
in a list.
• We identify the unique system events and store them in a list of message types.
• We count the message types separately by 1 hour, 30 and 10 minute time-bins.
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Currently, we evaluate three feature extraction algorithms. The algorithms
are: (i) Principal Component Analysis (PCA), (ii) Independent Component Analysis
(ICA), and (iii) Non-linear Principal Component Analysis (NLPCA). We use PCA
and ICA for identifying resource use counters and message types which are linearly
uncorrelated. We use NLPCA for identifying resource use counters and message
types which are non-linearly uncorrelated. PCA, ICA and NLPCA are unsupervised
dimensionality-reduction methods that do not require a-priori knowledge about the
data labels. Therefore, they can be used for identifying the significant resource use
counters and message types without the need to label the data. We integrate the
PCA, ICA and NLPCA methods into the Features Extraction module. Specifically,
the algorithms we use are: (i) the robust PCA algorithm [13] for obtaining the PCA
components, (ii) the fast ICA algorithm [39] for obtaining the ICA components,
and (iii) the NLPCA algorithm that is based on a neural network [60] for obtaining
the NLPCA components. A large HPC system can monitor hundreds of different
resource use counters and it can generate thousands of different message types. To
identify the significant resource use counters and message types is an essential but
non-trivial task [28, 44, 52].
The Feature Extraction module receives as its input, a resource use data
matrix and a message types data matrix as shown in Figure 6.1. The resource use
data matrix RUDt has m rows and n columns. Each row mi ∈ RUDt represent one
resource use counter, each column nj ∈ RUDt represent one time-bin and each cell
mcij ∈ RUDt contains the count of resource use counter mi at time-bin nj . The
message types data matrix MTDt has x rows and y columns. Each row xi ∈MTDt
represent one message type, each column yj ∈ MTDt represent one time-bin and
each cell mcij ∈MTDt contains the count of message type xi at time-bin yj .
PCA Features Extractor
PCA converts the set of observations of possibly correlated variables into a set of
values of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components. Because the
rows of the resource use and message types data matrices are the features and their





t. The resource use counters collected by TACC Stats
range from CPU usage to memory, Lustre I/O, network, virtual memory, process
and NUMA counters. The scale of the data collected may be different. For example,
CPU utilisation values can be given in percentage and Lustre I/O, memory, network,
virtual memory, process and NUMA counter values can be actual counts. To solve
the problem of different scales in the data, we normalise the values for all the resource
use counters such that their values range between 0 and 10. To capture the true
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variance, we adjust the columns in the normalised resource use data matrices to have
zero mean. To identify the significant message types under identical conditions, we
normalise the message types values and adjust the columns in the normalised data
matrices so that its columns have zero mean.
Next, we calculate the covariance matrices CRUD and CMTD using the normal-
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j>1(xi − xj).(yi − yj) where X and Y are
variables that can take on the values (xi, yi) for i = 1, ..., n, xi ∈ X and yi ∈ Y . We









t is the transpose of RUD
′N0
t , and (ii) the message types covari-








t is the transpose of
MTD
′N0
t . Currently, our PCA features extractor uses the robust PCA algorithm
[13] to obtain the principal components. The reference in [44] have shown that the
first principal component contains the largest variance. Therefore, we extract the
scores of the supplied data on the first principal component.
ICA Features Extractor




t , ICA also
finds a new set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables. Differently to PCA,
the components identified by ICA are not necessarily orthogonal. A pre-processing
step called whitening [42] is first applied on the input data matrix to obtain a new
set of variables which are uncorrelated and each have a variance of 1. Whitening
the input data matrix ensures that the average covariance between the whitened
variables and original variables is maximal [42]. Then, the ICA algorithm is applied
on the whitened data matrix. Currently, our ICA features extractor uses the fast
ICA algorithm [39] to obtain the ICA components. Based on the reference in [44]
that show that the first principal component contains the largest variance, we extract
the estimated scores of the supplied data on the first ICA component.
NLPCA Features Extractor





finds a new set of values of uncorrelated variables. Differently to PCA, the principal
components identified by NLPCA are non-linear (i.e., curved). Currently, our
NLPCA feature extractor uses a neural network based algorithm [60] that provides
a non-linear model of the mapping function to obtain the principal components.
Based on the reference in [44], we extract the scores of the supplied data on the first
component.
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Extracting the Significant Features
We implement a process for extracting the score and its associated resource use
counter and message type. The process works as follows: Let Lpair be a list that
contains pairs of 〈index, score〉 where index is the index of a resource use counter
or message type, score is the score of the resource use counter or message type
and SizeL = |Lpair| is the total number of index-score pairs in the list. First,
we sort the list Lpair in descending order such that the first pair 〈index1, score1〉
is the resource use counter or message type with the highest score. Then, we
extract a subset Lsubsetpair ⊂ Lpair such that ∀〈index, score〉 ∈ Lsubsetpair , score > 0 and
|Lsubsetpair | = d0.05× SizeLe. Next, ∀〈index, score〉 ∈ Lsubsetpair we map index to the list
of resource use counters and list of message types and obtain the list of significant
resource use counters and list of significant message types. Algorithms such as PICK
[4] can also be used to select the top 5% of resource use counters and message types.
6.2.4 EXERMEST: Correlation
The Features Extraction module described in the preceding section extracted the
lists of significant resource use counters and message types. Then, these lists are
given to the Correlation module to correlate the significant resource use counters to
other counters and correlate the significant message types to other message types.
The Correlation module is presented in [12] and we describe it here. Specifically, the
Correlation module performs the following:
• It calculates the correlation coefficient for all pairs of significant resource use
counters and other resource use counters, and obtain a resource use counters
correlation matrix.
• It calculates the correlation coefficient for all pairs of significant message types
and other message types, and obtain a message types correlation matrix.
To obtain the resource use counters and message types correlation matrices,
we implemented a process that works as follows:
• We obtain the significant data matrices containing counts of all the significant
resource counters or message types by time-bins of 1 hour, 30 and 10 minutes.
• We obtain the data matrices containing counts of all the resource counters or
message types by time-bins of 1 hour, 30 and 10 minutes.
• We apply two correlation methods on the significant resource use data matrix
and resource use data matrix by time-bins of 1 hour, 30 and 10 minutes, and
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obtain the resource use counters correlation matrices by 1 hour, 30 and 10
minute time-bins.
• We apply two correlation methods on the significant message types data matrix
and message types data matrix by time-bins of 1 hour, 30 and 10 minutes, and
obtain the message types correlation matrices by 1 hour, 30 and 10 minute
time-bins.
In our Correlation module, we currently use Pearson correlation and Spearman-
Rank correlation methods [1]. The details are described in Chapter 4.3.2 and we
provide a summary here. Pearson correlation coefficient [1], r is defined as the



















is the standard score of y, x and y are
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i=1(yi − ȳ)2 is the sample standard deviation of y, x̄ and ȳ is the
sample mean of x and y. We implemented the Pearson correlation algorithm to
identify resource use counters and message types which are correlated linearly.
Spearman-Rank correlation coefficient [1], ρ is defined as the Pearson correla-
tion coefficient between the ranks of a pair of variables. The following is assumed
by Spearman-Rank correlation: (i) the value of a variable increases when the value
of another variable increases, (ii) the value of a variable remains when the value of
another variable remains. We implemented the tied rank average method [67] and
obtain the ranked values for all pairs of variables. After we obtained the ranked
values for all pairs of variables, we input the ranked values into Pearson correla-
tion method to obtain Spearman-Rank correlation coefficient. We implemented the
Spearman-Rank correlation algorithm to identify resource use counters and message
types which are correlated monotonically.
There are many methods available. However, those methods assume that the
data variables are i.i.d, i.e., each variable has the same probability distribution as all
the other variables, and all the variables are mutually independent. The references in
[24, 51] have shown that correlation algorithms are effective in identifying influence
between interacting system components [51] and modeling system behaviour [24].
While a HPC system generates resource utilisation data at regular intervals, it
generates error and failure messages only when the error output statement in the
program code is executed. Because of this, the timestamps in the resource use data
and system logs are different. The correlation algorithms require that the same
number of data points is available on the x-axis in the dataset in order to calculate
the correlation coefficient. As such, we do not identify correlations of resource use
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counters to message types. Having said that, our objective is to identify correlations
of resource use counters and correlations of message types. We use the following
rules for interpreting the strength of the correlation coefficients [1]: (a) 0.8 to 1:
Strong positive correlation, (b) 0.3 to 0.79: Moderate positive correlation, (c) 0.1 to
0.29: Weak positive correlation.
Testing the Significance of the Correlation Coefficients
The technique we used to test the significance of all the correlation coefficients is
presented in Chapter 4.3.2; we summarise the validation technique here. We define
two null hypotheses and two alternate hypotheses. The null hypotheses are: (i)
H0r that two resource use counters are positive correlated with a score between
0.1 and 0.29, and (ii) H0m that two message types are positive correlated with a
score between 0.1 and 0.29. The alternate hypotheses are: (i) Har that two resource
counters are positive correlated with a score between 0.8 and 1, and (ii) Ham that
two message types are positive correlated with a score between 0.8 and 1. We apply
Fisher’s z-transform and obtain the z-scores for all correlation coefficients [67]. When
the absolute value of z at a confidence level of 99% is 2.64, it will reject the null
hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis.
Handling Inflation in False Positive
The technique we used to handle inflation in false positive due to testing multiple
independent hypothesis is presented in Chapter 4.3.2 and we summarise the technique
here. Our interest are on: (i) (strong) positive correlated resource use counters with
a score between 0.8 and 1, and (ii) (strong) positive correlated message types with a
score between 0.8 and 1. To test all the hypotheses, we apply a one-sided test. We
use the significance level, α = 0.01 to obtain an unadjusted P -value. The probability
of identifying a significant correlation due to chance increases when more correlations
are tested. The Bonferroni Correction [26] accounts for inflation in false positive by
adjusting the P -value. To obtain the adjusted P -value, we multiply the unadjusted
P -value by the number of dates.
Extracting the Nodes
Once the list containing the correlated significant messages and other messages
is obtained, we implemented a process to extract the nodes associated with the
correlated messages. The process is given as follows:
• Step 1: For each message type in the list of correlated messages, match the
message type back to the system logs.
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• Step 2: In the system logs, extract the log-entries that contain the message
type to obtain a smaller set of system logs.
• Step 3: For all log-entries in the smaller set of system logs, extract the node
and store it in a list of nodes.
• Step 4: Remove all repeated nodes in the list of nodes to obtain a list of unique
nodes.
6.3 Case Studies on Ranger and Lonestar4
We conduct studies of rare error cases on the Ranger and Lonestar4 HPC systems.
The Ranger HPC system was a 4,048 node Linux-based cluster and Lonestar4 was
a 1,888 node Linux-based cluster. Both the Ranger and Lonestar4 HPC systems
were operated by the Texas Advanced Computing Center at The University of Texas
at Austin. On Ranger and Lonestar4, the TACC Stats resource usage data were
sampled at intervals of 10 minutes. On Ranger, we collected 26 days worth of resource
use data and system logs. On Lonestar4, we collected 31 days worth of resource
usage data and system logs. A summary of the data is given in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Summary of resource use data and system logs.
Ranger
TACC Stats data Rationalized logs
No. days Data size No. of lines Data size No. of messages
26 124.1 GB 637,860,203 9.6 GB 64,822,682
Lonestar4
TACC Stats data Syslogs
No. days Data size No. of lines Data size No. of messages
31 46.6 GB 207,068,692 1.3 GB 12,267,629
Therefore, given a cluster system with nodes, next we evaluate the PCA, ICA
and NLPCA feature extractors and present four rare error cases.
6.3.1 Phase 1: Identify Significant Resource Use Counters and Mes-
sages
In this section, we determine on all dates: (i) the feature extractor which identifies
the largest number of significant resource use counters, and (ii) the feature extractor
which identifies the largest number of significant message types.
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Identify Significant Resource Use Counters
Figure 6.2 shows the number of significant resource use counters that were identified
by PCA, ICA and NLPCA on data matrices of 1 hour time-bins on Ranger.
Figure 6.2: Significant resource use counters on time-bins of 1 hour on Ranger.
We observe that 21 resource use counters were identified by PCA on 12 dates,
21 resource use counters were identified by ICA on 17 dates and 21 resource use
counters were identified by NLPCA on 26 dates.
Figure 6.3 shows the number of significant resource use counters that were
identified on data matrices of 30 minute time-bins on Ranger.
Figure 6.3: Significant resource use counters on time-bins of 30 minutes on Ranger.
We observe that 21 resource use counters were identified by PCA on 13 dates,
21 resource use counters were identified by ICA on 15 dates and 21 resource use
counters were identified by NLPCA on 26 dates.
Figure 6.4 shows the number of significant resource use counters that were
identified on data matrices of 10 minute time-bins on Ranger.
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Figure 6.4: Significant resource use counters on time-bins of 10 minutes on Ranger.
We observe that 21 resource use counters were identified by PCA on 14 dates,
21 resource use counters were identified by ICA on 14 dates, and 21 resource use
counters were identified by NLPCA on 26 dates. On the data matrices of 1 hour,
30 minute and 10 minute time-bins, both PCA and ICA took less than one second
to execute. On the data matrices of 1 hour, 30 minute and 10 minute time-bins,
NLPCA took an average of 55 seconds to execute. Our results show that:
• The largest number of significant resource use counters were identified only by
NLPCA on all 26 dates in July 2011.
• The number of significant resource use counters that were identified on all the
26 dates represent 6% of all the resource use counters monitored on Ranger.
Figure 6.5 shows the number of significant resource use counters that were
identified on data matrices of 1 hour time-bins on Lonestar4.
Figure 6.5: Significant resource use counters on time-bins of 1 hour on Lonestar4.
We observe that 21 resource use counters were identified by PCA on 24 dates,
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21 resource use counters were identified by ICA on 25 dates, and 21 resource use
counters were identified by NLPCA on 31 dates.
Figure 6.6 shows the number of significant resource use counters that were
identified on data matrices of 30 minute time-bins on Lonestar4.
Figure 6.6: Significant resource use counters on time-bins of 30 minutes on Lonestar4.
We observe that 21 resource use counters were identified by PCA on 25 dates,
21 resource use counters were identified by ICA on 17 dates, and 21 resource use
counters were identified by NLPCA on 31 dates.
Figure 6.7 shows the number of significant resource use counters that were
identified on data matrices of 10 minute time-bins on Lonestar4.
Figure 6.7: Significant resource use counters on time-bins of 10 minutes on Lonestar4.
We observe that 21 resource use counters were identified by PCA on 22 dates,
21 resource use counters were identified by ICA on 23 dates, and 21 resource use
counters were identified by NLPCA on 31 dates. On the data matrices of 1 hour,
30 minute and 10 minute time-bins, both PCA and ICA took less than one second
to execute. On the data matrices of 1 hour, 30 minute and 10 minute time-bins,
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NLPCA took an average of 1 minute 22 seconds to execute. Our results show that:
• The largest number of significant resource use counters were identified only by
NLPCA on all 31 dates in March 2013.
• The number of significant resource use counters that were identified on all the
31 dates represent 6% of all the resource use counters monitored on Lonestar4.
Identify Significant Message Types
Figure 6.8 shows the number of significant message types that were identified on
data matrices of 1 hour time-bins on Ranger.
Figure 6.8: Significant message types on time-bins of 1 hour on Ranger.
We observe that: (i) the largest number of significant message types were
identified by PCA on 23 dates, (ii) the largest number of significant message types
were identified by ICA on 19 dates, and (iii) the largest number of significant message
types were identified by NLPCA on 26 dates.
Figure 6.9 shows the number of significant message types that were identified
on data matrices of 30 minute time-bins on Ranger.
Figure 6.9: Significant message types on time-bins of 30 minutes on Ranger.
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We observe that: (i) the largest number of significant message types were
identified by PCA on 21 dates, (ii) the largest number of significant message types
were identified by ICA on 17 dates, and (iii) the largest number of significant message
types were identified by NLPCA on 25 dates.
Figure 6.10 shows the number of significant message types that were identified
on data matrices of 10 minute time-bins on Ranger.
Figure 6.10: Significant message types on time-bins of 10 minutes on Ranger.
We observe that: (i) the largest number of significant message types were
identified by PCA on 20 dates, (ii) the largest number of significant message types
were identified by ICA on 19 dates, and (iii) the largest number of significant message
types were identified by NLPCA on 25 dates. On the data matrices of 1 hour, 30
minute and 10 minute time-bins, PCA took 1.2 seconds to execute and ICA took
less than one second to execute. On the data matrices of 1 hour, 30 minute and 10
minute time-bins, NLPCA took an average of 77 seconds to execute. Our results
show that:
• Only NLPCA identified the largest number of significant message types on
data matrices of 1 hour time-bins on all 26 dates in July 2011.
• The number of significant message types identified on all 26 dates represent
between 5% and 50% of all message types generated on all the dates.
Figure 6.11 shows the number of significant message types that were identified
on data matrices of 1 hour time-bins on Lonestar4. We observe that: (i) the largest
number of message types were identified by PCA on 26 dates, (ii) the largest number
of message types were identified by ICA on 18 dates, and (iii) the largest number of
message types were identified by NLPCA on 31 dates.
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Figure 6.11: Significant message types on time-bins of 1 hour on Lonestar4.
Figure 6.12 shows the number of significant message types that were identified
on data matrices of 30 minute time-bins on Lonestar4.
Figure 6.12: Significant message types on time-bins of 30 minutes on Lonestar4.
We observe that: (i) the largest number of message types were identified by
PCA on 27 dates, (ii) the largest number of message types were identified by ICA on
20 dates, and (iii) the largest number of message types were identified by NLPCA
on 30 dates.
Figure 6.13 shows the number of significant message types that were identified
on data matrices of 10 minute time-bins on Lonestar4. We observe that: (i) the
largest number of message types were identified by PCA on 28 dates, (ii) the largest
number of message types were identified by ICA on 19 dates, and (iii) the largest
number of message types were identified by NLPCA on 31 dates. On the data
matrices of 1 hour, 30 minute and 10 minute time-bins, both PCA and ICA took
1.5 seconds to execute. On the data matrices of 1 hour, 30 minute and 10 minute
time-bins, NLPCA took an average of 2 minutes 12 seconds to execute. Our results
show that:
• Only NLPCA identified the largest number of significant message types on
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Figure 6.13: Significant message types on time-bins of 10 minutes on Lonestar4.
data matrices of 1 hour and 10 minute time-bins on all 31 dates in March 2013.
• The number of significant message types identified on all 31 dates represent
between 3% and 46% of message types generated on all the dates.
6.3.2 Phase 2: Identify Rare Error Cases
In this section, we provide details for four error cases on the Ranger and Lonestar4
HPC systems. We use the lists of correlated resource use counters and correlated
errors to identify the error cases and discussed the use cases with the system
administrator. In all the error cases, the errors are different. The errors are: (i)
network packet drops and Lustre I/O errors, (ii) CPU I/O bottleneck and Lustre
client eviction, (iii) virtual memory and harddisk I/O errors, and (iv) data and
network synchronisation errors. A summary of the error cases is given in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: List of rare error cases on Ranger and Lonestar4.
Ranger
Components Error Date
Infiniband & Lustre network, Network packet July 5
Lustre filesystem drops & Lustre I/O
CPU, harddisk & CPU I/O bottleneck & July 15
Lustre filesystem Lustre client eviction
Memory management, Virtual memory & July 25
harddisk & Lustre harddisk I/O
Lonestar4
Components Error Date
Memory, Linux threads Data & network March 1
& Lustre network synchronisation
When the Linux operating system kernel goes into a loop, i.e., Linux hanged,
a soft lockup event is generated. To identify the soft lockup event, we scan the
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system logs for a message containing the keywords soft lockup. We implemented a
function in EXERMEST to search the system logs for soft lockup events and extract
the dates of soft lockups. In the Ranger system logs, we identified 12 dates of soft
lockups for July 2011 (see Figure 3.2b). In the Lonestar4 system logs, we identified
seven dates of soft lockups for March 2013 (see Figure 3.3b).
Error Case 1: Infiniband, Lustre Network and Lustre Filesystem
The network interface card (NIC) transmits and receives data packets on a network.
When a NIC receives or transmits data, first it will store the data into the available
buffers on the network card. Most of the time, the network card receives the data
into its buffers correctly. However, in a rare case, the buffers on the network card
may be full and some of the data is dropped. A networked filesystem transmits and
receives a lot of data on the network. When a filesystem on a node wants to send
data to another node, it will send the data to the network card first. Most of the
time, the network card receives the data into its buffers correctly. However, if the
data size is larger than the available buffers on the network card, the NIC is not able
to transmit all the data.
We manually scan the lists of significant resource use counters generated by
PCA, ICA and NLPCA on data matrices of 1 hour, 30 minute and 10 minute time-bins.
We found that only the list generated on the resource use data matrix of 10 minute
time-bins contain both net ib0 tx_dropped and llite /work write_bytes. Fur-
ther, we identified the two resource use counters only on July 5 2011. We found
that both the PCA and ICA generated lists contain the llite /work write_bytes
resource use counter. Therefore, the Lustre filesystem write bytes resource use
counter follows a linear uncorrelated pattern – in this case, we can use PCA as
the primary method. We found that only the NLPCA generated list contain the
net ib0 tx_dropped resource use counter. Our result shows that: (i) the network
transmit packet drop resource use counter follows a non-linear uncorrelated pattern
on July 5 2011, and (ii) PCA and NLPCA are required for identifying the significant
net ib0 tx_dropped and llite /work write_bytes resource use counters.
Next, we scan the lists of correlated resource use counters generated on the
data matrix of 10 minute time-bins. Figure 6.14 shows the significant resource use
counters that are correlated to other resource use counters. We observe a strong cor-
relation of net ib0 tx_dropped to lnet rx_msgs_dropped, llite /work dirty_
pages_misses and llite /work ioctl – the correlation strength ranges from 0.93
to 1. We observe a strong correlation of llite /work write_bytes to lnet rx_msgs_
dropped, llite /work dirty_pages_misses and llite /work ioctl – the correl-
ation strength ranges from 0.93 to 1. We found that the correlated resource use coun-
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Figure 6.14: Correlated resource use counters on Ranger. The significant resource
use counters are “net ib0 tx dropped” and “llite /work write bytes”.
ters are contained only in the list generated by Pearson correlation. Pearson correla-
tion took 1.5 seconds to execute and generate the list. The lnet rx_msgs_dropped
records dropped packets on the Lustre filesystem network. Our result shows that
Pearson correlation is a suitable method; it identified the Lustre I/O, Infiniband and
Lustre network resource use counters that follow a linear pattern.
The IO window and PREFETCH window events can be used to see what happens
when the Linux kernel executes a function call. We manually scan the lists of
significant message types generated by PCA, ICA and NLPCA on the 1-hour, 30
and 10 minutes time-bins data matrices. We found that only the lists generated
on the 1-hour time-bins message types data matrix contain the IO window and
PREFETCH window events. Further, we identified the two system events only on
July 5. We found both the system events only in the NLPCA generated list. Our
result shows that the IO window and PREFETCH window events follow a non-linear
uncorrelated pattern on July 5 2011.
Next, we scan the lists of correlated messages that were generated on
the 1-hour time-bins data matrix on July 5 2011. Figure 6.15 shows the sig-
nificant system events that are correlated to other system events. We observe
a strong correlation of IO window to error reading dir, request timed out
and tried all connections ... – the correlation strength ranges from 0.88 to
1. We observe a strong correlation of PREFETCH window to error reading dir,
request timed out and tried all connections ... – the correlation strength
ranges from 0.88 to 1. We found that only the list generated by Pearson correlation
contain the correlated system events. Our result shows that Pearson correlation is a
suitable method; it identified that the system events follow a linear pattern on July
5 2011.
Correlation with failures: Next, we scan the correlation matrix that was
generated on the 1-hour time-bins data matrices to determine the correlation strength
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Figure 6.15: Correlated messages on Ranger. The significant events are “kernel IO
window” and “kernel PREFETCH window”.
of IO window and PREFETCH window to soft lockup events. We found that their
correlation scores is -0.07. Therefore, there is no correlation between the two Linux
function call messages and soft lockup events on July 5 2011.
Detailed diagnosis: On July 5 2011, data that was transmitted was dropped
by a NIC due to insufficient buffer space on the network card. On the same day, a
filesystem directory read error was strongly correlated to two Linux kernel function
calls. Further, two timeout and reconnection messages were strongly correlated to
both Linux kernel function calls. A soft lockup was reported on July 5 2011 but there
is no correlation of both the kernel function calls to the soft lockup event. Therefore,
the networked filesystem error did not cause compute node crash on July 5 2011.
When on the same day, correlations of network transmit packet drop, Lustre
I/O and Lustre network resource use counters and correlations of Linux I/O, Lustre
I/O and network error messages occur, we can use the network transmit packet drop
and Lustre I/O counters to monitor the state of the Infiniband and Lustre network
and filesystem.
Validation: We test the significance of: (i) strong positive correlated resource use
counters, and (ii) strong positive correlated messages. We summarise their z-scores
in Table 6.3. All the z-scores range from 4.85 to 27.73. At the confidence level of
99%, under the null hypothesis z0r = 2.64 and z0m = 2.64. Therefore, we reject the
null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis.
Table 6.3: z-scores for correlated resource use counters and correlated messages on
Ranger.
Correlated resource use counters July 5 2011
Infiniband network, Lustre network & I/O 16.00 ≤ zr ≤ 27.73
Correlated messages July 5 2011
Kernel function call, Lustre I/O & timeout errors 4.85 ≤ zm ≤ 10.68
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Next, we determine the probability of identifying a significant result due to
the increase in the number of hypotheses tested. The lowest z-score in Table 6.3
is 4.85. We apply a one-sided test and use the significance level, α = 0.01 for all
given hypothesis tests to obtain a P -value. The P -value is equal to P (Z > 4.85) =
1 − P (Z ≤ 4.85) = 1 − 0.9999 = 0.0001. Then, we obtain the adjusted P -value
0.0001× 26 = 0.0026 where the number of dates is 26. For all z-scores in Table 6.3,
the adjusted P -values are less than 0.01. This indicates that all the correlations
would not be observed under the null hypothesis.
Identify the nodes: We determine the nodes which are associated with the identi-
fied errors. A summary is given in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: List of messages and associated number of nodes on Ranger.
Significant message Nodes Correlated message Nodes
IO window 6 error reading dir 1
PREFETCH window 6 tried all connections, 3,929
request timed out 3,929
From Table 6.4, we observe:
• there are six nodes associated with IO window and PREFETCH window.
• there is one node associated with error reading dir.
• there are 3,929 nodes associated with request timed out and tried all
connections.
Error Case 2: CPU, Harddisk and Lustre Filesystem
When data is prepared to be written to the harddisk, the filesystem sends a write
request to the harddisk. The resource use counter named block hda wr_merges is
incremented when a write request merges with the existing in-queue requests. When
the filesystem performs an I/O operation, the processor waits for the I/O operation
to complete. The resource use counter named cpu 6 idle is incremented when a
processor waits on a filesystem I/O operation.
We manually scan the lists of significant counters generated by PCA, ICA
and NLPCA on the data matrices of 1 hour, 30 minute and 10 minute time-bins. We
found that only the lists generated on the 10 minutes time-bins data matrix contain
cpu 6 iowait and llite /work ioctl. Further, we identified both the resource
use counters only in the list on July 15. We found both the resource use counters
only in the list generated by NLPCA. Our results show that the CPU I/O wait and
Lustre filesystem I/O resource use counters follow a non-linear uncorrelated pattern
on July 15 2011.
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Next, we scan the lists of correlated resource use counters generated on the
10 minutes time-bins data matrices. Figure 6.16 shows the significant resource use
counters that are correlated to other resource use counters.
Figure 6.16: Correlated resource use counters on Ranger. The significant resource
use counters are “cpu iowait” and “llite /work ioctl”.
We observe there is a strong correlation of cpu 6 iowait to cpu 6 idle,
block hda wr_merges and numa 0 other_node – the correlation strength ranges
from 0.87 to 0.96. We observe there is a strong correlation of llite /work ioctl
to cpu 6 idle, block hda wr_ merges and numa 0 other_node – the correlation
strength ranges from 0.83 to 0.99. We found the correlated resource use counters
in the lists generated by Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods. The
Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods took 1.2 seconds to execute and
generate the lists. Our result shows that Spearman-Rank and Pearson correlation
are suitable methods. When both correlation methods identify the correlated events,
Pearson correlation can be used as the primary method.
The connection lost and connection restored events can be used to see
what happens when the Lustre filesystem communicates with an unresponsive client.
We scan the lists of significant message types generated by PCA, ICA and NLPCA
on the 1-hour, 30 and 10 minutes time-bins data matrices. We found that only the
lists generated on the 10 minutes time-bins data matrix contain connection lost
and connection restored events. Further, we identified the two events only in the
lists on July 15. We found the two events only in the list generated by ICA. Our
result shows that the two system events follow a linear uncorrelated pattern on July
15 2011.
Next, we scan the lists of correlated messages generated on the 10 minutes time-
bins data matrix. Figure 6.17 shows the significant events that are correlated to other
system events. We observe there is a strong correlation of connection was lost
to cancel RPC, request timed out and client was evicted – the correlation
strength is 0.86. We observe there is a strong correlation of connection restored
142
Figure 6.17: Correlated messages on Ranger. The significant events are “connection
was lost” and “connection restored”.
to cancel RPC, request timed out and client was evicted – the correlation
strength ranges from 0.87 to 0.88. We found the correlated events only in the list
generated by Pearson correlation. Our results show that the system events follow a
linear pattern on July 15 2011.
Correlation with failures: No soft lockup event was reported on July 15 2011
(see Figure 3.2b for the dates of compute node soft lockups on July 2011.). Therefore,
the Lustre filesystem eviction of an unresponsive client did not cause a compute
node to crash.
Detailed diagnosis : On July 15 2011, the Lustre filesystem was executing I/O
operation which caused the processor to wait for the I/O operation to finish. On the
same day, eviction of an unresponsive Lustre client was traced to three correlated
Lustre Evict/RPC protocol messages. On the same day, a NUMA resource use
counter which records the number of memory pages allocated to a remote process, is
correlated with CPU idle and harddisk I/O activity counters.
When on the same day: (i) correlations of significant cpu iowait activity to cpu
idle and harddisk I/O activities, and correlations of significant Lustre I/O activity to
cpu idle and harddisk I/O activities occur, and (ii) correlations of Lustre connection
and client eviction error events also occur it shows that Lustre network and client
evicted errors are generated by CPU, harddisk and Lustre filesystem activities.
Therefore, we can use the CPU I/O wait and Lustre filesystem I/O resource use
counters to monitor the state of the CPU, harddisk and Lustre filesystem.
Validation: We test the significance of: (i) strong positive correlated resource use
counters, and (ii) strong positive correlated messages. We summarise their z-scores
in Table 6.5. All the z-scores range from 10.42 to 27.73. At the confidence level of
99%, under the null hypothesis z0r = 2.64 and z0m = 2.64. Therefore, we reject the
null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis.
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Table 6.5: z-scores for correlated resource use counters and messages on Ranger.
Correlated resource use counters July 15 2011
CPU, harddisk, NUMA & Lustre I/O 10.42 ≤ zr ≤ 27.73
Correlated messages July 15 2011
Unresponsive Lustre client & Evict/RPC 11.67 ≤ zm ≤ 12.64
Next, we determine the probability of identifying a significant result due to the
increase in the number of hypotheses tested. We apply a one-sided test and use the
significance level, α = 0.01 for all given hypothesis tests to obtain a P -value. From
Table 6.5, we observe that the lowest z-score is 10.42. Since this is a one-sided test,
the P -value is equal to P (Z > 10.42) = 1− P (Z ≤ 10.42) = 1− 0.99999 = 0.00001.
Then, we obtain the adjusted P -value 0.00001 × 26 = 0.00026 where d = 26. For
all z-scores in Table 6.5, the adjusted P -values are less than 0.01. This indicates
that it is highly unlikely that all the correlations would be observed under the null
hypothesis.
Identify the nodes: We determine the nodes which are associated with the identi-
fied errors. A summary is given in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: List of messages and associated number of nodes on Ranger.
Significant message Nodes Correlated message Nodes
connection restored 152 cancel RPC 12
connection was lost 152 client was evicted 12
request timed out 151
From Table 6.6, we observe:
• there are 152 nodes associated with connection restored and connection
was lost.
• there are 12 nodes associated with cancel RPC and client was evicted.
• there are 151 nodes associated with request timed out.
Error Case 3: Linux Memory Management Unit, Harddisk and Lustre
Filesystem
When a program makes a request for data, the operating system checks that the data
requested by the program is available in main memory. If the data is not in the main
memory and the main memory is full, some existing data is moved to the harddisk to
free up space for new data. The resource use counter named mem Writeback records
the total amount of data that is moved from the memory to harddisk. The resource
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use counter named block hda wr_sectors records the total number of harddisk
sectors that were written.
We manually scan the lists of significant resource use counters generated by
PCA, ICA and NLPCA on the 1-hour, 30 and 10 minutes time-bins data matrices.
We found that: (i) only the lists generated on the 10 minutes time-bins data
matrix contain vm pgfault and llite /share ioctl, (ii) only the list generated
by ICA contain vm pgfault, and (iii) only the list generated by NLPCA contain
llite /share ioctl. Further, we identified the two resource use counters only in
the lists on July 25. The page-fault resource use counter follows a linear uncorrelated
pattern. The Lustre filesystem I/O resource use counter follows a non-linear uncor-
related pattern. Our result shows that ICA and NLPCA are required for identifying
the two significant resource use counters on July 25 2011.
Next, we scan the lists of correlated resource use counters generated on the
10 minutes time-bins data matrices. Figure 6.18 shows the significant resource use
counters that are correlated to other resource use counters.
Figure 6.18: Correlated resource use counters on Ranger. The significant resource
use counters are “vm pgfault” and “llite /share ioctl”.
We observe there is a strong correlation of vm pgfault to block wr_sectors,
mem Writeback and llite /work write_bytes – the correlation scores range from
0.85 to 0.99. We observe there is a strong correlation of llite /share ioctl to
block wr_sectors, mem Writeback and llite /work write_bytes – the correla-
tion scores range from 0.85 to 0.99. We found that both the Pearson and Spearman-
Rank correlation generated lists contain the correlated resource use counters. The
Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods took 1.5 seconds to execute and
generate the lists of correlated counters. Our result shows that Spearman-Rank and
Pearson correlation are suitable methods. When the correlated events are identified
by both correlation methods, Pearson correlation can be used as the primary method.
The get_user_pages and copy_strings system events can be used to see
what happens when Linux’s memory management unit functions are executed. We
scan the lists of significant message types generated by PCA, ICA and NLPCA
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on the 1-hour, 30 and 10 minutes time-bins data matrices. We found that only
the lists generated on the 1-hour time-bins message types data matrix contain the
get_user_pages and copy_strings events. Further, we identified the two system
events only in the list on July 25. We found the two system events only in the list
generated by NLPCA. Our result shows that NLPCA identified that the two system
events follow a non-linear uncorrelated pattern on July 25 2011.
Next, we scan the lists of correlated messages generated on the 1-hour time-
bins data matrix. Figure 6.19 shows the significant system events that are correlated
to other system events.
Figure 6.19: Correlated messages on Ranger. The significant events are “kernel
get user pages” and “kernel copy strings”.
We observe there is a strong correlation of get_user_pages to try_to_free_
pages, do_page_fault and soft lockup – the correlation score is 0.99. We observe
there is a strong correlation of copy_strings to try_to_free_pages, do_page_fault
and soft lockup – the correlation score is 0.99. We found that the correlated system
events are present only in the list generated by Pearson correlation. Our results show
that the correlated system events follow a linear pattern on July 25 2011.
Correlation with failures : From Figure 6.19, we observe that there is a strong
correlation of get_user_pages and copy_strings to soft lockup – the correlation
score is 1.
Detailed diagnosis: On July 25 2011, two kernel functions were executed by
the Linux memory management unit to free up available space in the system main
memory. The decision to free up space in main memory was made in response to a
program’s request for data. A page-fault occurred which led to a Linux operating
system crash.
When on the same day: (i) correlations of significant page-fault activity
to memory, harddisk I/O and filesystem activities, and correlations of significant
Lustre I/O activity to memory, harddisk I/O and filesystem activities occur, and (ii)
correlations of Linux memory management, page-fault error events and soft lockup
messages also occur, it shows that virtual memory and harddisk I/O errors are
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generated by page-fault, filesystem, harddisk and memory I/O activities. Therefore,
we can use the page-fault and Lustre filesystem I/O resource use counters to monitor
the state of Linux memory management.
Validation: We test the significance of: (i) strong positive correlated resource use
counters, and (ii) strong positive correlated messages. We summarise their z-scores
in Table 6.7. All the z-scores range from 10.68 to 27.73. At the confidence level of
99%, under the null hypothesis z0r = 2.64 and z0m = 2.64. Therefore, we reject the
null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis.
Table 6.7: z-scores for correlated resource use counters and messages on Ranger.
Correlated resource use counters July 25 2011
Page-fault, hard disk, memory & Lustre I/O 11.22 ≤ zr ≤ 27.73
Correlated messages July 25 2011
Memory management, page-fault & Linux crash zm = 10.68
Next, we determine the probability of identifying a significant result due to the
increase in the number of hypotheses tested. We apply a one-sided test and use the
significance level, α = 0.01 for all given hypothesis tests to obtain a P -value. From
Table 6.7, we observe that the lowest z-score is 10.68. Since this is a one-sided test,
the P -value is equal to P (Z > 10.68) = 1− P (Z ≤ 10.68) = 1− 0.99999 = 0.00001.
Then, we obtain the adjusted P -value 0.00001 × 26 = 0.00026 where d = 26. For
all z-scores in Table 6.7, the adjusted P -values are less than 0.01. This indicates
that it is highly unlikely that all the correlations would be observed under the null
hypothesis.
Identify the nodes: We determine the nodes which are associated with the identi-
fied errors. A summary is given in Table 6.8.
Table 6.8: List of messages and associated nodes on Ranger.
Significant message Node Correlated message Node
get user pages i182-312 do page fault i128-406, i182-312
copy strings i182-312 try to free pages i182-312
soft lockup i128-406, i162-208, i182-312
From Table 6.8, we observe:
• there is one node associated with get_user_pages and copy_strings.
• there are two nodes associated with do_page_fault.
• there is one node associated with try_to_free_pages.
• there are three nodes associated with soft lockup.
147
Error Case 4: Dirty Memory, Linux Threads and Lustre Network
When data in the main memory is modified but not yet written back to the harddisk,
the in-memory version of the data is out of sync with the version on disk. The
resource use counter named mem Dirty records the amount of data that is out of
sync. When the version on the harddisk is updated, the data in main memory and
harddisk are in sync. The resource use counter named mem Writeback records the
amount of data that is actively being written to the disk. Data in memory must be
synchronised with the data on disk when multiple threads belonging to a process
are created. In most cases, the data in memory is synchronised with the data on
disk. However, on a rare occasion, if one of the threads fail then some of the data
in memory and disk may not be synchronised. The resource use counter named
ps nr_threads records the number of threads.
We scan the list of significant resource use counters generated by PCA, ICA
and NLPCA on the 10 and 30 minutes and 1 hour time-bins data matrices. We
found that: (i) the resource use counter ps nr_threads is contained only in the
list generated by NLPCA on the 10 minutes time-bins data matrix, and (ii) the
resource use counter mem 0 Dirty is contained in the lists generated by NLPCA
on the 10 minutes time-bins data matrix and ICA on the 1 hour time-bins data
matrix. Further, ps nr_threads and mem 0 Dirty are contained only in the lists
of significant resource use counters on March 01 2013. Our results show that:
• the resource use counter ps nr_threads follows a non-linear uncorrelated
pattern on March 01 2013. Therefore, NLPCA is a suitable method for
identifying ps nr_threads.
• the resource use counter mem 0 Dirty follows: (i) a non-linear uncorrelated
pattern on 10 minutes time-bins, and (ii) a linear uncorrelated pattern on 1
hour time-bins on March 01 2013. Because ICA generates the list of significant
resource use counters faster than NLPCA, when NLPCA and ICA identifies
the significant resource use counter, ICA can be used as the primary method.
Next, we scan the lists of correlated resource use counters that were gen-
erated on the 10 minutes time-bins and 1 hour time-bins data matrices. Fig-
ure 6.20 shows the significant resource use counters that are correlated to other
resource use counters. We observe there is a strong correlation of ps nr_threads to
mem 1 Writeback, mem 1 Dirty and mem 0 LowFree – the correlation scores range
from 0.81 to 0.82. We observe there is a strong correlation of mem 0 Dirty to
mem 1 Writeback, mem 1 Dirty and mem 0 LowFree – the correlation scores range
from 0.8 to 0.95. We found that only Spearman-Rank correlation identified the cor-
related ps nr_threads and mem 1 Writeback, ps nr_threads and mem 1 Dirty,
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Figure 6.20: Correlated resource use counters on Lonestar4. The significant resource
use counters are “ps nr threads” and “mem 0 Dirty”.
mem 0 Dirty and mem 1 Dirty, and mem 0 Dirty and mem 0 LowFree. We found
that only Pearson correlation identified the correlated mem 0 Dirty and mem 1
Writeback. The correlated ps nr_threads and mem 0 LowFree resource use coun-
ters are contained in the lists generated by Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation
methods. Both Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods took 1.5 seconds
to generate the lists. Our results show that both Pearson and Spearman-Rank
correlation are required for identifying the correlated resource use counters.
The system events failed to close new saved state file and request
sent has timed out can be used to see what happens when synchronisation errors
occur. We scan the lists of significant messages generated by PCA, ICA and NLPCA
on the 10 and 30 minutes and 1 hour time-bins data matrices. We found that: (i)
the event failed to close new saved state file is contained only in the list
generated by NLPCA on the 30 minutes time-bins data matrix, and (ii) the event
request sent has timed out is contained only in the lists generated by ICA on
the 10 minutes and 1 hour time-bins data matrices. Further, the two error events
are contained only in the lists of significant messages on March 01 2013. Our results
show that:
• the event failed to close new saved state file follows a non-linear un-
correlated pattern on March 01 2013. Therefore, NLPCA is a suitable method
for identifying the event.
• the event request sent has timed out follows a linear uncorrelated pattern
on March 01 2013. Therefore, ICA is a suitable method for identifying the
event.
Next, we scan the lists of correlated messages generated on the 10 and
30 minutes time-bins data matrices. Figure 6.21 shows the significant messages
that are correlated to other messages. We observe there is a strong correlation
of failed to close new saved state file to data not saved properly – the
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Figure 6.21: Correlated messages on Lonestar4. The significant messages are “failed
to close new data saved state” and “request sent has timed out”.
correlation score is 1. We observe there is a strong correlation of request sent has
timed out to connection was lost and client was evicted – the correlation
score is 1. We found that the correlated messages are contained in the lists gen-
erated by Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods. Both Pearson and
Spearman-Rank correlation took 1.5 seconds to generate the list of correlated mes-
sages. When both Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods identify the
correlated messages, Pearson correlation can be used as the primary method.
Correlation with failures: There are no soft lockup events on March 01 2013.
Detailed diagnosis : On March 01 2013, two synchronisation error events were
reported by the Linux operating system. The decision to synchronise data in memory
and disk was identified from the strong correlations of Linux process threads to dirty
memory and memory writeback resource use counters. The synchronisation of data
and the generation of synchronisation error events did not lead to a compute node
crash on March 01 2013.
When on the same day: (i) correlations of significant Linux process threads
and dirty memory to memory writeback activities occur, and (ii) correlations of
significant network and data saved errors to Lustre network and data saved events
also occur, it shows that data and network synchronisation errors are generated by
Linux process threads and Lustre network events. Therefore, we can use the Linux
process threads and dirty memory resource use counters and Lustre network events
to monitor the state of data and network synchronisation.
Validation: We test the significance of: (i) strong positive correlated resource use
counters, and (ii) strong positive correlated messages. We summarise their z-scores
in Table 6.9. All the z-scores range from 6.98 to 27.73. At the confidence level of
99%, under the null hypothesis z0r = 2.64 and z0m = 2.64. Therefore, we reject the
null hypothesis in favour of the alternate hypothesis.
Next, we determine the probability of identifying a significant result due to
the increase in the number of hypotheses tested. We apply a one-sided test and use
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Table 6.9: z-scores for correlated resource use counters and messages on Lonestar4.
Correlated resource use counters March 01 2013
Linux threads & memory 6.98 ≤ zr ≤ 9.36
Correlated messages March 01 2013
Data synchronisation & Lustre network errors 23.41 ≤ zm ≤ 27.73
the significance level, α = 0.01 for all given hypothesis tests to obtain a P -value.
From Table 6.9, we observe that the lowest z-score is 6.98. Since this is a one-sided
test, the P -value is equal to P (Z > 6.98) = 1−P (Z ≤ 6.98) = 1−0.99997 = 0.00003.
Then, we obtain the adjusted P -value 0.00003 × 31 = 0.00093 where d = 31. For
all z-scores in Table 6.9, the adjusted P -values are less than 0.01. This indicates
that it is highly unlikely that all the correlations would be observed under the null
hypothesis.
Identify the nodes: We determine the nodes which are associated with the identi-
fied errors. A summary is given in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10: List of messages and associated nodes on Lonestar4.
Significant message Node Correlated message Node
failed to close new saved state file login3 data not saved properly login3
request sent has timed out 15 connection was lost 17
This client was evicted 17
From Table 6.10, we observe:
• there is one node associated with failed to close new saved state file
and data not saved properly.
• there are 15 nodes associated with request sent has timed out.
• there are 17 nodes associated with connection was lost and This client
was evicted.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the EXERMEST framework for diagnosing rare error
cases on HPC systems. The main technical contribution is a new workflow that
integrated three feature extraction methods and two correlation methods. We
evaluated the feature extractors and combined resource use data matrices with
message types data matrices to identify the significant resource use counters and
system events associated with rare error cases. EXERMEST identified four error
cases on two HPC systems and diagnosed multiple system components associated
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with the errors. We showed that multiple feature extractors and time-bins of different
granularities are required for identifying the error cases. EXERMEST used the
Bonferroni correction to ensure the accuracy of the diagnoses and showed that all
the correlations would not be observed under the null hypothesis.
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Chapter 7
A Comparative Analysis of
CORRMEXT and EXERMEST
In this chapter, we discuss the similarities and differences between the CORRMEXT
(CORrelating Resource use data and Message logs and EXtracting Times) and
EXERMEST (EXtracting FEatures and CoRrelating Resource Use Counters and
MESsage Types) diagnostics frameworks. Whereas the CORRMEXT framework
combines data type extraction, multiple correlation methods and time-bin extraction
to identify frequently occurring error cases and report the success and failure of error
recovery protocols, the EXERMEST framework combines multiple feature extraction
methods and multiple correlation methods to identify rare error cases. We provide
this chapter for the interested reader to easily compare the diagnostics capabilities
of CORRMEXT and EXERMEST.
We structure this chapter as follows: In Section 7.1, we summarise the
CORRMEXT framework and describe the list of error cases. In Section 7.2, we
summarise the EXERMEST framework and describe the list of error cases. In
Section 7.3, we discuss the similarities and differences between CORRMEXT and
EXERMEST and conclude with a summary in Section 7.4.
7.1 CORRMEXT Failure Diagnosis Framework
In this section, we summarise the CORRMEXT diagnostics framework and describe
the list of error cases.
7.1.1 Introduction
We developed CORRMEXT to study patterns of error cases that occur frequently.
CORRMEXT used real resource use data and system logs in its analyses. The
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resource use data and system logs were generated on production high performance
computing systems. CORRMEXT combined analysis of resource usage data and
system logs and report the success and failure of error recovery protocols. It is based
on the use of TACC Stats [17] resource usage monitor, Rationalized message logs
[36] and Syslogs [40]. We implemented an approach (CORRMEXT) that has three
phases. The three phases of the approach are:
• Correlating resource use counters in the resource use data to identify the
strongly positive correlated resource use counters.
• Correlating message types in the system logs to identify the strongly positive
correlated system events.
• Extracting the variance of the time-bins associated with the correlated resource
use counters and correlated system events to identify the earliest hour of change
in the system behaviour.
The CORRMEXT framework is composed of three modules. The three
modules are: (1) Data Type Extraction, (2) Correlation and (3) Time-bin Extraction.
When given a list of dates, CORRMEXT automatically applied the Data Type
Extraction, Correlation and Time-bin Extraction modules on the resource use data
and system logs. Next, we summarise the three modules within the CORRMEXT
framework.
CORRMEXT: Data Type Extraction
The Data Type Extraction module currently processes TACC Stats resource use
data, Rationalized message logs and Syslogs. It produced a standardise data format
on which standard analysis algorithms can be applied. We represented the resource
use data and system logs as two data matrices. In the data matrix that represents
resource use data, a resource use counter is represented by one row, a time-bin is
represented by one column and the count for one resource use counter at one time-bin
is represented by one cell. In the data matrix that represents the system logs, a
message type is represented by one row, a time-bin is represented by one column
and the count for one message type at one time-bin is represented by one cell. Our
objective is to identify error propagation and recovery patterns which occur over a
regular time window, not over different time windows. Therefore, we collected the
resource use data and system logs using a fixed time window of one hour.
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CORRMEXT: Correlation
The Correlation module computes: (i) the correlation coefficients between all the
resource use counters and extracts a list of strongly positive correlated resource use
counters for analysis, and (ii) the correlation coefficients between all the message
types and extracts a list of strongly positive correlated system events for analysis.
It receives the resource use counters and message types data matrices generated by
the Data Type Extraction module. Currently, the Correlation module evaluated two
different correlation algorithms. The correlation algorithms are Pearson correlation
and Spearman-Rank correlation. We implemented Pearson correlation and use it to
identify resource use counters and system events that follow a linear pattern. We
implemented Spearman-Rank correlation and use it to identify resource use counters
and system events that follow a monotonically increasing pattern. We combined
Pearson and Spearman-Rank correlation methods to detect a gradual change or
fluctuation in the relationship between a pair of resource use counters or a pair of
message types. We used the following rules to interpret the strength of the correlation
coefficient [1]: (i) between 0.8 to 1 as strong positive correlated, (ii) between 0.3 to
0.79 as moderate positive correlated, and (iii) between 0.1 to 0.29 as weak positive
correlated.
We tested the significance of all the correlation coefficients by applying a
standard technique called Fisher’s z-score [67]. We defined two null hypothesis
and two alternate hypothesis. The null hypotheses are: (i) a pair of resource use
counters is weakly positive correlated, and (ii) a pair of message types is weakly
positive correlated. The alternate hypotheses are: (i) a pair of resource use counters
is strongly positive correlated, and (ii) a pair of message types is strongly positive
correlated. We addressed the issue of inflation in false positive due to multiple
independent tests by applying the Bonferroni correction [26].
CORRMEXT: Time-bin Extraction
At every hour, the Time-bin Extraction module computes the variance of the
correlated resource use counters and correlated system events to identify the hour
that has the highest variance. It receives the data matrices that contain the strongly
positive correlated resource use counters and strongly positive correlated message
types. Our objective is to identify the earliest hour of change in the system behaviour
by identifying the hour containing the highest variance.
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7.1.2 Error Cases Identified by CORRMEXT
We applied CORRMEXT on the resource use data and system logs collected on
Ranger and Lonestar4. There are no system logs available on Stampede-1. Because of
this, we applied CORRMEXT only on the resource use data collected on Stampede-1
and focus on the system logs that are available on Ranger and Lonestar4. We
obtained the correlation reports that CORRMEXT has generated. We used the
correlation reports to identify the error cases. We identified seven different error
cases on Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1. The error cases are: (i) network data
and networking software errors, (ii) filesystem, Linux process and software errors, (iii)
file access and Linux process errors, (iv) Linux process errors and system memory
exhaustion, (v) NUMA memory allocation and Linux software memory leaks, (vi)
communication and filesystem I/O errors, and (vii) chipset and ECC memory errors.
A summary of the error cases and their associated system components is given in
Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: List of error cases identified on Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1.
HPC system Component Error
Lonestar4, Infiniband network Network data &
Stampede-1 software errors
Lonestar4, Storage system & Filesystem, process
Stampede-1 Linux processes & software errors
Ranger Linux virtual memory 1. File access &
& hard disk process errors
2. Process errors &
memory exhaustion
Ranger NUMA & memory Memory allocation
allocation & memory leaks
Ranger Lustre filesystem I/O & Communication &
Infiniband file-system I/O errors
Ranger Chipset & ECC memory Chipset & memory errors
Network Data and Networking Software Errors
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing network problems through: (i)
correlations between Infiniband and compute node network resource use counters,
and (ii) correlations between DNS lookup failures and FTP software failures. The
Infiniband and compute node network resource use counters record various activities
on the network ranging from the amount of network data received to the number
of data packets dropped and data frame errors. When data errors occur on the
network, the correlations between networking resource use counters can be used to
monitor the state of the Infiniband network. On Stampede-1, we found that: (i)
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network data frame errors were strongly positive correlated to network data received
on 26 out of 28 dates during February 2017, and (ii) network data CRC errors were
strongly positive correlated to network data received on 26 out of 28 dates also
during February 2017. This represented 92% of the dates that network data errors
occurred. On Lonestar4, we found that: (i) network data frame errors were strongly
positive correlated to network data packets received on 24 out of 26 dates during
February 2013, and (ii) network data CRC errors were strongly positive correlated
to network data packets received on 24 out of 26 dates also during February 2013.
This represented 92% of the dates that network data errors occurred.
A DNS lookup failure occurred when a networking software attempted to
identify a destination node on the network but the DNS server was incorrectly
configured. On Lonestar4, we found that DNS lookup failure messages were strongly
positive correlated to GSIFTP software error messages on six dates during February
2013. The correlated DNS lookup failures and GSIFTP software errors occurred
on the same dates when network data errors also occurred. On three out of the
six dates, the DNS lookup failure led to the GSIFTP software crash. However on
all six dates, we found that the DNS lookup failure and GSIFTP software errors
were weakly correlated to compute node soft lockups. Therefore, the DNS lookup
failure and GSIFTP software errors did not cause a compute node to crash. This
represented a recovery rate of 100%.
Filesystem, Linux Process and Software Errors
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing filesystem problems through:
(i) correlations between harddisk, Lustre filesystem and Linux process resource use
counters, and (ii) correlations between Linux process, Lustre filesystem and software
errors. The harddisk, filesystem and Linux process resource use counters record
various activities on the disk, filesystem and operating system ranging from the
number of inodes allocated to the number of disk sectors written and Linux processes
created. When a Linux process access the harddisk, the correlations between the
harddisk, filesystem and Linux process resource use counters can be used to monitor
the state of the storage and filesystem. On Stampede-1, we found that harddisk,
filesystem and Linux process resource use counters were strongly positive correlated
on 27 dates during February 2017. On Lonestar4, we found that: (i) filesystem and
Linux process resource use counters were strongly positive correlated on 19 dates,
(ii) filesystem and harddisk resource use counters were strongly positive correlated
on 18 dates, and (iii) harddisk and Linux process resource use counters were strongly
positive correlated on 24 dates.
A filesystem I/O error occurred when a harddisk degrades over time and star-
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ted to fail. On Lonestar4, we found a strong positive correlation between filesystem
I/O and Linux process errors and the errors were strongly positive correlated to
compute node soft lockup on one out of six dates. This represented a failure rate of
17%. On five more dates, we found a strong positive correlation between filesystem
I/O and Linux process errors and the errors were weakly correlated to compute node
soft lockups. The correlated filesystem I/O, Linux process errors and compute node
soft lockups coincided with the dates that harddisk, Lustre filesystem and Linux
process resource use counters were strongly positive correlated. On five of the six
dates, the filesystem I/O and Linux process errors did not cause a compute node to
crash. This represented a recovery rate of 83%.
File Access and Linux Process Errors
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing file-access problems through:
(i) correlations of harddisk and virtual memory resource use counters, and (ii)
correlations of file access and Linux process errors. The harddisk and virtual memory
resource use counters record various activities on the harddisk and virtual memory
system ranging from the number of disk sectors written to the number of major
page faults. When Linux uses the harddisk as memory due to low main memory, the
correlations between harddisk and virtual memory resource use counters can be used
to monitor the state of the system memory. On Ranger, we found that: (i) harddisk
I/O and major page faults were strongly positive correlated on 25 dates, and (ii)
file access errors were strongly correlated to compute node soft lockups on eight
out of eight dates. The correlated file access errors and compute node soft lockups
coincided with the dates that harddisk I/O and major page faults were strongly
positive correlated. On all eight dates, file access errors led to a compute node crash.
This represented a failure rate of 100%.
Linux Process Errors and System Memory Exhaustion
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing system memory problems
through: (i) correlations of harddisk and virtual memory resource use counters,
and (ii) correlations of Linux process and system memory exhaustion errors. The
harddisk and virtual memory resource use counters record various activities on the
harddisk and virtual memory system ranging from the number of disk sectors written
to the number of major page faults. When Linux uses the harddisk as memory
due to low main memory, the correlations between harddisk and virtual memory
resource use counters can be used to monitor the state of the system memory. On
Ranger, we found that: (i) harddisk I/O and major page faults were strongly positive
correlated on 25 dates, and (ii) Linux process and system memory exhaustion errors
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were strongly correlated on two dates. The correlated Linux process and system
memory exhaustion errors were also strongly positive correlated to compute node
soft lockups on the two dates. All the dates of the correlated Linux process, system
memory exhaustion errors and compute node soft lockups coincided with the dates
that harddisk I/O and major page faults were correlated. On two out of the two
dates, Linux process and system memory exhaustion errors led to a compute node
crash. This represented a failure rate of 100%.
NUMA Memory Allocation and Linux Software Memory Leaks
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing memory allocation and application
memory leak through: (i) correlations of NUMA and Linux process resource use
counters, and (ii) correlations of Linux software memory leaks. The NUMA and
Linux process resource use counters record node memory allocation activities based
on a Linux process request. When a node runs out of memory, the correlations
between NUMA and Linux process resource use counters can be used to monitor the
state of memory allocation in the system. On Ranger, we found that: (i) NUMA and
Linux process resource use counters were strongly positive correlated on 25 dates,
and (ii) segmentation fault and general protection error messages were strongly
positive correlated on 10 dates. All the dates of the correlated segmentation fault
and general protection errors coincided with the dates that NUMA and Linux process
resource use counters were correlated. We found that the correlated segmentation
fault and general protection errors were strongly positive correlated to compute node
soft lockups on 2 of the 10 dates. On the two dates, segmentation fault and general
protection errors led to a compute node crash. This represented a failure rate of
20%. On 8 of the 10 dates, the correlated segmentation fault and general protection
errors were weakly correlated to compute node soft lockups – segmentation fault and
general protection errors did not lead to a compute node crash. This represented a
recovery rate of 80%.
Communication and Filesystem I/O Errors
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing communication and filesystem
errors through: (i) correlations of Lustre filesystem I/O and Infiniband resource use
counters, and (ii) correlations of Lustre filesystem and communication errors. The
Lustre filesystem I/O and Infiniband resource use counters record filesystem and
network traffic activities. When the network and filesystem are heavily used, the
correlations between network data error and filesystem I/O resource use counters
can be used to monitor the state of the networked filesystem. On Ranger, we found
that: (i) Infiniband network packet drop and Lustre I/O resource use counters were
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strongly positive correlated on 24 dates, and (ii) communication and filesystem
errors were strongly positive correlated on 11 dates. All the dates of correlated
communication and filesystem errors coincided with the dates of correlated network
packet drop and Lustre I/O resource use counters. On 2 of the 11 dates, the correlated
communication and filesystem errors were strongly positive correlated to compute
node soft lockups. On the 2 dates, communication and filesystem errors led to a
compute node crash. This represented a failure rate of 18%. On 9 of the 11 dates, the
correlated communication and filesystem errors were weakly correlated to compute
node soft lockups. On the 9 dates, communication and filesystem errors did not lead
to a compute node crash. This represented a recovery rate of 81%.
Chipset and ECC Memory Errors
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing memory errors through: (i)
correlations of CPU and memory resource use counters, and (ii) correlations of
chipset and ECC errors. The CPU and memory resource use counters record various
activities ranging from user and system CPU usage to active and inactive memory
usage. When the CPU and memory are heavily used, the correlations between CPU
and memory resource use counters can be used to monitor the state of the CPU and
memory system. On Ranger, we found that: (i) user and system CPU and active
and inactive memory resource use counters were strongly positive correlated on 13
dates, and (ii) chipset and ECC errors were strongly positive correlated on 26 dates.
All the dates of correlated CPU and memory resource use counters coincided with
the dates of correlated chipset and ECC errors. On all the 26 dates, chipset and
ECC errors were weakly correlated to compute node soft lockups – chipset and ECC
errors did not lead to a compute node crash. This represented a recovery rate of
100%.
7.2 EXERMEST Failure Diagnosis Framework
In this section, we summarise the EXERMEST failure diagnosis framework and
describe the list of error cases.
7.2.1 Introduction
We developed the EXERMEST framework to identify the significant resource use
counters and system events associated with rare error cases. By significant, we
mean the resource use counters and system events assigned the highest scores by the
feature extractors. EXERMEST used the resource use data matrices and message
types data matrices. It is based on the data matrices that are generated from
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TACC Stats [17] resource usage monitor, Rationalized message logs [36] and Syslogs
[40]. EXERMEST evaluated multiple feature extraction methods. We implemented
an approach (EXERMEST) that has two phases. The two phases of the approach
are:
• Extracting the significant resource use counters and system events by applying
different feature extraction methods.
• Correlating the significant resource use counters to other resource use counters
and correlating the significant system events to other system events by applying
different correlation algorithms.
The EXERMEST framework is composed of two modules. The two modules
are: (i) Feature Extraction, and (ii) Correlation. When given a list of dates,
EXERMEST automatically applied the Feature Extraction and Correlation modules
on the resource use data and message types data matrices. Next, we summarise the
two modules within the EXERMEST framework.
EXERMEST: Feature Extraction
The Feature Extraction module receives as its input, a resource use counters data
matrix and message types data matrix. In the resource use counters data matrix
a resource use counter is represented by one row, a time-bin is represented by one
column and the count for the resource use counter at a time-bin is represented by
one cell in the data matrix. In the message types data matrix, a message type is
represented by one row, a time-bin is represented by one column and the count
for the message type at a time-bin is represented by one cell in the data matrix.
The Feature Extraction module currently process three different time-bins of data
matrices. The time-bins are 10 minutes, 30 minutes and 1 hour.
Currently, our Feature Extraction module evaluated three different feature
extraction methods. The feature extraction methods are: (i) Principal Component
Analysis (PCA), (ii) Independent Component Analysis (ICA), and (iii) Non-linear
Principal Component Analysis (NLPCA). Our objective for applying different feature
extraction methods is to identify different patterns of significant resource use counters
and message types. We used PCA and ICA to extract the resource use counters and
message types that follow a linear uncorrelated pattern. We used NLPCA to extract
the resource use counters and message types that follow a non-linear uncorrelated
pattern.
We implemented a process to extract the significant resource use counters
and message types. The process is as follows: First, we extracted the scores of the
supplied data on the first principal component and obtain three sets of scores by
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PCA, ICA and NLPCA. Second, we sorted the scores by PCA, ICA and NLPCA in
descending order. Third, we extracted the top 5% of the scores by PCA, ICA and
NLPCA and obtain three lists of significant resource use counters and three lists of
significant message types.
EXERMEST: Correlation
The Correlation module received as its input the data matrices as follows: (i) the
resource use data matrix and a smaller data matrix that contains the significant re-
source use counters, and (ii) the message types data matrix and a smaller data matrix
that contains the significant message types. Our Correlation module computed:
• The correlation coefficients between the significant resource use counters and
all the other resource use counters and extracts a smaller set of resource use
counters for analysis.
• The correlation coefficients between the significant message types and all the
other message types and extracts a smaller set of message types for analysis.
Currently, the Correlation module applies two different correlation algorithms.
The correlation algorithms are Pearson correlation and Spearman-Rank correlation.
We used Pearson correlation to identify pairs of resource use counters and pairs of
message types that has a linear relationship. We used Spearman-Rank correlation
to identify pairs of resource use counters and pairs of message types that has a
monotonically increasing relationship. We used the following rules to interpret the
strength of the correlation coefficient [1]: (i) between 0.8 to 1 as strong positive
correlated, (ii) between 0.3 to 0.79 as moderate positive correlated, and (iii) between
0.1 to 0.29 as weak positive correlated.
We applied a standard technique called Fisher’s z-score [67] to test the
significance of all the correlation coefficients. We tested the correlation coefficients
by defining two null hypothesis and two alternate hypothesis. The null hypotheses
are: (i) a pair of resource use counters is weakly positive correlated, and (ii) a pair
of message types is weakly positive correlated. The alternate hypotheses are: (i)
a pair of resource use counters is strongly positive correlated, and (ii) a pair of
message types is strongly positive correlated. We applied the Bonferroni correction
[26] to address the inflation in false positive due to multiple independent tests. We
addressed the inflation in false positive by multiplying the P -value by the number of
tests.
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7.2.2 Error Cases Identified by EXERMEST
We applied EXERMEST on the resource use data and system logs collected on
Ranger and Lonestar4. We obtained the features and correlation reports generated
by EXERMEST. We used the reports to identify the rare error cases. All the error
cases are different. The error cases are: (i) network packet drop and Lustre I/O
errors, (ii) CPU I/O bottleneck and Lustre client eviction, (iii) virtual memory and
harddisk I/O errors, and (iv) data and network synchronisation errors. A summary
of the error cases and their associated system components is given in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: List of rare error cases on Ranger and Lonestar4.
Ranger
Components Error Date
Infiniband & Lustre network, Network packet July 5
Lustre filesystem drops & Lustre I/O
CPU, harddisk & CPU I/O bottleneck & July 15
Lustre filesystem Lustre client eviction
Memory management, Virtual memory & July 25
harddisk & Lustre harddisk I/O
Lonestar4
Components Error Date
Memory, Linux threads Data & network March 1
& Lustre network synchronisation
Network Packet Drop and Lustre I/O Error
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing buffer overflow on a network
card through: (i) correlation of significant Infiniband network packet drop to Lustre
network packet drop and Lustre I/O resource use counters and correlation of sig-
nificant Lustre write bytes to Lustre network packet drop and Lustre I/O resource
use counters, and (ii) correlation of significant Linux kernel I/O function calls to
Lustre I/O and Lustre communication errors. When network data transmission error
occurred due to a network card buffer overflow, the correlated Infiniband, Lustre
network and Lustre I/O resource use counters can be used to monitor the state of
the Infiniband, Lustre network and filesystem.
We identified Infiniband network packet drop and Lustre write bytes as
significant resource use counters on Ranger. We found that: (i) the significant
Infiniband network packet drop resource use counter was only identified by NLPCA,
and (ii) the significant Lustre write bytes resource use counter was only identified by
PCA and ICA. Further, we found that the significant resource use counters were only
identified on the data matrix of 10 minute time-bins. We identified two Linux kernel
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I/O function calls as significant system events. We found that the two Linux kernel
I/O function calls were only identified by NLPCA. Further, we found that both
function calls were only identified on the data matrix of 1 hour time-bins. Our results
showed that: (i) we require different feature extractors for identifying the significant
resource use counters, and (ii) we require time-bins of different granularities for
identifying the significant resource use counters and system events.
CPU I/O Bottleneck and Lustre Client Eviction Error
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing bottlenecks through: (i)
correlations of significant CPU I/O wait to CPU idle, harddisk sectors merged and
NUMA resource use counters and correlations of significant Lustre I/O call to CPU
idle, harddisk sectors merged and NUMA resource use counters, and (ii) correlations
of significant Lustre communication errors to Lustre client eviction events. When a
Lustre filesystem client is evicted due to communication errors, the correlated CPU
I/O wait to CPU idle, harddisk sectors merged and NUMA resource use counters and
correlated Lustre I/O function call to CPU idle, harddisk sectors merged and NUMA
resource use counters can be used to monitor bottlenecks on the CPU, harddisk and
Lustre filesystem.
We identified CPU I/O wait and Lustre I/O function call as significant
resource use counters on Ranger. We found that: (i) both significant resource
use counters were only identified by NLPCA, and (ii) both significant resource
use counters were only identified on the data matrix of 10 minute time-bins. We
identified two Lustre filesystem communication error messages as significant events.
We found that: (i) both significant error messages were only identified by ICA, and
(ii) both significant error messages were only identified on the data matrix of 10
minute time-bins. Our results showed that we require different feature extractors for
identifying the significant resource use counters and error messages.
Virtual Memory and Harddisk I/O Error
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing a virtual memory allocation error
through: (i) correlations of significant page fault to harddisk sectors written, memory
writeback and Lustre write bytes resource use counters and correlations of Lustre
I/O function call to harddisk sectors written, memory writeback and Lustre write
bytes resource use counters, and (ii) correlations of significant Linux kernel memory
management function calls to Linux page fault and soft lockup events. When the
Linux operating system crashed due to insufficient main memory and virtual memory
allocation, the correlated page fault, harddisk sectors written, memory writeback
and Lustre write bytes resource use counters and correlated Lustre I/O function
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call, harddisk sectors written, memory writeback and Lustre write bytes resource
use counters can be used to monitor the state of Linux memory management.
We identified virtual memory page fault and Lustre I/O function call as
significant resource use counters on Ranger. We found that: (i) the virtual memory
page fault resource use counter was only identified by ICA, and (ii) the Lustre I/O
function call resource use counter was only identified by NLPCA. Further, we found
both resource use counters only in the data matrix of 10 minute time-bins. We
identified two Linux memory management function calls as significant system events.
We found that: (i) both function call messages were only identified by NLPCA, and
(ii) both function call messages were only identified on the data matrix of 1 hour
time-bins. Our results showed that: (i) we require different feature extractors for
identifying the significant resource use counters, and (ii) we require time-bins of
different granularities for identifying the significant resource use counters and system
events.
Data and Network Synchronisation Error
In this error case, we gave an example of diagnosing a synchronisation error through:
(i) correlations of significant Linux threads count to memory state resource use
counters and correlations of significant out-of-sync memory data to memory state
resource use counters, and (ii) correlations of significant data synchronisation errors
to communication errors. When data and communication errors occur due to
synchronisation issues on the network and Linux operating system, the correlated
Linux threads count and memory state resource use counters can be used to monitor
the state of data synchronisation on the Linux operating system.
We identified Linux threads count and memory data out-of-sync as significant
resource use counters on Lonestar4. We found that the significant Linux threads
count resource use counter was only identified by NLPCA. Further, it was only
identified on the data matrix of 10 minute time-bins. We found that the memory
data out-of-sync resource use counter was identified by ICA and NLPCA. Further, the
significant memory data out-of-sync resource use counter was identified: (i) only on
the data matrix of 10 minute time-bins by NLPCA, and (ii) only on the data matrix
of 1 hour time-bins by ICA. We identified two synchronisation error messages as
significant system events. We found that one of the significant synchronisation error
message was only identified by NLPCA. Further, it was identified only on the data
matrix of 30 minute time-bins. We found that the second significant synchronisation
error message was only identified by ICA. Further, it was identified on the data
matrices of 10 minute time-bins and 1 hour time-bins. Our results showed that: (i)
we require different feature extractors for identifying the significant resource use
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counters and error messages, and (ii) we require time-bins of different granularities
for identifying the significant resource use counters and error messages.
7.3 Similarities and Differences Between CORRMEXT
and EXERMEST
In this section, we discuss the similarities and differences between the CORRMEXT
and EXERMEST failure diagnosis frameworks. We begin by comparing the methods
within the CORRMEXT and EXERMEST frameworks. Then, we highlight the
types of errors CORRMEXT and EXERMEST were designed to identify. Then, we
highlight the similarities of CORRMEXT and EXERMEST which can help integrate
both workflows.
7.3.1 Features of CORRMEXT and EXERMEST
The CORRMEXT framework integrated the Data Type Extraction, Correlation and
Time-bin Extraction modules. The EXERMEST framework integrated the Feature
Extraction and Correlation modules. A comparison of the functions of CORRMEXT
and EXERMEST is given in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3: Comparing features of the CORRMEXT and EXERMEST frameworks.
Multiple Feature Feature Raw Data
time-bins selection extraction data matrix
CORRMEXT No Yes No Yes Yes
EXERMEST Yes Yes Yes No Yes
We summarise the functions of CORRMEXT that are different to EXER-
MEST:
• It uses the raw resource use data and system logs as input.
• It organises the resource use data and system logs into time-bins of 1 hour.
• It applies supervised methods to select the features to be used for detailed dia-
gnosis. The methods are Pearson correlation and Spearman-Rank correlation.
We summarise the functions of EXERMEST that are different to COR-
RMEXT:
• It uses the resource use data matrices and message types data matrices as
input.
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• It processes resource use data matrices and message types data matrices of
multiple granularities of time-bins.
• It applies unsupervised methods to extract the features for an initial diagnosis.
The methods are PCA, ICA and NLPCA.
7.3.2 Frequent and Rare Error Cases
The CORRMEXT framework identifies error cases that occur frequently and reports
the success and failure of error recovery protocols. The EXERMEST framework
identifies the significant system events and resource use counters to diagnose error
cases that are rare. A summary of the types of error cases is given in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4: Summary of error cases diagnosed using CORRMEXT and EXERMEST.
Multiple components Rare errors Frequent errors
CORRMEXT Yes No Yes
EXERMEST Yes Yes No
From Table 7.4, we observe that the type of error cases CORRMEXT and
EXERMEST identified are different in the following way: (i) the error cases COR-
RMEXT identifies are frequently occurring ones, (ii) the error cases EXERMEST
identifies are rare. Therefore, we can use CORRMEXT to identify error cases
that occur frequently and use EXERMEST to identify error cases that are rare.
Both EXERMEST and CORRMEXT identify errors that occur on multiple system
components.
7.3.3 Integrating EXERMEST and CORRMEXT
From Table 7.3, we observe that CORRMEXT and EXERMEST shared two functions.
The functions are: (i) using correlation to select features for detailed diagnosis,
(ii) using resource use data matrices and message types data matrices to identify
the features which are relevant to the diagnosis of an error. From Table 7.4, we
observe that CORRMEXT and EXERMEST identified errors that occur on multiple
system components. Based on the similarities, a framework which integrates the
CORRMEXT and EXERMEST workflows can be developed. We are implementing
a framework to bring the workflows together.
7.4 Summary
We presented a comparative analysis of the CORRMEXT and EXERMEST failure
diagnosis frameworks. We summarised the Data Type Extraction, Correlation and
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Time-bin Extraction modules used within CORRMEXT and described the list of
error cases. We summarised the Feature Extraction and Correlation modules used
within EXERMEST and described the list of error cases. We discussed the features
of CORRMEXT and EXERMEST and showed that CORRMEXT and EXERMEST
complemented each other through their diagnostics functions.
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Chapter 8
Summary and Future Research
Analysing failures to improve the reliability of HPC systems is important. The
system logs and resource use data that HPC systems generate are a useful source of
information, however the large amount of data presents a significant challenge for
systems diagnosis. In this thesis, we developed two failure diagnosis frameworks. We
implemented the Data Type Extraction, Feature Extraction, Correlation and Time-
bin Extraction modules. We integrated the Data Type Extraction, Correlation and
Time-bin Extraction modules into the framework called CORRMEXT. It identified
frequently occurring error cases and reported the success and failure of error recovery
protocols. We integrated the Feature Extraction and Correlation modules into
the framework called EXERMEST. It extracted the significant system events and
resource use counters associated with rare error cases.
We structure the remainder of this chapter as follows: In Section 8.1, we
summarise the contribution of Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. In Section 8.2, we provide
a number of suggestions for future research.
8.1 Summary of Chapters
The introductory chapters in this thesis are: (i) Introduction (Chapter 1), (ii) Review
of cluster log-files data processing tools (Chapter 2), and (iii) Define the research
problem, describe the HPC systems and log-data (Chapter 3). The contribution
chapters in this thesis are: (i) The CORRMEXT framework (Chapters 4 and 5), and
(ii) The EXERMEST framework (Chapter 6).
In Chapter 2, we presented a detailed survey of system log-file processing
tools. We showed that most of the tools were comprised of two main activities. The
first activity tokenised system log messages by extracting sequences of English-only
words in the free form text of the textual message logs. The second activity applied
a method to measure the similarity between system log messages. Further, we
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showed that the method implemented by the tools can be grouped into five different
categories.
In Chapter 3, we described the system model, fault model and system issues,
introduced the Ranger, Lonestar4 and Stampede-1 HPC systems operated by the
Texas Advanced Computing Center, described the TACC Stats resource use data,
Rationalized message logs and Syslogs, and gave the implementation details for the
Resource Use Data and Message Types Data preprocessing modules.
In Chapter 4, we presented the CORRMEXT framework that processed both
the resource use data and system logs to identify: (i) frequently occurring error
cases, and (ii) report the success and failure of error recovery protocols. We applied
CORRMEXT on the TACC Stats resource use data and Rationalized message logs on
the Ranger HPC system. CORRMEXT diagnosed five error cases and extracted the
variance in the times of the correlated resource use counter groups and correlated error
groups to identify the earliest occurrences of the problem. To ensure diagnostics
accuracy, CORRMEXT used the Bonferroni correction and showed that all the
correlations are significant. The main technical contribution of the chapter is a
new failure diagnostics framework that integrated resource use data and system
log-preprocessing, multiple correlation methods and time-bins extraction.
In Chapter 5, we applied CORRMEXT on multiple HPC systems. COR-
RMEXT generated the analyses focused on the correlated groups of resource use
counters and correlated groups of errors. It confirmed the findings reported in
Chapter 4 and identified three different error cases and one resource usage activity
case. To ensure diagnostics accuracy, we showed that all the correlations would not
be observed under the null hypothesis.
In Chapter 6, we presented the EXERMEST framework for diagnosing rare
error cases on multiple HPC systems. EXERMEST used the resource use data
matrices and message types data matrices in its analyses. It evaluated three different
feature extraction methods. EXERMEST identified four different error cases on two
HPC systems. EXERMEST used the Bonferroni correction to ensure the accuracy of
the diagnoses and showed that all the correlations would not be observed under the
null hypothesis. The main technical contribution of the chapter is a new workflow that
integrated multiple feature extraction methods and multiple correlation methods.
In Chapter 7, we presented a comparative analysis of the CORRMEXT
and EXERMEST failure diagnosis frameworks. We summarised the Data Type
Extraction, Correlation and Time-bin Extraction modules used within CORRMEXT
and provided the list of error cases. We summarised the Feature Extraction and
Correlation modules used within EXERMEST and provided the list of error cases.
We discussed the various functions in CORRMEXT and EXERMEST and showed
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that they complement one another by identifying their similarities.
8.2 Future Research
In this section, we provide a number of suggestions for future research.
8.2.1 Preventive Maintenance
The groups of correlated resource use counters and groups of correlated errors
(presented in Chapters 4 and 5) raise an interesting point for discussion on further
work. A detailed analysis of spatial failures on a large HPC system was presented
in [29]. The authors used the analyses to improve the performance of applications
running on the Titan supercomputer at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. They
proposed a novel scheme that exploited the spatial characteristics of system failures.
In contrast to the analyses presented in [29], we argue that the CORRMEXT
framework focuses on the problem specification described in Section 4.2.2, i.e., we
seek to correlate groups of resource use counters and correlate groups of errors by
time-bins. We know that network data and networking software errors, file access
errors and process messages, process errors and system memory exhaustion, and
filesystem, Linux process and software errors can be identified using hour-based
correlation analysis. A potential thread for future research is to integrate location
and time-based analysis approaches to relate system processes to new error cases.
This will lead to an interesting application where the diagnoses can be used as part
of a preventive maintenance regime. Here, the goal is to identify small problems and
fix them before they become a major problem.
8.2.2 Extension to Distributed Systems
The HPC systems presented in Chapter 3 raise an interesting point for discussion on
further work. The CORRMEXT framework does not process system logs generated
on distributed systems but CORRMEXT’s data type extractor was designed to work
on system logs that contain only three fields (timestamp, node and message). We
argue that this pertains to the case study systems, i.e., we identify the error cases on
HPC systems. Having said that, we can apply CORRMEXT’s data type extractor to
process system logs generated on distributed systems, for example: Hadoop system
logs. We can integrate distributed log-analysis frameworks, for example: DILAF [2]
with CORRMEXT. A potential thread for future research is to extend CORRMEXT
to diagnose errors on distributed systems.
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8.2.3 Failure Prediction
The error cases presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 raise an interesting point for
discussion on further work. The EXERMEST and CORRMEXT frameworks do not
infer actual root cause of system failures but it is done with the aid of a system
administrator. We argue that this pertains to the fault model described in Section
6.2.1, i.e., we identify errors without prior knowledge of fault models. There is no
prediction model. Therefore, we focus on system diagnosis. Having said that, we can:
(i) use the error cases identified by EXERMEST and (ii) use the frequently occurring
error cases identified by CORRMEXT to predict when those errors are likely to occur
in the future. We can integrate online failure prediction frameworks, for example:
the reference in [52], failure prediction techniques described in [59] with EXERMEST
and CORRMEXT. Integrating EXERMEST and CORRMEXT with an online failure
prediction framework and error detection method, for example: CRUDE [34] will
expand it into the error prediction and detection phases. A potential thread for
future research is to develop an unsupervised approach to identify which resource
use counter and system event are good predictors for the error cases.
8.2.4 Feature Selection and Optimisation
The Correlation module implemented in CORRMEXT raises an interesting point
for further work. CORRMEXT generated the correlation reports which is manually
scanned to extract the resource use counters and system errors for diagnosing an
error case. We argue that this pertains to the problem specification described in
Section 4.2.2, i.e., we seek to correlate groups of resource use counters and correlate
groups of errors by time-bins. Having said that, we can integrate feature extraction
with correlation, for example: in EXERMEST (see Chapter 6). We can also integrate
correlation-based feature selection techniques, for example: the reference in [43] with
CORRMEXT. A potential thread for future research is to develop a correlation-based
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